

MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: AN APPROACH FOR THE
21ST CENTURY

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By Allison Atieh

ABSTRACT

The emergence of a new world order, which resulted from the collapse of the Cold War, has raised expectations about the potential for peacekeeping to play a major role in addressing threats to international peace and security. Peacekeeping operations have multiplied considerably in recent years, and as conflicts arise, the international community and regional organizations find themselves drawn into ever more challenging and long drawn-out efforts to oversee and assist in the implementation of peace agreements.

For the past decade, African conflicts have been characterized by the combination of internal and international conflict with serious human rights violations and large scale suffering among the civilian population. Dealing with conflict in Africa is on the front-burner of the United Nations, but in order to be effective in its actions it is necessary for the UN to transform its traditional approach to peacekeeping into a multilateral effort.

This thesis proposes that there should be a three-tiered approach to international peacekeeping in Africa. First, there should be a powerful, cohesive multinational force(MNF) approved by the Security Council but under the command of a member state that is authorized to take coercive action if necessary. Once the conflict has ended and there is a cease-fire agreement between warring parties, the United Nations should take the reigns from the MNF in a smooth and seamless transition with little visible changes on the ground. The most important element of this three-tiered approach is the role of regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity(OAU). These

organizations can be an integral part of the peace enforcement stage and work in coordination with the MNF and then help to promote long-term stability by collaborating with the UN on peacekeeping and peace building efforts.

Through an examination of three case studies on peacekeeping in Africa in the 1990s, this thesis will discuss the roles of the UN, individual states and regional organizations in peace operations. By looking at the respective roles of these international actors in Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia and the subsequent resulting lessons on how to make peacekeeping more effective, this thesis posits a multilateral approach to peacekeeping in Africa tailored to conflicts in the 21st century.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis, and the hours of hard work that came with it, to international peacekeepers worldwide. Whether affiliated with the United Nations, regional organizations or individual states, it is the devotion of peacekeepers to ameliorating conflict and promoting peace that makes for a more stable and just international system. I commend them on the hard and exhausting job they do and honor them for all the lives saved and suffering alleviated under their watch.

INTRODUCTION:

The emergence of a new world order, which resulted from the collapse of the Cold War, has raised expectations about the potential for peacekeeping to play a major role in addressing threats to international peace and security. It seems the emerging norm that international intervention is justified, sometimes trumping traditional conceptions of sovereignty. These transformations are indicative of the changing nature of international relations and the need for more effective international peacekeeping. Since the inception of United Nations peacekeeping in 1948, there have been many changes in the nature of international conflicts and thus alters the manner in which these conflicts need to be addressed. The world has witnessed a shift from interstate conflict to intrastate conflict fueled by ethnic, religious and historical tensions. Fighting between warring parties is now taking place within the borders of a single country, making traditional methods of ameliorating international conflict obsolete. Intrastate conflicts are occurring in every corner of the globe, from Europe to Asia. These conflicts are most prevalent in Africa, where a large number of states are currently experiencing internal strife, oftentimes drawing neighboring countries into the fighting. It is a region of the world that has garnered much of the world's attention in the last few decades with such incidents as the civil war in Somalia and genocide in Rwanda. These conflicts are tearing at the very roots of the continent and threaten to crumble fragile state systems and destroy regional relations. Aiding in conflict resolution is a way the international community can help to stabilize the situation in Africa and bring peace to a war-torn area of the world.

PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

The international community faces a problem of effective intervention into complex conflicts in Africa that demand efforts at amelioration; the obstacles being conceptual, contextual, political and practical in nature. There is an unfortunate lack of political will and public support to resolve that plague the continent. Promises of financial aid and resources are rarely fulfilled by Western nations, considering the temperamental nature of commitments to Africa.

African conflicts have been characterized by the combination of internal and international discord with serious human rights violations and large-scale suffering among the threatened civilian population. The international community tends to focus on the symptoms of these conflicts, such as genocide and armed combat between parties, instead of addressing the underlying causes. There is also a hesitation on the part of the international community to get involved due to the internal nature of conflicts and the ensuing debate on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state. It is necessary to transform peacekeeping in Africa to suit the changing nature of conflicts and in doing so become effective in bringing peace to the region.

A PROBABLE SOLUTION

Dealing with intrastate conflict in Africa is on the front-burner for the UN, but in order for the organization to be effective it is necessary to transform its traditional approach to peacekeeping into a multi-lateral effort encompassing regional organizations and member states. Traditional notions of peacekeeping insist that there be a cease-fire agreement in existence between warring parties and that the host country's government invites in the UN. This method of peacekeeping needs to be tailored in order to

accommodate the intrastate conflicts in Africa, where often there is no stable government running a country.

This thesis proposes that there should be a three-tiered approach to international peace operations in Africa. First, there should be a powerful, cohesive multinational force approved by the Security Council but under the command of a member state that is authorized to take coercive action to help end the conflict. This combat force is necessary due the nature of many intrastate conflicts in Africa, where a cease-fire agreement is difficult to negotiate and even harder to adhere to. The warring parties are oftentimes rebel groups or religious factions or militant sects of a government or army, all of which refuse to concede to traditional notions of conflict resolution. For example, in Sierra Leone there was a cease-fire agreement in effect when the rebel group, the RUF, decided to take over 200 UN peacekeepers hostage. This was possible because the peacekeepers were lightly armed and ill prepared to take even defensive action to protect themselves, let alone the civilians of Sierra Leone. Such incidents call for a multinational peacekeeping force that has the ability to enforce a stable peace and protect innocent civilians within the conflicted territory.

Once the conflict within the state has ended and there is a peace between the warring parties, the United Nations should take the reigns from the multinational force(MNF) and establish a mission to aid in keeping the peace. At this stage it is necessary to address the root causes of the conflict and work on developing the infrastructure and institutions within the deteriorated states. It is inherent that the transition from the MNF to the UN mission be seamless and show little visible change to those on the ground. The purpose of the mission is to help begin the transition to build long-term peace and stability within the country. This includes overseeing the

improvement of infrastructure, assisting with the coordination of development work, stabilizing the humanitarian situation and assuring that the environment is not prone to future conflict. An example is the presence of the U.S.-led MNF and United Nations in Haiti. The United States sent in a combat force, sanctioned by the UN, that under Chapter VII of the UN Charter had the ability to use force if necessary in order to secure the environment and unseat the military junta. Once this phase was complete, the UN set up a peacekeeping mission that focused on peace-building by instituting democratic institutions and supervising elections. The MNF had stabilized the country and allowed for the peacekeepers to perform their duties as outlined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. This tactic, utilized in the South American conflicts, would be beneficial in addressing conflicts in Africa.

The most important element of this approach is the role of regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity(OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS). There is the necessity to involve regional organizations in order to promote long-term security within the area. They can be an integral part of the peace enforcement stage and work in coordination with the multinational force. There is a need to develop a common concept, guidelines and doctrine for participation of these regional organizations in peace operations. Once the fighting has ceased and the environment is stable enough for UN peacekeepers to take over under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the role of regional organizations should be altered. The OAU and ECOWAS should encourage the coordination of local NGOs and grassroots movements and involve the people in rebuilding their torn nation. The UN should collaborate with regional organizations on development procedures and peace-building endeavors. An effort orchestrated by Africans to help other Africans will allow the entire region to

become more stable as interstate relationships are improved, which will lead to less conflicts in the future.

Through an examination of three case studies on peacekeeping in Africa in the 1990s, this thesis will discuss the roles of the UN, individual states and regional organizations in peace operations. By looking at the respective roles of these international actors in Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia and the resulting lessons on how to make peacekeeping more effective, this thesis posits an approach to peacekeeping in Africa tailored to conflicts in the 21st century.

ORGANIZATIONAL FORMAT OF THESIS

Chapter One of this thesis will address peacekeeping as it is defined in the post-Cold War era. The end of the Cold War has created numerous opportunities for the Security Council and individual states to take action in the settlement of a number of conflicts once considered off-limits. It will also look at peacekeeping in the context of international law by examining provisions of the UN Charter. With an increase in the number of peacekeeping operations has come an expansion of traditional mandates and goals of peacekeeping, thus necessitating new interpretations of the Charter. The new ambitious operations are challenging the old rules and paving the way for more effective and active intervention. This chapter will offer a comprehensive look at peacekeeping today and provide a base for the reader to later understand the specific nature of such missions in Africa.

Chapter two will offer a typology of modern African conflicts that have occurred since 1990. It is necessary to understand the nature of African conflicts in order to comprehend the type of peacekeeping missions that will be successful in ameliorating

those conflicts. This typology is constructed under six main issues that will provide a simplified map of the seemingly incomprehensible amalgam of conflicts in Africa. It is my hope that the increased comprehension of these conflicts will in turn enhance the readers' concerns over the challenges of peace and security in Africa. This chapter also addresses the problem of the nature of African conflicts by highlighting some of the deep-rooted underlying causes, such as ethnic tensions and underdeveloped infrastructure.

Chapter three will explore the role of the United Nations in peacekeeping missions. By examining the civil conflict in Rwanda, this chapter analyzes the role of the UN and from that proposes 'lessons learned' that can be applied to future UN missions. This section of the thesis also discusses the role of the OAU and the French-led *Operation Turquoise*, especially in regard to their respective collaborative efforts with the UN.

Chapter four will focus on the role that individual member states play in peacekeeping. The case study of Somalia illustrates the involvement of the U.S.-led United Force(UNITAF) and its actions of coercive intervention, authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This case study helps illuminate errors in current peace enforcement missions and puts forth suggestions on how to be more effective in future conflicts.

Chapter five will address the role of regional organizations in peacekeeping missions. By studying the role of ECOWAS in Liberia, this case study illustrates why traditional methods of peacekeeping are becoming obsolete, thus making way for systems of regional security and stability. This chapter stresses the significance of the ECOMOG

peace operations and proposes ways to make regional-based peace operations, albeit peacekeeping, peace enforcement or peace-building missions, more capable.

Chapter six is a culmination of material discussed in previous chapters and sets forth a three-tiered multilateral approach to peace operations. This approach is tailored to the 21st century in that is specifically geared towards intrastate conflict and calls for heavy involvement of regional organizations. This chapter outlines the roles of the UN, states and regional organizations in peace operations and establishes a formula that will indoctrinate conditions for peace operations into the international system. This section also stresses the need for a peace-building phase, which promotes development of human resources and infrastructure to ensure long-lasting peace and stability.

CHAPTER ONE: THE UN CHARTER AND PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Peacekeeping operations have multiplied considerably in recent years, and as conflicts arise, the international community and regional organizations find themselves drawn into ever more challenging and long drawn-out efforts to oversee and assist in the implementation of peace agreements.¹ The bulk of peacekeeping missions are headed by the United Nations, which has developed one of the major innovations of the twentieth century in international conflict management. For over fifty years, UN personnel have attempted to restore and preserve the peace in almost a dozen conflicts that span the globe. The chapter discusses three primary topics. First, it examines specific provisions of the UN Charter that apply to conflict resolution. The subsequent section looks at

¹ Oliver Furley and Roy May, eds. "Introduction" in *Peacekeeping in Africa* (Sydney: Ashgate, 1998), p. 4

different terms and definitions associated with peace operations. The final section of the chapter looks at peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era through application of the 1992 *Agenda for Peace* and the *Brahimi Report*; both are evaluations on the strengths and weaknesses of peace operations in the post-Cold War era. The *Brahimi Report* is indicative of Secretary-General Kofi Annan's outlook on peacekeeping missions and sets goals that, if achieved, will alter the face of peacekeeping.

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER PROVISIONS

The Charter of the United Nations states that a primary purpose of the organization, as enumerated in Article I, is to "maintain international peace and security...and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace."² In systems of collective security, states "form an international organization and pledge, long in advance of any particular conflict, to act collectively to defeat any aggressor state, irrespective of that state's character or geographic location."³ At first glance, this definition seems to fit the United Nations, which attempts to maintain international peace and security through joint action. However, the Security Council has special power and can unilaterally cancel collective action by vetoing a proposed multilateral response. Therefore, the United Nations is not truly a system of collective security, but has produced an effective alternative to global conflict management, which is outlined in chapters VI-VIII of the Charter.

² *Charter of the United Nations, Article I(1)*, 1945

³ Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, *International Law and the Use of Force* (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 51.

These chapters of the Charter form the institutional cornerstones of the UN approach to conflict resolution. Chapter VI(Articles 33-38) establishes the premises for the peace settlement of international disputes. Article 33 requires states to resolve disputes which could "endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."⁴ This article stresses that conflicts be resolved peacefully through such means as mediation, negotiation, and arbitration. Chapter VI also permits the Security Council to investigate disputes and to recommend procedures for resolving disputes.

If Chapter VI measures fail and the conflict is not resolved, then the Security Council turns to Chapter VII for guidance. Chapter VII is entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." This chapter enables the Security Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and [then] make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken."⁵ Articles 40-42 of Chapter VII suggest that the measures must not include the use of force, unless economic sanctions or severance of diplomatic relations are unsuccessful.

Chapter VIII, which establishes the nature of the UN's relationship to regional organizations, also touches on the use of force under UN auspices. Under this chapter, the Security Council may commission regional organizations to assist the UN in the implementation of military sanctions. It is important to note that the provision contains an important restriction. Regional organizations cannot unilaterally undertake enforcement actions without prior authorization from the Security Council. This

⁴ *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter VI(33), 1945

⁵ *Ibid*, Chapter VII(39), 1945

restriction on the use of force is integral in the case study of ECOWAS and Liberia, which helps to illustrate the role regional organizations play in peace operations.

Chapters VI-VIII of the Charter outline the UN's manner of conflict resolution, but fail to specifically address the issue of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations were "not originally envisaged in the Charter as among measures to preserve world peace; they are a purely empirical creation born of necessity...the term 'peacekeeping' gained currency in the 1960's."⁶ The UN peacekeeping operations are provisional measures that the Organization may take to prevent aggravation of a conflict situation. They can stop and contain hostilities but cannot resolve the political problems underlying the conflict. The next section explains the meaning of peacekeeping and associated efforts, such as peace enforcement and peace-building.

DEFINITIONS OF PEACE OPERATIONS

The term peacekeeping has been used to designate a wide variety of actions aimed at resolving conflict. When applied to the United Nations, the term is narrowly defined with a strict explanation for when peacekeeping is feasible. The UN itself has no established definition of peacekeeping but from its past and present peacekeeping missions, scholars have formulated a concept. For the UN, peacekeeping is the "stationing of neutral, lightly armed troops as an interposition force following a cease-fire to separate combatants and promote an environment suitable for conflict resolution...a pre-requisite is the notion of consent based on a desire by the major

⁶ United Nations Department of Public Information, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, (New York: UN, 1985), p. 3

warring parties for peace."⁷ UN peacekeepers are not authorized to use force, except in self-defense, because peacekeeping troops are not designed to restore order or stop the fighting between warring parties. Other distinguishing features of peacekeeping operations include "limited military capability, neutrality and permission of host country."⁸ The most significant of these is permission of the host country, due to the fact that peacekeeping operations must recognize and respect the sovereignty of states. Thomas Weiss, a scholar of UN peacekeeping, stresses that "no requirement is clearer than the consent of parties in conflict...it is a political and operational imperative."⁹ Even so, there seems to be changing attitudes in the international community on the consent of parties. Conflicts today, such as those in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, illustrate that the host government may be the guilty party or there may be no host government at all. In cases such as these, a more aggressive use of peacekeeping is necessary.

Another definition of peacekeeping, formulated by the International Peace Academy, is much broader and more assertive in nature. The Academy states that peacekeeping is the "prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities, through the medium of peaceful third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace."¹⁰ It is vague in that it does not address the specific situation that peacekeepers can enter into, as did the UN definition, which mandated a stable

⁷ Oliver Furley and Roy May, eds. "Introduction" in *Peacekeeping in Africa* (Sydney: Ashgate, 1998), p. 4

⁸ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1994), p. 7-9

⁹ Thomas Weiss and David Forsythe, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), p. 89

¹⁰ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1994), p.5

environment free of fighting. This definition stresses that the intervention must be peaceful yet at the same time defines peacekeeping as the containment, moderation and termination of hostilities, all of which might require force. Here is where the definition of peacekeeping blends with the term peace enforcement.

Peace enforcement is defined as the "intervention of troops from an external state or states into a situation of conflict with the purpose of imposing peace. There is the absence of consent from the warring factions and it may be synonymous with war fighting."¹¹ 'Mission creep' is an unplanned move from peacekeeping to peacemaking and can be dangerous for the troops involved. General Rose said, "You cannot fight war from white-painted vehicles,"¹² which raises the issue of who is involved in peace enforcement. This thesis proposes that a multinational force(MNF) be responsible for making the peace, in order to create a stable environment and prevent 'mission creep' from occurring to UN missions. Numerous peacekeeping missions have failed because of fragile cease-fire agreements or lack of a host government. In these instances, as soon as peacekeepers entered the picture, the "stable" environment deteriorated into chaos and the peacekeeping troops were in no position to restore order. By having a Security Council-sanctioned MNF to create peace, it will ensure a smooth transition to UN peacekeeping troops who will then be able to uphold the peace.

Peace-building is a term more recent in origin and includes missions which "undertake on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence

¹¹ Oliver Furley and Roy May, eds. "Introduction" in *Peacekeeping in Africa*(Sydney: Ashgate, 1998), p.5

¹² Interview with Lt. Col. P.R. Wilkinson at Coventry University on February 23, 1996 in *Peacekeeping in Africa*, p. 11

of war. These activities included "strengthening the rule of law, improving respect for human rights...and providing technical assistance for democratic development and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques."¹³ Peace-building improves the infrastructure within the war-torn territory and helps to develop institutions that will help ensure a long-lasting peace. This is an integral part of peace operations and one that can be carried out by peacekeeping troops but also by regional organizations. These organizations have a stake in the stability of a certain area of the world and if they play a role in peace-building, relations between nations will improve, thus creating a stable regional environment less prone to conflict.

Peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-building are distinct activities that serve specific purposes in conflict resolution. This thesis sets out a formula that encompasses each of these activities, assigning roles to international organizations, regional organizations and individual member states. Hopefully, by incorporating all three activities into a multilateral effort it will provide a guideline for future peace missions.

PEACEKEEPING IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The fall of Communism was a watershed event that ushered in a new era and triggered feelings of euphoria within the international community. This transformation is indicative of many welcome developments, such as a reduction in East-West tension and diminished threat of nuclear war. However, alongside these positive changes comes an

¹³ *Brahimi Report: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, January 2001, Section II: Doctrine, Strategy and Decision-making for Peace Operations, part A 13.

absence of a stable and definable world order, with many nations suffering from intrastate conflicts. Post-Cold War conflicts are characterized by "ethno-hypernationalism, territorial revanchism and religious hatred...all of which have surged to the fore in Somalia...and Rwanda."¹⁴ In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War many hoped that by "increasing commitments to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, the UN collective security regime might be able to prove capable of intervening in likely future conflicts, including disintegration of states and civil societies."¹⁵

In this new era, the burden of peacekeeping does not only fall to the UN. The number of non-UN peacekeeping missions has increased in recent years, with regional organizations and ad hoc multinational forces playing important roles in ameliorating conflict. These groups are most effective in cases where the Security Council approves a Chapter VII UN mandate, which gives troops the ability to use force in creating a safe environment within the conflicted region. Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the UN, admitted in his *UN Report on Reform* that the "United Nations does not have, at this point in history, the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter VII...the UN still lacks the capacity to implement rapidly and effectively decisions of the Security Council calling for the dispatch of peacekeeping operations in crisis situations."¹⁶ Due to the lack of ability on the part of the UN to carry out Chapter

¹⁴ William Bradford, "International Legal Regimes and the Incidence of Interstate War in the Twentieth Century: A Cursory Quantitative Assessment of the Associative Relationship," in 16 *American University International Law Review*(647, 2001), p. 2

¹⁵David Fidler, "Caught Between Traditions: The Security Council in Philosophical Conundrum," in 17 *Michigan Journal of International Law*(411, 1996), p. 39

¹⁶ Kofi Annan, *UN Report on Reform*, reprinted in "Peacekeeping in Africa: Trends and Responses," by Mark Malan, "Peacekeeping in Africa: Trends and Responses," *Symposium on International Peace and Security: The African Experience*, Institute for Security Studies, September 21-23, 1998, p 4

VII missions, regional organizations and state-led MNFs are needed to take a coercive role in peacekeeping. It is very feasible that regional organizations and MNFs have the capability to be deployed much more rapidly than UN forces, making these missions more effective in crisis situations.

The 1992 *Agenda for Peace* and the 2000 *Brahimi Report* help to outline the role of UN peacekeeping and its coordination with regional organizations and member states. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* discusses the changing nature of peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peace-building in the context of the post-Cold War era. He relates that since the "creation of the UN in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world have left some 20 million dead. The UN was rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises because of the vetoes-279 of them-cast in the Security Council, which were a vivid expression of the divisions of that period."¹⁷ Since 1990, there have been no vetoes on issues regarding peacekeeping and conflict resolution. This development signifies the desire for member states to work together to ameliorate conflict, which will hopefully result in more effective peace operations. Madeleine Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the UN, discussed the challenges of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era in an address to the Security Council in 1995. Ambassador Albright pointed out that "transitions go on for a long time. Certainly we can all hope that the upheavals in global politics triggered by the end of the Cold War a few years ago will soon pass. She also declared that "a new order of international affairs is not just around

¹⁷ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992, p. 3

the corner,"¹⁸ thus it is necessary to try and create stability in regional and international affairs through the containment of conflict.

The *Agenda for Peace* posits that "peacekeeping and peace enforcement are not adjacent points on a continuum."¹⁹ It highlights that a failure within the UN Department of Peacekeeping has been to deploy lightly armed peacekeepers into an unstable environment that necessitated the act of peace enforcement. In this case, the report recommends that there should be mechanisms in place to ensure a secure environment, such as diplomatic proceedings between warring parties, which will prevent the conflict from flaring up again. The *Agenda for Peace* stresses that there should be a logical flow from one type of peace operation to the next. Boutros Boutros-Ghali begins by urging the UN to "identify at an early stage situations that could produce conflict and then through diplomatic measures, remove sources of danger."²⁰ These preventive measures might include confidence-building talks and education in methods of peaceful conflict resolution. If these diplomatic efforts fail and the conflict escalates, peace enforcement might be necessary. Here the report suggests coordination with regional organizations, in hopes that involvement of local organizations will lead to regional stability. A force authorized to use coercive action may be deployed in order to bring a halt to the fighting and to create a stable environment for peacekeepers. The peacekeeping phase will ensure that the cease-fire agreement is adhered to and work to bring order to the worn-torn area. Finally, peace building will begin in the secured

¹⁸ Albright, Madeleine Amb., "Ambassador Albright on Agenda for Peace," U.S. Mission to the UN, US Department of State, January 18, 1995.

¹⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, A/47/277-S/24111, June 17, 1992.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 10.

environment and work to build democratic institutions and develop infrastructure within the region.

The *Agenda for Peace* was generally well-accepted within the UN, except for one recommendation of the Secretary-General. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's suggestion that under Chapter VII(Article 43) all members of the UN "undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement, armed forces, assistance and facilities"²¹ to be used in a rapid reaction force. Most member states, especially the United States, felt that having a force standing by at all times would be a waste of money and may not be that effective, even in crisis situations. Ambassador Albright advised the Security Council that it should continue to look at regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions to meet peace enforcement needs.

The *Agenda for Peace* is very extensive in its scope of addressing peace operations in the post Cold-War era. The report fell short in its ability to explain how the recommendations could be implemented. It especially lacked in its discussion of finances and peacekeeping by laying out broad and ambiguous suggestions on how to allocate funds, glossing over the specific issues that warranted the UN's attention. A document produced eight years after the *Agenda for Peace* picked up where the report left off by addressing the aforementioned issues with clarity and offering specific and detailed solutions to the problems of peacekeeping.

The *Brahimi Report* was produced in 2000 by an independent panel comprised of scholars hand-picked by the current Secretary-General Kofi Annan. It was a multi-national panel given free reign by the UN to fully examine peace operations and make

²¹ *UN Charter*, Chapter VII, Article 43.

suggestions on how to improve them. The panel's study has resulted in the *Brahimi Report*, named in honor of the panel's chairman Lakhdar Brahimi. It is the most insightful and comprehensive examination of UN capabilities and weaknesses and contains the most far-reaching recommendations for reform by the UN system and member states. The *Brahimi* reforms would significantly improve the capability of the UN, working with member states, to prevent the type of internal conflict that has become more ubiquitous in the last decade. However, the difficulties in implementing such reforms are numerous and pose a challenge to the UN Department of Peacekeeping. The success of the *Brahimi Report* rests upon the determination of the Secretary General and heads of other UN agencies who must work to carry out the recommendations.

The *Brahimi Report* discusses the immediate causes of weaknesses in UN conflict prevention and intervention, and goes further to address the underlying reasons. Going beyond peacekeeping as a means of conflict management, the *Brahimi Report* calls for greater and earlier use by the Secretary General of his authority to "deploy fact-finding missions to potential trouble spots well before the situation reaches the crisis stage."²² This recommendation mirrors the preventive diplomacy of the *Agenda for Peace*, and takes it a step further by explaining the exact composition and goals of these missions. When trouble begins to brew, a combined effort of diplomacy and assistance should be mobilized by the UN and interested member states to address the causes rather than wait for the crisis stage when some form of military intervention will be necessitated.

In terms of peacekeeping, the panel concurs that "consent of local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defense should remain bedrock principles of

²² *Brahimi Report: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. October, 2000, Section 1(33), p. 4

peacekeeping...experience shows that in the context of intra-state/transnational conflicts...use of force might be necessary."²³ The panel also emphasizes the need for robust doctrine and realistic mandates that allow "United Nations peacekeepers to carry out their orders professionally and successfully."²⁴

In regards to funding of peace operations, the panel reveals the failure of the UN to allocate sufficient funds for major positions, indicating a weakness in the UN's hierarchical structure. These problems of funding are addressed in the *Resource Requirements for the Implementation of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, a hundred page document that recommends specific allocation of funds to such issue-areas as political affairs and disarmament.

Overall, the *Brahimi Report* stands as a breath of fresh air for UN peace operations, which will shake up the system and make peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era much more effective. The Report is exhaustive in nature and attempts to deal with all the underlying causes of failed missions in the past. This thesis will address the fundamental ideas of the *Brahimi Report* later in the discussion of the case studies and in the final chapter regarding a new approach of peacekeeping for the 21st century.

CHAPTER TWO: A TYPOLOGY OF MODERN AFRICAN CONFLICTS AND THE PROBLEM OF PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

²³ *Ibid*, Section I(48), p.7

²⁴ *Ibid*, Section I(49), p.7-8

In 1990, it seemed reasonable to predict that the end of the Cold War would lead to a reduction in warfare in Africa. Many of the conflicts in Africa during the Cold War had stemmed from an extension of superpower dominance over fragile states in the region. Wars between the East and West, and theoretically between Communism and Democracy, were fought out on African soil, involving the governments and people of the continent in a bipolar struggle. During the Cold War, in "two major regional theatres of warfare, Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, the breadth and duration of local conflicts had been amplified and extended by the external support received by various governments as a consequence of great power rivalries."²⁵ Due to fact that the capacity of African states to wage war was enhanced by Cold War powers, it would seem logical that the incidence of conflicts would diminish in the absence of this support. In truth, African conflicts have become more numerous in the past decade, with most fighting occurring within borders and amongst ethnic groups of one state.

This chapter claims that it is necessary to understand the nature of African conflicts in order to comprehend the type of peacekeeping missions that will be successful in ameliorating those conflicts. The first section of this chapter constructs a typology of Africa's armed conflicts since 1990 under six main issues that will provide a simplified map of the seemingly incomprehensible amalgam of conflicts in Africa. It is my hope that the increased comprehension of these conflicts will in turn enhance the readers' concerns over the challenges of peace and security in Africa. The second section

²⁵ Tom Lodge, "Towards An Understanding of Contemporary Armed Conflicts in Africa," *Symposium on International Peace and Security: The African Experience*, Institute for Security Studies, September 21-23, 1998, p. 1

of this chapter addresses the problems of peacekeeping in Africa in light of these different types of conflict. It seems that the "UN and the rest of the international community face seemingly insurmountable hurdles in trying to bring stability to conflict-ridden African states,"²⁶ with peace operations facing many challenges that prevent the success of these missions. An examination of the types of conflicts in Africa and the consequent problems of peacekeeping will set the stage for the three case studies of Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia in subsequent chapters, which illustrate the challenges faced in resolving intrastate conflicts.

A TYPOLOGY OF MODERN AFRICAN CONFLICTS

The task of constructing a typology can not be too difficult considering the prevalence of intrastate conflicts and the degree to which they interconnected. Tom Lodge in "Towards An Understanding of Contemporary Armed Conflicts in Africa," sets up a rudimentary typology of African conflicts that this thesis will expound upon. This section will briefly convey four types of African conflicts and then focus on two distinct kinds of conflict that were present in Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia.

A typology of Africa's armed conflicts in the post Cold-War era are grouped under six issues, the first being regional and secessionist rebellions. These conflicts are usually characterized by regional rivalries predicated on the basis of historical and political discord. An example of this strain of conflict is the Sudanese Civil War that has lasted for almost five decades. Complicating the situation in Sudan is the instance of

²⁶ Mark Malan, "Peacekeeping in Africa: Trends and Responses," *Symposium on International Peace and Security: The African Experience*, Institute for Security Studies, September 21-23, 1998, p 4

religious confrontations, with Muslim and Christian groups attempting to assert dominance in the region.

A second type of conflict in Africa is grounded in the continuation of liberation insurrections. For example, the "protracted character of the Angolan war is attributable to the complexities of a liberation struggle which featured three popularly-based movements competing for ascendancy."²⁷ UNITA, a rebel group and prime opponent of the Angolan government, has waged a war of severe and intense conflict. This type of conflict is very hard to resolve due to the powerful beliefs motivating the actions of those involved and the resolve of the parties not to find a point of compromise.

A third type of struggle that plagues Africa is "protracted conflict within politicized militaries."²⁸ Lodge suggests that this category of conflict can be viewed as an early symptom of state collapse. If the military of a state is not unified and cohesive in nature, mutiny within the ranks can occur, leading to disintegration of order and the rule of Law. An example is in "Congo-Brazzaville...[where] feuding between army militias loyal to rival political leaderships persisted"²⁹ for years.

Another form of conflict in Africa, border disputes, falls under the more traditional category of interstate conflict. The most recent border dispute was between Ethiopia and Eritrea, where assertions of historical claims played themselves out in arena of bitterness and bloodshed. The contested boundary between the two states led to an escalating conflict resulting in the death of thousands of civilians.

²⁷ Tom Lodge, "Towards An Understanding of Contemporary Armed Conflicts in Africa," *Symposium on International Peace and Security: The African Experience*, Institute for Security Studies, September 21-23, 1998, p.3

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 5

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 5-6

These four types of conflict in Africa illustrate the varying nature of disputes within and outside state borders. In regards to peacekeeping, it is important to understand the characteristics of a specific conflict in order to prescribe a tailored solution that will be most effective. This thesis examines three cases of conflict in Africa, all of which fall into two categories; the first being ethnic competition for control of the state and the second being warfare that arises from state collapse.

The conflict in Rwanda had its origins in rival ethnic groups that competed for control of the state by claiming dominance over the opposing party. The conflict was a "struggle for ascendancy between the culturally similar Tutsi and Hutu groups,"³⁰ which resulted in the act of genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi population. In 1994 alone, over 850,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus lost their lives. The conflict in Rwanda will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter, which highlights the role of the United Nations in resolving the conflict. In examination of that case, it is important to remember the ethnic nature of the conflict and how it led to a power struggle for control of the state.

The other type of conflict related to the case studies is warfare that arises from the breakdown of a state system. In the event of Somalia, the overthrow of President Siad Barre constituted a state of emergency as rival military factions vied for dominance in a situation devoid of order and the rule of law. The historical makeup of Somalia reveals a clan system that was organized around regional relations and "networks of kinship."³¹ This clan-based system left the state susceptible to fragmentation when a central authority was omitted from the situation. This dominant characteristic of the conflict is

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 2

³¹ *Ibid*, p. 5

emblematic of the challenges faced by outside powers and organizations that became involved in the situation.

Conflict in the context of a deteriorated state system of governance is the dominant feature of the Liberian civil war. The war began with a rebellion by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia(NPFL), which enjoyed support of regional allies, leading to a victory in 1997 against the government. It is important to note the role of ECOMOG, ECOWAS's peacekeeping force, in creating stability in an environment constituted by a vacuum of power and governance.

This typology attempts to organize the panoply of distinct conflicts in Africa into an organized and easily definable grouping that will facilitate an examination of peacekeeping's role in these situations. These distinctions will be the groundwork for an understanding of the conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia and by elucidating the causes of these conflicts strive to find precise and effective solutions.

THE PROBLEM OF PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

As the preceding typology suggests, conflicts in Africa are a combination of an internal and international conflict that leads to transnational strife inevitably resulting in large numbers of refugees and displaced persons. Many of these conflicts have deep-rooted causes that must be addressed in peacekeeping missions in order to prevent future conflicts. Ethnic tensions are predominant causes of intrastate conflict and growing at such a rapid pace that methods of traditional resolution seem powerless. There is an incidence of suppression of minority groups by either state governments or dominant majorities. This oppression is often coupled with corrupt and dictatorial regimes, which pay little concern to human rights and humanitarian issues. The lack of

stable infrastructure and institutions within African states has led to chronic poverty and underdevelopment, which can hardly be addressed in the face of a grinding debt burden.

Unfortunately, the aforementioned issues are rarely addressed in peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts. As both the *Agenda for Peace* and the *Brahimi Report* suggest, it is necessary to focus on peace-building in the wake of conflict. Peace-building seeks to correct institutional flaws within the state system and works to develop a dependable infrastructure, facilitating conflict reconciliation and national healing. Before peace-building activities can be instituted, it is necessary for the environment to be secure and stable. It is the role of peacekeeping that is integral in resolving the conflicts in Africa and must take into consideration lessons learned from past missions in order to be more effective in the future.

The following chapters illustrate the role of international peacekeeping in Africa as it is played out by the United Nations, regional organizations and individual member states. These chapters do not purport to solve the problem of peacekeeping in Africa; the case studies are there as a learning tool that will lead peacekeepers to be cognizant of past mistakes and thus improve upon them and be more capable in resolving future conflicts. Taking into consideration the typology of African conflicts and the problems of peacekeeping resulting from these distinctions, the examination of conflicts in Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia will warrant a greater understanding of peace operations and expound upon principles that constitute effective peacekeeping missions.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Case Study: Rwanda

"If the international community does not take the necessary steps to mandate the UN to manage crises, genocide will occur again...."-General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of UNIMIR

The forerunner of modern international peacekeeping, the United Nations is involved, in varying degrees of capacity, in all missions worldwide today. It is the "world security institution...and action authorized and taken in its name carries a broad responsibility, the sum of the sovereignties that have sanctioned it."³² This chapter examines the role of the United Nations in peacekeeping missions by taking a close look at the part the organization played in Rwanda and determines if the UN fulfilled its responsibility to maintain international peace and security. This case study warrants attention due to the role of not only the UN, but also the involvement of a regional organization, the OAU, and a multinational force, *Operation Turquoise*. The role of these other groups is relevant to the subject of this thesis, which posits a three-tiered approach to peace operations, and will be examined in relation to their level of coordination and active participation with the UN. The chapter is divided into three sections, beginning with the historical background of the conflict in Rwanda. In order to understand the role the UN took in bettering the situation, it is necessary to discern the origins and nature of the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples. The next section discusses the actions of the UN in regards to the Arusha Accords and the establishment of UNAMIR(United Nations Mission in Rwanda). The final section analyzes the role of the UN and from that proposes 'lessons learned' that can be applied to future UN missions.

³² William Zartman, "Intervening to Prevent State Collapse: The Role of the United Nations" in *Multilateral Diplomacy and the United Nations Today* edited by James Muldoon et al (New York: Westview Press, 1999), p. 68

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Internal tension, unrest and violence are all characteristics of Rwandan history; the common threads that tie together a chronicle of progressive and permeating conflicts. The "two main ethnic groups-the Hutus and the Tutsis-speak the same language and share the same culture...[even so], there are numerous political power struggles and economic rivalries between them...and have divided the population and led on several occasions to the slaughter and flight of large numbers of civilians."³³ This history of civil unrest resulted in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, which was one of the greatest tragedies since World War II. This chapter explains the historical discord leading to the genocide and charts the events that precipitated UN involvement.

Prior to colonization by the Germans (pre-World War I) and then the Belgians (post-World War I through 1962), the Tutsi dominated Rwanda people. The Tutsis, "who are currently 15 percent of the Rwandan population, established a monarchy and ruled over the Hutu people, constituting 85 percent of the population, for eighteen generations until the arrival of the Germans."³⁴ Shaharyar Khan, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Rwanda, emphasizes that differences between the Hutu and Tutsi people were great, but their respective identities blurred over time. The Hutus were short and stocky where the Tutsis were tall and thin, each possessing easily identifiable characteristics that disclosed ethnic origins in battle. Representative Khan makes the point that during the 1994 genocide the Hutu and Tutsi populations were so

³³ United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume X (New York: UNDP, 1996), p.7

³⁴ Deborah Kobak, "Rwanda: Never Again?," in *Breaking the Cycle* edited by Roderick von Lipsey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 151

integrated that ethnic associations were not easily discernable, blurring the line between victim and aggressor.³⁵

While under colonial rule, the economic divide that separated the Hutus and Tutsis grew due to integration of Tutsi elites in institutions governed by the Germans and Belgians. Even the Catholic missionaries favored the Tutsis over the Hutus, which deepened the ethnic division between the two groups and "exacerbated Hutu resentment of Tutsi domination in Rwanda."³⁶ In 1959, Hutu insurgents organized a bloody rebellion that killed almost 20,000 Tutsi and forced another 150,000 into exile into Burundi and Uganda. A week after the violent rebellion, the "Belgian Government published a policy statement outlining reforms designed to establish a system of local government which would progressively assume autonomy."³⁷ It is then that the United Nations became involved by issuing a series of General Assembly resolutions that sought to "support national reconciliation and a smooth transition to a democratic, representative government."³⁸ In 1962, Belgian colonial rule was terminated and Rwanda became an independent and sovereign nation.

The Tutsis that had taken refuge in neighboring states banded together and launched armed attacks against the Hutus from neighboring Zaire and Uganda. These actions marked the beginning of a decades long struggle by the Tutsis to regain their position of power in Rwanda. In 1973, "Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, seized power in a coup and established a single-party government that institutionalized

³⁵ Shaharyar M. Khan, *Shallow Graves of Rwanda* (New York: IB Tauris Publishers, 2000), p. 12.

³⁶ Deborah Kobak, "Rwanda: Never Again?," in *Breaking the Cycle* edited by Roderick von Lipsey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 151

³⁷United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume X (New York: UNDPI, 1996), p.9

³⁸ *Ibid*, p.9

ethnic discrimination, which added regional rivalries to the country's ethnic-based antagonisms."³⁹ These actions angered the Tutsis, culminating in the formation of the Rwandese Patriotic Front(RPF), which was a political and military movement with the aims of securing repatriation of refugees and reforms to the discriminatory government.

On October 1, 1990 the RPF launched a major attack on Rwanda from Uganda with a force over 7,000 strong. The Rwandese Government Army was able to fend off the attack after a few weeks, but the fighting displaced thousands of Hutus. The "nature and character of the initial response by regional neighbors...fell squarely within the prevailing paradigm of African responses to internal conflicts. It was based on the 'summit' approach. The initial objectives were to achieve a peaceful settlement to the conflict, beginning with a cessation of the hostilities or a cease-fire agreement."⁴⁰ The numerous summits, held in coordination with the OAU, did bring about a cease-fire agreement. The cease-fire agreement was short-lived and fighting broke out again. However, the number of casualties and cost of supporting thousands of soldiers proved too much for the Rwandese Government and the RPF, and both parties went back to the negotiating table in August 1992. It is then that the United Nations, the OAU and other nations such as France, Belgium and the U.S. became involved in the Arusha Peace Negotiations.

THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE UN

³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 11

⁴⁰ Ami R. Mpungwe, "Crisis and Response in Rwanda: Reflections on the Arusha Peace Process," *Symposium on International Peace and Security: The African Experience*, Institute for Security Studies, September 21-23, 1998, p. 2

Peace negotiations began on August 10, 1992 in Arusha, Tanzania, which were coordinated by the UN and the OAU. The negotiations lasted almost a year and several protocols were successfully signed and put into effect. President Habyarimana and the Chairman of the RPF signed the comprehensive Arusha Peace Agreement on August 4, 1993. Ambassador Ami Mpungwe, appointed by the Tanzanian Government to chair the negotiations, remarks that the *Arusha Peace Agreement* was "heralded as Africa's most strategic and successful response to an African conflict to date...one of those rare occasions when an African conflict was seen to have been resolved in Africa by African people themselves."⁴¹

The successful implementation of the *Arusha Peace Agreement* depended upon a sentiment of trust between the two parties and merited a concerted effort on each side to follow the agreed upon protocol. The agreement stipulated that both sides demobilize and disarm their troops, that Tutsi refugees be repatriated and that a transitional multiparty government assume power. The UN was charged with the responsibility of creating a stable environment within which to successfully implement the agreement. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stressed the need for the "two sides to cooperate fully with one another and with the UN in complying with their commitments under the *Arusha Peace Agreement*...and the UN needed to be provided in a timely manner with the necessary human and financial resources."⁴² In October 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p.4

⁴²United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume X (New York: UNDPI, 1996), p.27

Rwanda(UNAMIR) to create a stabilizing presence that would facilitate implementation of the *Arusha Peace Agreement*.

UNAMIR was given a modest mandate and limited manpower and resources to carry out their objectives. The mission's main tasks were to "assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali, monitor the cease-fire, investigate non-compliance with any provision of the peace agreement and provide security for the repatriation of Rwandese refugees."⁴³ The OAU had deployed a Neutral Military Observer Mission(NMOG) in 1992 to help monitor the cease-fire during the Arusha negotiations. Once the *Arusha Peace Agreement* was implemented, the OAU indicated it did not have the resources to continue its operations, thus troops from NMOG were incorporated into UNAMIR. This is an excellent example of coordination between the UN and regional organizations, indicative of a collaborative effort involving local and international troops. The NMOG mission was relieved by 2500 troops under Canadian general Romeo Dallaire, which was an insufficient number of troops to achieve the mission's objectives. Deborah Kobak, a policy research analyst, asserts that UNAMIR was "fraught with serious problems from its inception...the mission rendered virtually ineffective by its UN Charter Chapter VI mandate, which did not permit UN troops to forcibly address the violations of the cease-fire agreement. In addition, UNAMIR was hindered by lengthy delays in the deployment of troops and the acquisition of equipment needed to outfit the mission."⁴⁴ These criticisms illustrate the inability of UNAMIR to protect the civilian population of Rwanda and to put a halt to the genocide once it had begun.

⁴³Margaret Carey, "Peacekeeping in Africa: Recent Revolution and Prospects" in *Peacekeeping In Africa* edited by Oliver Furley and Roy May (London: Ashgate, 1998), p. 22

⁴⁴ Deborah Kobak, "Rwanda: Never Again?," in *Breaking the Cycle* edited by Roderick von Lipsey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 161

On April 6, 1994 President Habyarimana's plane was shot down and hours later a systematic wave of massacres began that killed over 850,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus and displaced over 2 million Rwandans. UNAMIR's inability to stop the slaughter was furthered by the withdrawal of 400 Belgian troops and without a Chapter VII mandate to use force to quell the violence, the remaining UN troops were rendered ineffective. The Security Council reduced the 2500 troops to 270, leaving a small force to act as an intermediary between the RPF and Rwandan Government, sparking an outcry by the international community. General Dallaire warned that "if the international community does not take the necessary steps to mandate the UN to manage crises, genocide will occur again."⁴⁵

The OAU's sentiments on the issue mirrored those of Dallaire and the organization took steps to help consolidate troops needed for a second intervention effort. Faced with a humanitarian catastrophe and intensified threats against UNAMIR troops, the UN was forced to revisit the nature of its mandate in Rwanda. UNAMIR II, established under Security Council Resolution 918, was comprised of 5,500 troops and was given a Chapter VI mandate to provide humanitarian assistance. The troops' arrival was delayed due to limited funds and the French took action and "unilaterally launched a military operation code-named *Operation Turquoise*, which was 2,500 troops strong and attempted to secure a safe zone for civilians in the southwestern portion of the country."⁴⁶ *Operation Turquoise* was reluctantly approved by the Security Council due to its questionable impartiality and given a Chapter VII mandate. There had been much collaboration between the Habyarimana regime and the French government in the past.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, p.161

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p. 163.

Even so, the safe zone saved thousands of lives. In July, a month after *Operation Turquoise*, the RPF declared a unilateral cease-fire and established a government of national unity in Kigali. Two months later, UNAMIR II took over and was in place until March 1996, and focused heavily on political reconciliation and the provision of humanitarian aid to refugees and the internally displaced.

LESSONS LEARNED

What can the international community learn from the UN's role in Rwanda? UNAMIR was an unsuccessful mission due to its failure to protect civilians and prevent the genocide of 850,000 people. This failure has cast a heavy shadow on the credibility of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and called into question the ability of the UN to "maintain international peace and security."⁴⁷ It was unsuccessful not because it was unable to carry out its original mandate, even though it did have insufficient resources; it failed because the Security Council did not give UNAMIR a Chapter VII mandate that would have authorized it to use all means necessary to secure the environment in Rwanda.

UNAMIR commander General Dallaire sought "UN backing for a strengthened operation designed to simply protect human life...but instead the Security Council ordered UNAMIR's withdrawal, except for a token 270 troops, abandoning hundreds of thousands of Rwandans to a grisly death."⁴⁸ The Security Council should have been cognizant of the turmoil-ridden history of Rwanda, which speaks of conflicts between the

⁴⁷ *UN Charter*, Article I(1)

⁴⁸ Margaret Carey, "Peacekeeping in Africa: Recent Revolution and Prospects" in *Peacekeeping In Africa* edited by Oliver Furley and Roy May (London: Ashgate, 1998), p. 21

Hutus and Tutsis for generations. The UN should have remembered the Hutu rebellion of 1959 and the resulting deaths of thousands of Tutsis. Taking these historical facts into consideration, the Security Council should have deemed coercive action necessary to implement the *Arusha Peace Agreement* and garnered international support for a multinational force to take action early on. *Operation Turquoise*, led by France, was formed too late in the situation to save thousands from genocide and even then had only minimal support from the Security Council.

This thesis stresses the need for a multilateral approach to conflict resolution. In this case, the UN should have taken action as soon as the *Arusha Peace Agreement* began to fall apart. UNAMIR was a peacekeeping mission and did not have the supplies, manpower or mandate to take coercive action in the situation. The UN should have appealed to member states and aid nations in establishing a MNF under the auspices of the UN. The *UN Agenda for Peace* coined the term peace enforcement, which dictates the use of force to secure a conflict and work towards a resolution. In most cases, as with *Operation Turquoise*, the credible threat of force is enough, diminishing the need for actual use of force. When the French set up the safe zone in the south, no force was used; the fact that the French force was armed and ready to take coercive action led the RPF to issue a unilateral cease-fire.

The MNF, if deployed early on, around the time of UNAMIR, would have been able to stabilize the situation and prevent the genocide. After the environment was secure and the protocol of the *Arusha Peace Agreement* implemented, UNAMIR, a UN peacekeeping force under a Chapter VI mandate could have taken over. It is essential to remember in this case that a smooth and seamless transition is necessary with little

visible changes on the ground. The less perceptible the transition is, the more effective the subsequent peacekeeping mission will be.

The only laudable role in the international response to Rwanda is that of the OAU. The OAU took necessary action by overseeing the Arusha negotiations and encouraging that the international community get involved. It is a positive development to see a regional organization take such an active role, especially with the deployment of NMOG in 1992. The OAU was quick to form and deploy NMOG, making it that much more effective in helping to implement the agreement. The fact that NMOG admitted its weaknesses and was willing to be incorporated into UNAMIR illustrates a commitment on the part of the OAU to coordinate its peacekeeping efforts with those of the UN.

From the conflict in Rwanda, the United Nations learned that in order to be successful, a mission must have a mandate and sufficient resources that allow it meet all objectives. In most cases, the Security Council should approve peace enforcement action, if the organization is not willing to give its own forces a Chapter VII mandate. In addition, immediate action in crisis situations is necessary whereas a delay in action carries dire consequences, as in the death of 850,000 Rwandans. The role of regional organizations is integral for success in any peace enforcement or peacekeeping mission in that these organizations work within the hostile region and have much at stake in the resolution of the conflict. These organizations also have the ability to get involved much more quickly as their member nations are in close proximity to the violence. If these considerations are taken to heart, the UN will be able be more effective in resolving conflicts and be successful in coordinating its activities with both member states and regional organizations.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF STATES

Case Study: Somalia

"We should have done something about Somalia earlier. But just how do you get busy people to stop and pay attention to a country like Somalia?"-Former U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger

Somalia is linked in many people's minds to Rwanda, the two symbolizing the post-Cold War problems of ethnic and factional conflicts within states and humanitarian disaster. In fact, the events in Somalia and the ensuing involvement of the international community tempered responses to the crisis in Rwanda. This chapter explores the role that states play in peacekeeping in Africa by looking at the active participation of the U.S. led-United Task Force(UNITAF), which was a case of humanitarian intervention in a country's internal affairs under Chapter VII, authorizing the mission to take coercive action if necessary. As was the case with Rwanda, the UN and regional organizations also played a role in Somalia; here their roles will be examined in relation to the degree of coordination with UNITAF. The first section of this chapter will chart the events leading to international involvement in the civil war in Somalia. The second section reviews the role of UNITAF and the transition to the UN Operation in Somalia(UNOSOM II). The final section analyzes the role of UNITAF and suggests ways that future peace enforcement missions can be more effective.

EVENTS PRECEDING INTERVENTION:

In October of 1969, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre launched a coup that led to 21 years of military dictatorship. He set up a highly authoritarian regime that enjoyed

public support in its first year. He initially initiated a literacy campaign and called on all Somalis to overcome traditional clan divisions and come together as a united people. The general had an alliance with the Soviet Union, which provided all necessary military equipment for Somalia to take back claimed territory. In October 1977, Somalia attacked Ethiopia in order to regain a piece of land. The Soviets then turned and supported the Marxist regime of Ethiopia. The U.S., fearing the spread of communism into the Horn of Africa, lent support the Somalis. Throughout the 80's, the U.S. economic aid program was the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁴⁹

In April of 1988, Ethiopia and Somalia signed a peace agreement, just as internal strife between clans was reaching the rebellion level. April Oliver, a foreign affairs reporter for CNN, notes that "in retrospect, civil unrest on this scale should have been a clarion call to the international community...it was a missed opportunity for mediation."⁵⁰ In May of 1990, a group of Somalis from different clans issued the Manifesto of Mogadishu, which condemned the Siad Barre regime and demanded that it begin political reforms. The rebellion escalated and "Somalia began to fragment...the culture of disenfranchisement became more pervasive."⁵¹ On the local level, both the social and political institutions of Somalia, the crux of the state system, began to deteriorate.

⁴⁹ John Hirsch and Robert Oakely, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington DC: USIP, 1995), p. 5 Please note that the majority of information in this paragraph on the background of the situation in Somalia comes from this book. It is an excellent source on the history of civil discord in Somalia and provides a wonderful basis for understanding the underlying causes of the conflict.

⁵⁰ April Oliver, "The Somalia Syndrome," in *Breaking the Cycle* edited by Roderick von Lipsey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 124

⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 124

In January 1991, Siad Barre desperately "launched a massive distribution of weapons and ammunition and his power all but evaporated when he turned his army loose on sections of the city, destroying much of the infrastructure and provoking a violent and deadly uprising in the process."⁵² A state of emergency was declared and President Siad Barre fled Mogadishu, which fell to rival factions of the United Somali Congress(USC) and insurgent leaders in the region. In the vacuum of power created by ruin of the Somali government, fighting between these clans intensified. There was widespread famine, which increased the flight of refugees into neighboring Kenya. "Control of food was a vital political resource for the Somali warlords and a currency to pay the mercenary gangs who formed their militias."⁵³ In July 1992, the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that 95 percent of the people in Somalia suffered from malnutrition, with as many as 1,000 Somalis dying every day and three-fourths of Somalia's children under the age of five already dead."⁵⁴

How did the international community respond when faced with human suffering on such a massive scale? It seemed no organization or nation was immediately ready to get involved. Veteran diplomats Robert Oakley and John Hirsch admit, "neither the United Nations nor the United States was ready to do so. The UN Secretariat and Security Council were already engaged in more issues than they could handle, still troubled by sovereignty issues and reluctant to engage in internal disputes...and the OAU

⁵² Jeffrey Clark, "Debate in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*," edited by Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), p.210

⁵³ Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns, *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Westview Press, 2000),p. 92

⁵⁴Jeffrey Clark, "Debate in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*," edited by Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), p.212

lacked the capacity, will and focus,"⁵⁵ to become involved in the situation. This apathetic attitude of the international community led to the death of thousands that could have been saved with immediate and effective action.

After much debate within the organization, the United Nations in 1992 "mounted in conditions of exceptional complexity, in a country where all organs of government had collapsed, the operation in Somalia...which was called upon to deal with a devastating famine and a brutal multi-sided civil war that had claimed the lives of 300,000 people."⁵⁶ In April 1992, the Security Council established the United Nations Operation in Somalia(UNOSOM I), which provided for fifty unarmed UN observers and allowed for the possible future deployment of a peacekeeping force of 500. The Secretary-General appointed Mohamed Sahnoun as his special representative to Somalia, who was to report back on the conditions in the failed state. In June 1992, Sahnoun wrote to the UN that "some 4,500,000 people are in urgent need of food...an absence of food breeds insecurity which, in turn causes instability leading to starvation, suffering and disease. Breaking this diabolical cycle may be the key to resolving the intricate social and political problems in Somalia."⁵⁷ Sahnoun's words of wisdom could not have been more truthful and struck a cord within the Security Council. In December 1992, the UN passed a resolution authorizing a U.S.-led force to "use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations," under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This UNITAF mission was dubbed Operation Restore Hope.

⁵⁵ John Hirsch and Robert Oakely, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington DC: USIP, 1995), p. 170

⁵⁶ United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII (New York: UNDPI, 1997), p.3

⁵⁷ Mohamed Sahnoun, from *Somalia*, p. vii quoted in "The Somalia Syndrome," in *Breaking the Cycle* edited by Roderick von Lipsey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 128

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

UNITAF was largely successful in achieving its humanitarian objectives by supplying food to those in need and imposing a *de facto* cease-fire in areas of its deployment. The force was comprised of 37,000 troops, three quarters of which were from the U.S, which began to experience political problems soon after deployment. Boutros-Ghali "thought that a secure environment for relief necessarily required a commitment to disarm the gunmen, but Bush and the US commanders on the ground thought that this was neither necessary to ensure relief, nor practicable...this position on disarmament was to cause friction between the UN and UNITAF."⁵⁸ UNITAF thought that it could be above the political fray, but in fact it was part of the political scene that was manipulated by Somali players. UNITAF tried to play role to promote reconciliation, which was useless considering that the 'warlords' knew UNITAF's role would be short-lived and that differences would emerge when UNOSOM II took over. To combat this indifferent sentiment of the 'warlords,' US Special Envoy Robert Oakley tried to take a diplomatic approach. He organized conferences with "Aideed and Ali Mahdi, two leaders of political factions, and tried to work out an agreement on voluntary disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration of militias into Somali society."⁵⁹ But tensions soon resurfaced between the rival 'warlords' and UNITAF continued its mission by trying to restore law and order. UNITAF trained police forces and even established a

⁵⁸ Peter Woodard, "Somalia," in *Peacekeeping in Africa*, edited by Oliver Furley and Roy May (London: Ashgate, 1998), p. 143

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, p.149

few courts, and at the end of the day accomplished what it had set out to do, namely establish a safer environment for relief efforts.

UNITAF was conceived as a "temporary exercise in peace enforcement...however, events in Somalia in the first months of 1993 made it increasingly clear that the follow-up mission would also need the authority to use force. The Security Council thus established UNOSOM II as the first peace enforcement operation explicitly authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter...both organized and commanded by the UN."⁶⁰ Chester Crocker of Georgetown University asserts that transition from UNITAF to UNISOM II was "poorly executed...and within a mere four months of mounting the initial intervention, that intervention's leadership, doctrine, reporting channels, available resources and mission mandate were transformed. Worse, the new mandate was significantly more ambitious, while the military resources available were cut back severely."⁶¹ U.S. officials accused the Secretary-General of deliberately stalling the transfer of responsibility to UN forces because of a reluctance to assume financial and political costs, causing an escalation of U.S.-UN tensions.

LESSONS LEARNED

What lessons can be learned from international intervention into Somalia? It was definitely a test case of the international community's ability to engage in forceful humanitarian action. Charles William Maynes, former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, points out that the characteristics of the situation in

⁶⁰ United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII (New York: UNDPI, 1997), p.40

⁶¹ Chester Crocker, "The Varieties of Intervention," in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), p. 191

Somalia and the pervading feeling of the international community facilitated the success of UNITAF's mission. He contends that the "various clans were lightly armed...they had no tanks, no aircraft and little sophisticated equipment. In addition, the international force enjoyed unquestioned legitimacy and there was no local governmental authority to protest international interference. The international human rights community was in favor of intervention to end the starvation and suffering and...even the clan leaders initially seemed to accept the respite from the conflict that the international intervention brought."⁶² Considering how difficult the mission was in light of all these facilitating factors shows just how difficult humanitarian intervention can be.

It is clear that "the United States and its military forces will be called upon in the future to participate in a variety of humanitarian peacekeeping operations, contributing the expertise, resources and capabilities" of a developed and militarily superior nation."⁶³ UNITAF was flexible in that it could be deployed swiftly and then adapted to the situation in an effective and expeditious manner. It accomplished its mission to secure the environment for delivery of food supplies, although got bogged down in disarmament discussions with the UN and its insistence to become involved in Somali 'warlord' politics. Taking this into account, a list of lessons from Somalia will make the next state-led peace enforcement mission much more effective.

First, early intervention has the greatest chance of success. UNOSOM I should never have been established, for it had a limited mandate with only 50 peacekeepers to carry out its objectives. Had UNITAF or an alternative peace enforcement operation

⁶² Charles William Maynes, "Humanitarian Intervention," in *Peacemaking: Moral and Policy Challenges for a New World*, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1997), p. 233

⁶³ John Hirsch and Robert Oakely, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington DC: USIP, 1995), p. 168

become involved sooner, thousands of lives taken by starvation could have been saved. Second, it is necessary to remember that peace enforcement needs a strong mandate that is backed by sufficient will and a leading nation willing to absorb the bulk of the costs. In the case of Somalia, UNITAF committed almost 40,000 troops but only for a short period of time, which indicated a lack of will on the part of the U.S. to solve the conflict.

Third, plan to minimize casualties while preparing for the worse. In areas of unmitigated conflict, as in Somalia, it is necessary to prepare the public for casualties. The fact that the American public thought UNITAF was purely a humanitarian effort and not a military mission led to the shocked reaction and public outcry when 18 U.S. soldiers were killed. The image of a U.S. soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu is forever imprinted on the minds of the American public. In Haiti, a year later the U.S. led a MNF that was prepared to take coercive action if necessary to unseat the military junta. The American public was warned of the danger of the mission and in a poll almost 80% of the US population still supported the intervention. Fourth, if a transition from one intervention force to another is planned, make sure the hand-off is smooth and that there is little visible change on the ground. The awkward and unsuccessful transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was taken to heart by the UN and rectified in Haiti with the seamless shift of power from the US-led MNF to UNMIH. Finally, it is necessary to become involved at the local level and enfranchise all parties to the conflict by making them feel as if they have a stake in the outcome. US Special Envoy Oakley partially succeeded in doing this, but all fell apart when tensions flared between rival 'warlords,' with no attainable resolution in sight.

Somalia acts as a wonderful learning tool that can be utilized to make MNF peace enforcement missions more effective. Multinational forces are "better able to obtain authorization, can supply and organize the troops in a pre-established pattern and have few financial worries...these benefits make MNF peace enforcement operations more efficient in many ways than a UN peacekeeping force could be."⁶⁴ Under a Chapter VII mandate, and with authorization from the Security Council, multinational force arrangements should be the first approach of the United Nations in conflict resolution; the most effective option for peace enforcement.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Case Study: Liberia

"So the question then is, where does a country whose government has collapsed, and with warring factions that are unable to reach an agreement, and unable to establish any form of authority, where does this country go, what do the people do, what then becomes the most crucial issue in their survival? Is it the question of their preservation of their humanity, or is it the question of holding on to some legal notion of sovereignty?"-Amos Sawyer, President, Interim Government of National

Unity of Liberia, August 1991

The use of regional organizations is a growing component in the endeavor of the international community to bring about the resolution of conflicts in Africa. There is a prevailing desire to provide 'African solutions to African problems' in hopes that these efforts will contribute to regional stability, decreasing the chance for future hostilities. In Africa, the two main regional organizations are the Organization of African Unity(OAU) and the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS). This chapter

⁶⁴ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1994), p. 141

discusses the role of regional organizations in peace operations by focusing on the role of ECOMOG, the military monitoring group of ECOWAS, in Liberia. The experience of ECOMOG is an example of a regional peacekeeping operation that succeeded as an intervention and was triumphant in meeting the slated objectives. This chapter begins with a short history of the conflict in Liberia and explains the origins of the civil war of 1990-1991. The following section offers a short background on ECOWAS and ECOMOG and explains the role and significance of ECOMOG peace operations in Liberia. The final section of this chapter will suggest lessons that can be taken from the ECOMOG experience and be applied to future interventions by regional actors.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE 1989-1990 CIVIL WAR

To some degree, the conflict in Liberia dates back to 1822, when a small group of emancipated slaves from the U.S. settled in Liberia. These people became known as the "Americo-Liberians...and sought to duplicate in Liberia the society they had known in the United States" and established a republican form of government.⁶⁵ For the next 150 years the Americo-Liberians dominated the country's political and economic life by subjugating the indigenous population as slaves. In the 1950's and 1960's, there were two presidents in office that promised to make reforms and integrate the indigenous population into the political scene. In reality, there were no changes and the power remained in the hands of the Americo-Liberians. On April 12, 1980, a unit of the Liberian National Guard, under leadership of Samuel Doe, staged a coup and instituted a

⁶⁵ David Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* edited by Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), p.160

revolutionary government. Doe "suspended the Constitution, abolished the legislature, and placed the country under martial law."⁶⁶ He promised to combat corruption and redistribute the nation's wealth among the different ethnic groups. These turned out to be empty promises, angering the majority of the population, especially the Gios and Mano ethnic groups. These groups fled to neighboring Cote d'Ivoire and joined Charles Taylor's army, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia(NPFL).

On Christmas Day 1989, the NPFL invaded Liberia and were met by government troops. The "NPLF's hit-and-run tactics were frustrating and elusive and government troops responded by massacring hundreds of Gio and Mano civilians accused of supporting Taylor's forces."⁶⁷ In little time, the conflict expanded into a large-scale inter-ethnic civil war, causing almost one million Liberians to flee into neighboring countries. By May 1990, the NPFL was in the capital of Monrovia; the invasion resulting in anarchy and loss of all civilian authority. The rebels were not able to capture Doe's stronghold, his fortified mansion, and a military stalemate ensued. In that same month, the ECOWAS heads of state met for their annual summit and organized peace talks in Sierra Leone. Due to Doe's reluctance to resign, the talks failed, which led to multiple calls for military intervention. The U.S. refused to intervene on grounds that the disintegration of Liberia was an internal affair, and the UN Security Council felt the problem should be solved by Africans. The international community's refusal to act set the stage for the subsequent ECOWAS intervention.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p.162

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p163

ECOWAS AND THE ECOMOG PEACE OPERATIONS IN LIBERIA

As its name suggests, the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) is a regional organization designed to promote West African economic integration. The organization was founded in 1975 under the Treaty of Lagos and is comprised of 16 member states. The protocol "commits member states that cannot resolve an intra-Community dispute peacefully to submit such disputes to the ECOWAS head of state for resolution."⁶⁸ In the case of Liberia, this initial action of mediation and negotiation failed, leaving the members of ECOWAS to act on one the organization's fundamental principles. Article 4 of the ECOWAS Treaty commits parties to adhere to the principle of "maintenance of regional peace, stability and security through the promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness."⁶⁹ In pursuit of regional peace and stability, the organization called on warring parties to observe an immediate cease-fire and established the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group(ECOMOG) for the purpose of restoring law and order to Liberia.

ECOMOG was initially created as a peacekeeping or "cease-fire monitoring," but it was clear from the start that it would have to act as a peace enforcement operation and establish a cease-fire by force. The troops were deployed within two weeks of ECOMOG's inception, which demonstrates that African states can deploy their forces rapidly in crisis situations. This expediency lends itself to the fact that the "operation was largely carried out by the armed forces of one country, Nigeria, using maritime

⁶⁸ Gerry Cleaver, "Liberia: Lessons for the Future from the Experience of ECOMOG," in *Peacekeeping in Africa*, edited by Oliver Furley and Roy May (London: Ashgate, 1998), p. 224

⁶⁹ *Treaty of ECOWAS*, Article 4(e), 1975

transport facilities to quickly reach the area of conflict, Monrovia."⁷⁰ Initially, ECOMOG consisted of 3,000 troops, which proved inadequate for the tasks allotted and was later increased to 9,000. The moment the ECOMOG soldiers landed in Monrovia, they came under attack by Taylor's forces but were able to negotiate a temporary cease-fire. During this time, ECOWAS helped construct an interim government, headed by Amos Sawyer, with the task of national reconciliation and the conduct of elections. In September 1990, "President Doe made the fatal mistake of visiting ECOMOG headquarters and was seized by rebel forces, tortured and killed."⁷¹

ECOMOG forces were embarrassed by Doe's capture and began a full-scale offensive to drive the NPFL from Monrovia. A "more aggressive strategy was adopted...ECOMOG's strength was doubled...forcing the NPFL out of Monrovia, thus paving the way for arrival of humanitarian aid and the installation of the interim government."⁷² ECOMOG's actions resulted in a cease-fire between warring parties, which Charles Taylor refused to recognize. In retaliation, he encouraged the NPFL join with Sierra Leonean dissidents and invade the country in March 1991. ECOWAS's fears of Liberia as a threat to the region's peace and security were quickly materializing. The conflict widened and encompassed different factions within the capital of Monrovia, such as the AFL, the INPFL and ULIMO. A more in-depth discussion of the origins, composition and goals of these factions is not pertinent to this thesis; it should suffice to state that the increase in the number of factions merited an enlargement of ECOMOG

⁷⁰ Gerry Cleaver, "Liberia: Lessons for the Future from the Experience of ECOMOG," in *Peacekeeping in Africa*, edited by Oliver Furley and Roy May (London: Ashgate, 1998), p. 226

⁷¹David Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* edited by Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), p.168

⁷² Gerry Cleaver, "Liberia: Lessons for the Future from the Experience of ECOMOG," in *Peacekeeping in Africa*, edited by Oliver Furley and Roy May (London: Ashgate, 1998), p. 227

forces. In the following "six years the size of ECOMOG fluctuated to reflect both the levels of commitment and frustration of the contributing countries and the emphasis placed on the military element of any solution to the crisis."⁷³ By 1997, there had been a series of cease-fire agreements and efforts of disarmament that failed due to lack of cooperation on part of the warring factions.

In August 1996, there was a cease-fire agreement signed between the ECOWAS heads of state and the Liberian faction leaders. By early 1997, ECOMOG, with a strength of 10,000, was able to disarm "more than 23,000 of the estimated 35,000 fighters in Liberia,"⁷⁴ constituting the force's greatest victory. Elections were held in July of that year culminating in the election of Charles Taylor, with his party garnering 75 percent of the vote. ECOMOG was scheduled to stay in Liberia up to six months after the election to train the army and police. This was the beginning of the peace-building phase, which will be addressed in the following section.

LESSONS LEARNED

The experience of ECOMOG in Liberia has been hailed as an African peacekeeping success story. Even so, there were many drawbacks to the mission, which to some degree tempered its success. Regional organizations can learn from ECOMOG's mistakes and apply the lessons to future involvement in African conflicts.

Before addressing the negative aspects of ECOMOG's mission, it is important to recognize that ECOWAS's Monitoring Group has shown the value and effectiveness of a regional organizational in addressing conflict. First, ECOWAS has demonstrated that a

⁷³ *Ibid*, p. 227

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.235

regional organization can "muster the political will to tackle a seemingly intractable interethnic civil war."⁷⁵ When the international community failed to deal with the situation, a regional organization was able to illustrate the ability to take coercive action. Second, the Liberian conflict reveals that a regional organization might be more effective than the UN or a multinational force. This is attributed to fact that a regional organization has much more at stake in the conflict, namely local stability, and has the capability to deploy troops quickly due to its proximity to the conflict.

Third, the "willingness of the international community to acquiesce in but not overly approve forcible intervention in Liberia suggests that states or groups of states willing to undertake interventions will not incur condemnation or international sanction." Chapter VIII of the UN Charter empowers regional organizations to undertake enforcement action to address threats to international peace and security, provided that the Security Council authorize such action. Ruth Wedgwood, a professor at Yale Law School, points out that a "retroactive blessing was given to the military actions of the ECOWAS regional force...two years after deployment the Security Council commended ECOWAS efforts."⁷⁶ For future interventions, it is important for regional organizations to secure permission from the Security Council before going ahead with the intervention. This international 'stamp of approval' will put political clout behind the intervention, contributing to its effectiveness. The "Liberian experience shows that African peacekeeping forces and their sponsors need to seek the widest possible support from

⁷⁵David Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* edited by Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), p.190

⁷⁶ Ruth Wedgwood, "Regional and Subregional Organizations," in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), p.

outside the continent as well as from Africa itself."⁷⁷ Finally, Liberia "demonstrates the extent to which intervention in an internal conflict can draw the intervenors into the long-term political reconstruction...of the affected country."⁷⁸ This element of peace-building, as defined in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, is the most important to stabilizing the region, hopefully contributing to a long-term peace. ECOWAS showed considerable flexibility, ingenuity and patience in its efforts to stabilize Liberia. It is this commitment that is an example to other regional organizations, such as the OAU, and should provide encouragement for long-term involvement in post-conflict areas.

Even in light of ECOMOG's success, there are many difficulties the mission encountered that prevented it from being more effective earlier on. An important lesson to emerge from the experience of ECOMOG is that the size, equipment and funding of any regional organization force must be sufficient to match the tasks allotted. From a "military standpoint, the ECOMOG operation in Liberia started off inauspiciously, beset by problems with military equipment, logistics, training and interoperability."⁷⁹ These problems stem from the nations that are contributing the troops. In the case of Liberia, Nigerian troops were inadequately trained and ill prepared to handle a mission of that magnitude. In future circumstances, it would be beneficial to garner the support and financial aid of wealthier countries, as long as regional organizations take all necessary measures to maintain the African nature of the mission.

⁷⁷Gerry Cleaver, "Liberia: Lessons for the Future from the Experience of ECOMOG," in *Peacekeeping in Africa*, edited by Oliver Furley and Roy May (London: Ashgate, 1998), p. 227

⁷⁸David Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* edited by Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), p.194

⁷⁹ Eboe Hutchful, "The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in West Africa," *Symposium on International Peace and Security: The African Experience*, Institute for Security Studies, September 21-23, 1998, p. 7

Second, the ECOMOG mission had a problem with the legitimacy of force due to internal discord within ECOWAS. There was a "rift between members of ECOWAS... that led a number of states to be suspicious of Nigeria's motives."⁸⁰ Nigeria had been the prime mover behind ECOMOG, and the largest contributing member, which led states to believe that Nigeria was using ECOMOG as a vehicle for its own regional hegemonic ambitions, causing states such as Burkina Faso and Senegal to denounce the intervention as illegal.⁸¹ These divisions within ECOWAS left the organization vulnerable to international criticism and allowed Charles Taylor to exacerbate these divisions for his own gain. In the future, regional organizations must work towards consensus between members. If there is internal discord, the organization should show few visible signs, protecting the viability and legitimacy of the mission.

Finally, the experience of ECOMOG's relationships with states and international organizations highlights a number of problems that can impede the progress of an intervention in achieving its goal. In terms of relations with states, the "effective disengagement of the USA from the Liberian conflict, at least in political terms, made ECOMOG's task more difficult than it might have been in the presence of overt U.S. support and political leverage."⁸² If the U.S. had been involved, even at a very indirect level, it would have lent credibility to ECOMOG's mission, especially in the eyes of the warring factions. Also, active U.S. support for a peacekeeping operation can encourage others to provide assistance and discourage other countries from meddling in an unhelpful manner. In regard to involvement of the UN, in 1993 unarmed peacekeepers were

⁸⁰ Gerry Cleaver, "Liberia: Lessons for the Future from the Experience of ECOMOG," in *Peacekeeping in Africa*, edited by Oliver Furley and Roy May (London: Ashgate, 1998), p. 224

⁸¹ *Ibid*, p. 225

⁸² *Ibid*, p. 229

deployed to monitor the cease-fire. The United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) charged ECOMOG with providing the security of its troops and disarmament of the factions. This was an immense burden for ECOMOG and made for poor relations between the two organizations. In addition, UNOMIL's close cooperation with ECOMOG questioned its impartiality, in essence calling into question the entire standing of the UN in the eyes of the faction leaders.

What transpired in Liberia with ECOMOG raised a number of issues which are particularly relevant to current discussions over peacekeeping operations in Africa. The lessons from ECOMOG's involvement in Liberia will make peace operations, especially those of peace enforcement, by regional organizations more effective in the future.

CHAPTER SIX: MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA: AN APPROACH FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

"The first peace operation was an attempt to confront and defeat the worst in man with the best in man: to counter violence with tolerance, might with moderation, and war with peace. Since then, day after day, year after year, peacekeepers have been meeting the threat and reality of conflict, without losing faith, without giving in, without giving up."-Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations

As illustrated in the case studies of Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia, conflicts in Africa are becoming increasingly more complicated and prevalent in the post-Cold War era. The challenge now is to create a strategy of cooperative security that will provide for the maintenance of long-term global peace. This thesis proposes that there be a three-tiered approach to international peace operations in Africa, with specifically defined roles for the United Nations, individual states and regional organizations. In order to coordinate the activities of these distinct international actors, there is a need to

develop a common concept, guidelines and doctrine for participation in peace operations. This chapter establishes a formula for intervention into African conflicts, which outlines the specific roles of the UN, individual states and regional organizations in relation to peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace-building activities. This formula incorporates lessons from Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia and takes into account the myriad of African conflicts addressed in the typology in chapter two. Peace operations in Africa in the 21st century promise to be challenging and wrought with difficulties due to the changing nature of conflicts in the post-Cold War era. The formula for international involvement set forth in this chapter is an innovative approach to conflict resolution in Africa.

The first section of this chapter lays out principles and guidelines that the UN should adhere to when it makes the decision to intervene in an African conflict. Drawing on the *Brahimi Report* and lessons from Rwanda, the formula suggests that the UN focus on peacekeeping. As with the preceding section, the second part suggests a set of guidelines that an international actor can follow when deciding to intervene in a conflict in Africa. In this case, the actor is an individual member state that must obtain Security Council permission under Chapter VII before intervening. Based on the lessons from Somalia and the formulated set of guidelines, individual states should focus on peace enforcement activities. The third section sets forth a common concept for intervention by regional organizations into African conflicts. The importance of regional organizations in peace operations is stressed due to their interest in African relations and proximity to the conflict. Taking into account lessons from Liberia and provisions of the OAU Charter and Treaty of ECOWAS, this chapter recommends that regional organizations take part in both peace enforcement and peacekeeping activities. The final

section outlines the necessity for all of the aforementioned international actors to take part in peace-building activities. Peace-building improves the infrastructure within country, strengthens the rule of law, improves respect for human rights and develops institutions that will help support the process of reconciliation. These activities make peace-building an integral part of any peace operation, calling upon all parties associated with the conflict to get involved. Peace-building leads to a stable and secure environment and one less prone to future conflicts.

THE UN AND PEACEKEEPING

Adam Roberts, in "Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," notes that it is "possible to conclude that the United Nations must confine its activities to...the classic approach to peacekeeping."⁸³ This chapter echoes that position and proposes that the UN focus on peacekeeping in African conflicts. Taking into account the failure of UNAMIR II's expanded mandate in Rwanda, the UN should develop mandates with obtainable objectives that have sufficient funding and manpower to fulfill them. In following the recommendations of the *Brahimi Report*, such traditional notions of peacekeeping should be adhered to, such as the consent of local parties and unwavering impartiality. This chapter establishes a guideline that the UN should follow when it makes the decision to deploy peacekeeping troops into an African conflict.

The "UN Security Council has been a focal point for many of the efforts to respond constructively to internal conflicts...[possessing] power under the Charter to

⁸³ Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), p. 311

respond to acts of aggression, breaches of peace and threats to peace."⁸⁴ The UN should realize the nature of the conflicts in Africa, where there is often no host government and no cease-fire agreement in effect and thus no authority to obtain consent for peacekeeping missions. In cases such as these, the Security Council should authorize a Chapter VII mandate for a state-led multinational force that can establish an environment suitable for UN peacekeepers. Considering the distinct and numerous causes of conflict, previously discussed in the typology, the presence of a MNF is necessary to ensure security by addressing the underlying origins of the conflict. This issue will be discussed further in the following chapter detailing the role of multinational forces in African conflicts.

After the environment is secure, the UN can then proceed with its true purpose in conflict resolution, which is the deployment of peacekeeping missions. In order to ensure success in the peacekeeping mission, the UN must follow a guideline, acting as a checklist for all missions in Africa. First and foremost, the UN must remember that peacekeeping is the "imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed."⁸⁵ Secretary-General Annan stresses that these factors "remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping"⁸⁶ in order for the mission to meet objectives not overstep the bounds of its authority.

Second, it is inherent that when the UN is debating the establishment of a mission, it must address the scope of its mandate and sources of funding. In Rwanda,

⁸⁴ Max Kampelman, "Foreward," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* edited by Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), x

⁸⁵ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1994), p. 13

⁸⁶ *Brahimi Report: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. October, 2000, Section I(33), p. 4

UNAMIR I did not have sufficient resources to carry out its mandate, leading to failure of the mission, which resulted in the death of 850,000 Rwandans. UNAMIR II's mandate was similar to that of the first mission, but was subjected to 'mission creep,' and suffered from a lack of resources and manpower. The *Brahimi Report* recommends a "substantial increase in resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping operations...[which] should be treated as a core activity of the UN."⁸⁷ Increase in funding of missions will allow the peacekeepers to better carry out the mandate, thus making peacekeeping in Africa more effective.

Third, before the Security Council agrees to implement a cease-fire agreement and deploy troops, it should assure itself that the agreement meets specific conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines. This is especially relevant to cases of conflict in Africa where sometimes there are numerous cease-fire agreements constantly being broken and re-negotiated. If the UN approves the cease-fire agreement after having measured it against a set of threshold standards, the peacekeeping mission will be more prepared in its ability to uphold the agreement.

Finally, before the UN deploys a peacekeeping mission, it should take all necessary measures to ensure a smooth transition of power from the multinational force who was in charge of the peace enforcement operation. This means ensuring that there is little visible change in authority and presence of troops, which stipulates close coordination between the MNF and the UN.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, p. 21

INDIVIDUAL STATES AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Developments in the international system have led to a growing acceptance of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. The majority of conflicts in Africa today involve serious human rights violations and large scale suffering among the civilian population. These conditions are in breach of standards of international law and merit intervention that aims to rectify the situation. The preceding chapter suggests that the UN focus on peacekeeping activities, which fall within the organization's scope of authority, and sanction a state-led peace enforcement mission to intervene initially and stabilize the conflict, using force if necessary. This section focuses on the roles of states in the action of peace enforcement and suggests a set of guidelines that an international actor can follow when deciding to intervene in a conflict in Africa. In this case, the actor is an individual member state that must obtain Security Council permission under Chapter VII before intervening. Taking into consideration the lessons from UNITAF's intervention in Somalia, individual states should observe the following set of guidelines when making the decision to intervene in an African conflict.

First, it is necessary for individual states to determine what merits an intervention by a multinational force. The nation or nations that are willing to organize and lead the intervention must have a clear idea of why they are undertaking such action. There is currently a normative set of conditions that merit outside intervention in a state's internal affairs developing within the international community. These conditions include "genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as seen in Liberia; interference with the delivery of humanitarian aid, evidenced in Somalia; and collapse of civil order

entailing substantial loss of life; exemplified in both Liberia and Somalia."⁸⁸ Even though these conditions are becoming more universally accepted, reasons for intervention are determined at a state level, which brings national interest into play.

The United States is an excellent example how this first principle is applied in practice. The U.S. "is in an agonizing process of redefining its national interest in the post-Cold War era,"⁸⁹ especially in regard to its involvement in international crises. This is important considering that in the majority of multinational force peace enforcement missions, the U.S. is at the helm and provides most of the troops and funding necessary for the mission. In the wake of Somalia, still mourning the deaths of 18 of its troops, the U.S. issued its view on multilateral peace operations in the Presidential Decision Directive(PDD) 25. When the U.S. is considering participation in peace operations, PDD-25 states that the "objectives of an operation must be clearly defined in 'America's own national interest' and assured of continuing public and Congressional support." In addition, the "commitment of US troops cannot be 'open-ended' and consequently an 'exit strategy' must be in place before troops are deployed."⁹⁰ The conditions of PDD-25 pose a problem for the future of multinational force arrangements in that they indicate a lack of will to see a conflict through to its end, leaving the U.S. absent in the important process of peace-building. PDD-25 is "bound to limit the scope for direct peacekeeping involvement in Africa...but does allow policy makers to analyze intervention on a case-by-case basis."⁹¹ This specific case of the U.S. is especially important in light of lessons

⁸⁸ Lori Fisler Damrosch, "Introduction," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* edited by Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), x

⁸⁹ Max Kampelman, "Foreward," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* edited by Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), x

⁹⁰ Mats Berdal, "Peacekeeping in Africa, 1990-1996: The Role of the United States, France and Britain," in *Peacekeeping in Africa*, edited by Oliver Furley and Roy May (London: Ashgate, 1998), p. 55

⁹¹ *Ibid*, 56

learned in Somalia, and PDD-25 will temper the U.S.'s involvement in peace operations in Africa in the future.

A second guideline that states should follow when making the decision to intervene in an African conflict is to determine the best possible time for intervention, which will help contribute to the mission's success. In most cases, early intervention has the greatest chance of success. In Somalia, UNITAF intervened in the conflict after countless lives had been lost to starvation. Once the multinational force did intervene, it quickly secured the environment, which allowed for immediate delivery of food supplies. In some cases, delayed intervention in the conflict may be more effective. An example is a situation where the warring parties and their respective positions are not clearly defined and recognizable by outside actors. In such instances, immediate intervention may complicate the conflict by blurring the identities of the parties even more and using force in a situation that may not warrant it.

Third, states should take into account the budgetary costs of intervention. Determining the fixed costs of maintaining a military with enough size and structure to conduct peace operations is a more complicated, and in the end, subjective, task.⁹² If the peace enforcement mission is to be effective, it will need to have sufficient funds to carry out its objectives. Insufficient funds has been the ruin of numerous UN peacekeeping missions, with states usually obliged to help cover the costs. When states are the active parties in the intervention, as with peace enforcement, there is no other international actor to fall back on if funds prove to be insufficient. Thus, states should carefully

⁹² Michael O'Hanlon, *Saving Lives With Force: Military Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1997), p. 63.

calculate budgetary costs of a peace enforcement mission before deciding whether or not to intervene.

Finally, states should make casualty estimates and then proceed to make a decision on intervention in light of the assessment. Given the political and military variables at play in any conflict, there is no established formula for calculating casualties. A casualty estimation is especially important if the intervening party is the U.S. As was set forth in PDD-25, the U.S. states that it will support an intervention that enjoys support of both the American public and of Congress. Americans do not like to see their soldiers being killed in far off places for a cause that is not related to the interests of Americans. Although, in such cases as Bosnia and Somalia, the American public felt that violations of human rights were rampant, and was willing to support humanitarian intervention. It is necessary to plan to minimize casualties while preparing the state's citizens for the worst. If a state warns the public that there is the possibility for casualties and the people choose to support the intervention, they will be prepared in the event that there actually are casualties. In the case of Somalia, the American public thought that UNITAF was purely a humanitarian effort and thus did not expect any casualties. Consequently, when the people learned of the 18 U.S. casualties, they were more shocked and outraged than they would have if they had been prepared.

These guidelines are not an exact formula that will determine, in each conflict situation, whether or not states will intervene. But by following the aforementioned suggestions, the decision to intervene will be an educated one and comprehensive in nature, providing for a more effective peace enforcement mission.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DUAL ROLE OF PEACE
ENFORCEMENT AND PEACEKEEPING

Given the nature of problems that might require intervention by the states of Sub-Saharan Africa in the affairs of neighbors, it is "clear that those states need to be able to conduct the full range of peace operations from, on the one hand, traditional style peacekeeping, to, at the other extreme peace enforcement".⁹³ This dual role of regional organizations in conflict resolution places much responsibility on the member states and their respective armies. Such organizations as the OAU and ECOWAS are called upon to provide not only financial and military resources, but an accompanying political will to carry out the peace operations. Regional organizations have much at stake in the stability of the region and are usually willing to assist in efforts to resolve conflict in Africa. Over the years, for example, "22 African countries have made 95 individual contributions to 21 separate UN operations."⁹⁴ These statistics indicate that regional organizations are concerned about African conflicts and have been for a number of years. Taking into account lessons from Liberia and provisions of the OAU Charter, the following are a set of suggestions that regional organizations should consider when deciding whether to partake in both peace enforcement and peacekeeping activities.

First, the mandate of the mission and its composition need to be agreed upon by the participants and clearly explained to those affected. This avoids contributing nations working towards their own agendas and misinterpretation of the force's role by those with whom it is intervening. An example of this was internal strife between members of ECOWAS in regard to ECOMOG's role in Liberia. Many member nations were suspicious of Nigeria's motives in supplying the bulk of the troops for the mission. This

⁹³Gerry Cleaver and Roy May, "African Perspectives: Regional Peacekeeping," in *Peacekeeping in Africa*, edited by Oliver Furley and Roy May (London: Ashgate, 1998), p. 43

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 41

rift was visible on the outside and allowed for Charles Taylor to manipulate these divisions for his own gain.

Second, it is necessary for regional organizations to take into account the military capabilities of their member states. It is "realistic to expect that all branches of any given state's armed forces might be called upon to contribute to any peacekeeping operation ...thus taking into account not only an African state's army but also the navy and air force."⁹⁵ The vast majority of countries have armies numbering less than 50,000 men, with only five states, such as Angola and Sudan, possessing an army in excess of 50,000. This means that the total military manpower pool available to address conflict resolution is little over a million.⁹⁶ But taking into account those countries suffering from civil conflict and those unwilling to get involved, real manpower capabilities is just above 500,000. Effective peacekeeping requires a great deal of time and training, which suggests that with its limited manpower pool, lack of trained troops and insufficient funds, African nations will face challenges in regional peacekeeping arrangements.

Furthermore, and expounding upon the above suggestion, individual countries need to earmark those forces which they intend to make available for peace operations in practical terms. Troops need to receive specific training appropriate to the complexities of peacekeeping and command structures set up. "Political structures would need to establish permanent military staffs where differing practices between militaries could be harmonized to facilitate future cooperation."⁹⁷

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p.40

⁹⁶*Ibid*, p. 40

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 43

Third, and in relation to the last point, organizational structures need to be established that will monitor the actions and progress of the peace operation force. Coordinating the efforts of member states into one unified front on peacekeeping is a challenge for regional organizations. The construction of organizational structures will provide a framework for effective intervention in either a peace enforcement or peacekeeping capacity. Due to the specific details of distinct conflicts, there is no real formula for development of these organizational structures. The structures should be created on a case-by-case basis so as to be tailored to address and facilitate each individual peace operation.

Finally, it is necessary for regional organizations to ensure good relations and sound collaboration tactics in working with both individual states and the UN. In regard to peace enforcement, regional organizations much coordinate their efforts with those of the multinational force. Perhaps, the regional organization could provide the bulk of the troops considering their proximity to the conflict, with individual states contributing some troops but primarily offering support in the form of financial funding of the mission. In regard to peacekeeping, regional organizations should strive for a close level of interaction, and work towards achieving common goals. In the case of Liberia, ECOWAS worked closely with the UN to procure a Chapter VIII mandate, which authorized the use of force, albeit retroactively.

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND PEACE-BUILDING

In the past decade, armed conflict in Africa has eroded the developmental foundations of countries as "people are killed, infrastructure is destroyed, and resources

are diverted from routine maintenance of existing social and economic institutions."⁹⁸ This destruction has caused the collapse of numerous state systems in Africa and has inhibited the redevelopment efforts of war-torn societies. Peace-building activities include "strengthening the rule of law, improving respect for human rights...and providing technical assistance for democratic development and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques."⁹⁹ The positive results of these actions on post-conflict situations is enormous and illustrate why peace-building is a necessary element of any successful peace operation. Peace-building helps to create an environment of sustainable development by creating institutions that facilitate reconciliation and community healing, ensuring a long-lasting peace. This is an integral part of peace operations and one that can be carried out through collaboration between the UN, states, and regional organizations.

First and foremost, the United Nations has focused much of its efforts in peace operations on peace-building activities. The *Brahimi Report* calls for an even greater emphasis to be placed on peace-building efforts in the next decade, which will lead to development of strong institutions and infrastructure that support and contribute to a stable international order. An example of these peace-building efforts is in the case studies of Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia.¹⁰⁰ In Rwanda, the UN has established an ad hoc

⁹⁸ Nicole Ball, "The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies," in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), p. 607

⁹⁹ *Brahimi Report: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, January 2001, Section II: Doctrine, Strategy and Decision-making for Peace Operations, part A 13.

¹⁰⁰ Please refer to appendixes F-G for more in-depth information on UN peace-building activities in Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia. These current studies also indicate the humanitarian situation with the states, which illustrate the degree to which conflict can detrimentally affect the region long after it has been resolved. Peace-building efforts work to better the situation by instituting institutions and organizations that can carry on development efforts after departure of the UN.

international tribunal that is responsible for trying perpetrators of war crimes. With regard to the situation in Somalia, the UN has taken the initiative to organize periodic "Meetings of External Actors," which acts as a means of ensuring better coordination of peace building efforts. On-going efforts in Somalia have resulted in the creation of a new Parliament, which is one step towards re-instituting a viable state system. The existence of such democratic institutions will encourage further development of infrastructure by acting as forums for the citizens to take part in reforms at all levels.

Individual states should make efforts to stay involved in African conflicts after the need for peace enforcement operations has been satisfied. One important component of peace-building is "consolidating internal and external security,"¹⁰¹ which can be provided for by having troops from the peace enforcement mission stay on and train soldiers and police indigenous to the region. These efforts include the reform of military and police education systems and the evaluation of former security forces. Individual states can also play a role in peace-building by assisting with the economic needs associated with development. Donor nations could assess the damage to economic and social infrastructure within a post-conflict area in Africa and "offer technical assistance to plan and implement rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts."¹⁰² This assistance might include restructuring of the health and education services, two of the most important institutions in development of a nation and its citizens.

Regional organizations have a stake in the stability of a certain area of the world and if they play a role in peace-building, relations between nations will improve, thus

¹⁰¹Nicole Ball, "The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies," in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997), p. 615

¹⁰² *Ibid*, p.616

creating a stable regional environment less prone to conflict. Due to their proximity to the post-conflict area, regional organizations have the ability to get involved at a grass roots level, thus incorporating the people of nation into a comprehensive peace-building effort. Having Africans help Africans will help foster a sense of community and strengthen relations within the region. Regional organizations have the ability to help promote national reconciliation by stressing collaborative modes of behavior already in place in some of the organization's member states. The OAU Charter states as one of its main purposes the necessity to "promote the unity and solidarity of the African States...and coordinate and intensify cooperation efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa."¹⁰³ Peace-building is a perfect means to fulfill this objective of the OAU as it works towards providing stability and peace in the region.

It is important to remember that no peace operation is complete, and can never truly be successful, without peace-building. These efforts lead to long-term stability and will lead to the prevention of future conflicts on the African continent.

CONCLUSION:

Human institutions are capable of growth and change and indicative of the transformations that the international community has witnessed in the post-Cold War era. The crises in Africa in the 1990's has created a need to look beyond state boundaries to the source of instability within states. These intrastate conflicts are becoming more prevalent and have begun to shape notions about the ever-changing nature of conflicts in the 21st century. This thesis has explored a three-tiered approach to international peace

¹⁰³ *OAU Charter*, Article II(1a,b)

operations in Africa and has defined the specific roles that the UN, states and regional organizations play in peace operations. The UN should be primarily responsible for peacekeeping, with state-led multinational arrangements taking on a peace enforcement role to initially stabilize the conflict-ridden environment. Regional organizations take on the dual role of peacekeeping and peace enforcement; this integrated approach allowing for stability within the African continent.

The most important aspect of any peace operation is peace-building, which provides for the development in the post-conflict climate, usually characterized by destruction, chaos and depletion of human resources. It is during this phase of peace operations that a nation is able to begin and heal its war-wounds and attempt to reconcile disparities between the separate parties. Peace building ensures that damaged infrastructure is rebuilt and that deteriorated institutions are restored. Oftentimes, there are no remaining signs of previous order and an entire new state system must be constructed from the ground-up. Each of the international actors plays a specific role in peace-building efforts. The UN takes on an organizational role and helps to coordinate the efforts of other involved parties, such as NGOs. States are a little more removed from the process in that they primarily provide aid to assist with peace-building activities. Regional organizations are the most heavily involved in peace building efforts due to their concern about local stability and security. Involvement of regional organizations at the grass-roots level provides for an all-encompassing approach to peace building that incorporates the people.

It is my hope that the multilateral approach to peace operations posited in this thesis will help bring long-term peace and stability to areas in Africa suffering from horrific civil wars and intrastate ethnic conflicts. By calling on various and distinct

international actors to play a part in conflict resolution in Africa, this thesis draws attention to an area of the world in dire need of international assistance and supportive efforts. It is important to remember that achieving peace in an unstable region of the world such as Africa is a process. This multilateral process encourages participation of both local and international organizations and is dependent upon collaboration and cooperation between states, regions and peoples. It is forever ongoing and different for each conflict situation. By incorporating the three-tiered approach to multilateral peace operations into this dynamic process of peace, conflicts in Africa in the 21st can be addressed more effectively and eventually resolved.

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