

AID AS A PEACEMAKER:

A View From Burundi

ÖZSEL BELELI

JUSTICE & PEACE CERTIFICATE

SENIOR THESIS

SPRING 2001

Contents

INTRODUCTION	2
AID AS A PEACEMAKER: THE BACKGROUND.....	4
CHANGING THE PARADIGM AND OBSTACLES	7
STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER	10
 SECTION I:	
INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	11
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT	11
INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	12
CAUSES OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS	13
THE CAUSES OF THE BURUNDIAN CONFLICT	16
 SECTION II:	
AID & CONFLICT	20
 SECTION III:	
AID AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION	24
THE LEADERSHIP LEVEL	24
Operational Prevention and Aid	24
Structural Prevention and Aid	26
Peace Assessment and ‘Do No Harm’	29
Preventive Development.....	30
Capacity Building	31
Conditionality	33
Aid to Burundi Prior to 1993	35
THE GRASSROOTS LEVEL	39
Promotive Approach	40
Preventive Approach and Capacity Building	41
Addressing the Root Causes	43
 SECTION IV:	
AID AS A TOOL FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS	44
THE LEADERSHIP LEVEL	44
Sticks & Carrots	45
Institutional Development	46
THE GRASSROOTS LEVEL	48
Changing Paradigms of Relief Work.....	48
Relief Assistance in Burundi	50
Aid as a Peacemaker in the Midst of a Conflict	51
Capacity Building & Investing in Social & Human Capital	53
Investing in Stable Pockets of Peace	56
Building Bridges Across Identities	57
 SECTION V:	
OBSTACLES & RECOMMENDATIONS.....	59
 CONCLUSION.....	63
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	67

INTRODUCTION:

The last decade of the twentieth century has been a period of unique political changes that have transformed the nature of international relations. Not only the Cold War power politics that shaped international relations has been significantly challenged as a result of the dismantling of the communist regimes, but also the fragile domestic and regional balances created in the East vs. West conflict zones have been seriously disturbed. The proliferation of intra-state conflicts around the world has been one of the most bloody manifestations of the troubled fragile power balances and the consequent withdrawal of superpower support to client regimes (Kaldor 1999: 3).

In the last decade, intra-state conflicts fought over natural resources and political power within weakened state structures have vastly outnumbered the traditional inter-state wars (Sollenberg 1999: 7). Most of these new wars have been fought in the underdeveloped world and they have resulted in extreme numbers of casualties.¹ The guerilla wars of post-World War II that were characterized by well-founded ideological goals for the impoverished people turned into vicious wars carried out mainly for political and economic gains in the post-Cold War period. In these new wars civilian casualties are no longer perceived as undesirable by-products of the armed conflicts but instead they are increasingly becoming the main target of these brutal and horrific conflicts (Kaldor 1999: 8). Consequently, the number of civilians affected by these conflicts is reaching unprecedented levels.

Located in the heart of East Africa with a population of about 6 million people, Burundi has been one of the most extreme cases where the civilians have been plagued by violence and bloodshed for years. The country has experienced a series of outbreaks of violence in the last 38 years that have claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians. The latest episode of

these outbreaks of violence started in 1993 following the assassination of Burundi's first democratically elected president and it has turned into the longest and the most destructive one of all previous civil conflicts. During the eight years the conflict has been going on over 200,000 civilians were killed, about 400,000 were internally displaced, and 350,000 became refugees.² In addition to the high civilian death toll and displacement, the economic capital of Burundi has deteriorated to an extremely low level. It is estimated that the country's mainly subsistence economy contracted by 25 percent, the headcount of the poor has more than doubled in urban areas, and the reported cases of endemic diseases have increased by over 200 percent (World Bank 1999).³

In the face of the extreme destruction and violence of intra-state conflicts, an overwhelming agreement emerged within the international community about the need 'to do something' to resolve these conflicts. Consequently, a search for effective international responses to the complexities of the new intra-state wars became widespread among academics, policy-makers, and NGO/IO staff in conflict areas. As a result an overwhelming amount of literature has been produced on numerous conflict-related topics ranging from the causes of intra-state conflicts to military peacekeeping operations, and from diplomatic intervention to humanitarian relief. Extensive discussions have taken place within both the academic and policy circles about the need and ways to preserve and make peace in the destabilizing parts of the world. As extensive as these discussions might have been, an extremely important link has been missing from the literature. The potential of using development and relief aid as instruments of conflict prevention and resolution has been almost totally neglected.⁴

Aid As a Peacemaker: The Background

Utilizing aid as a tool for peace by introducing a conflict transformative dimension to it emerges as a possibility based on five recent trends in the fields of conflict management and foreign aid. During the last decade, what emerged in the field of conflict management have been a recognition of the necessity of a reform to make the international conflict management mechanisms more effective and a preference for making use of existing institutions in carrying out this reform. On top of the search for a more effective conflict management mechanism emerged a growing skepticism about the success of the existing conflict resolution methods that had by and large overlooked the necessity to address the basic human needs. In the field of foreign aid, on the other hand, a deeper crisis has emerged as a result of the need to re-define the goals of aid after the end of the Cold War. On top of this search for new goals, a trend of skepticism has become widespread regarding the effects of aid in areas of conflict.

The last decade has left the international community facing its inability to resolve intra-state conflicts once they cross a certain threshold of violence. In most of these conflicts, with the spread of violence -and stories of violence- from a limited area of origin to a wider community, the social institution of trust that under normal circumstances hold communities together has quickly become replaced by fear. Once fear has become prevalent, it has lead into new episodes of violence committed for reasons of “self-defense”. Once a certain threshold of violence has been crossed, the existing conflict management mechanisms have tied the hands of international community in its efforts of turning back the wheel to recreate trust and co-existence. Combined with the unacceptable dimensions of human suffering in these conflicts, this inability to manage intra-state conflicts has led to a realization of the necessity to create more effective mechanisms of conflict management that could particularly prevent or resolve conflicts before that threshold

was crossed. This realization has become even more solemn because the trend of intra-state conflicts have been expected to become more widespread and deadly in the future, making an effective response by the international community even more urgent (Carnegie 1997: 9).

The agreed need of making a leap in the international community's ability and determination to prevent and resolve violent conflicts have initially brought about a trend towards creating new preventive institutions, mechanisms and instruments. Yet, this trend searching for new bodies of conflict management has since been out under increasing criticism by a growing number of policy makers. These arguments state that in an international arena that is already flooded with an abundance of institutions that a reform of the existing bodies to take on a conflict preventive role is the ideal solution. Consequently, more recently there emerged an exploration of the potential of existing international institutions, mechanisms and instruments for the prevention and resolution of intra-state conflicts.

On top of these two trends that greatly influenced the international conflict management efforts, a growing skepticism came to the surface among a number of security specialists stating that conflict resolution was unlikely to be successful unless it addressed the underlying causes of conflict, i.e. promoted human development (Miller 1992: 7; Byrne&Ayulo 1998: 422). The main idea underlying this argument for an expanded scope of conflict resolution activities found its principles in human needs theory. In very simple terms, the human needs theory argues that when a group of people suffer together from combinations of the poverty of the basic needs of subsistence, protection, affection, participation, and identity because the social structures and institutions are not functioning, they will strive to have these needs satisfied through other means including violence (Bremner 1994: 4). Thus, in order to be effective conflict management efforts need to reform or restructure the social institutions so that basic human needs are satisfied. In

other words, conflict management efforts that take place solely at the leadership level with no attention to the root causes of a conflict cannot bring about permanent peace and thus, should be replaced by a more comprehensive approach to peacemaking.

The last decade has brought about a period of reassessment also in the field of foreign aid. What was put under growing criticism was not only the success of the existing mechanisms of foreign aid (Lancaster 1999: 4), which was the case in the field of conflict management. Unlike conflict management, foreign aid suffered significantly from the disappearance of the clearly-defined Cold War goals. First, with the end of the Cold War the traditional role of aid as a strategic and political tool for protecting security by helping contain the expansion of communist influence disappeared (Lancaster 2000: 18). Consequently, with bilateral aid regimes experiencing a serious loss of direction and goal, aid fatigue became a frequently pronounced term among the Northern donors. Aid fatigue was further strengthened as a result of a number of eye-opening experiences about the negative effects of aid in areas of conflict. The extent of the negative influence the introduction of external resources could have on community conflicts in resource-scarce settings became another reason for the hesitancy of the bilateral donors in sending aid to conflict-prone areas (Anderson 1999: 2). Thus, aid's great potential to influence the local conditions translated itself into only extreme caution on behalf of aid donors and workers. The positive influence aid could have in conflict situations has been left unexplored with the exception of a handful of recent writings.⁵ Donors continued to dismiss foreign aid's potential in addressing the root causes of a conflict and in encouraging cooperation and inclusiveness as such issues fell outside of the traditional role of aid.

These trends in the fields of conflict management and foreign aid are the foundations on which the argument for the utilization of aid as a peacemaker is based. On the one hand is the

desire for successful conflict management through the existing institutions and the recognition that such attempts are unlikely to be successful in the long term if they do not promote human development. On the other hand is an aid regime that has the potential to promote human development and make positive changes for peace but yet is suffering from the lack of clear objectives. Putting these trends together, the incorporation of a peace dimension into the existing instrument of aid and using it as a tool for conflict management emerges as a solution to the problems in both fields. Reforming the existing institution of aid to incorporate a peace dimension would both strengthen the external actors' efforts for conflict management by addressing the underlying causes of a conflict and give a new and well-defined direction for bilateral aid regimes. It is this line of argument from which the origins of the founding idea of this paper has emerged.

Aid As a Peacemaker: Changing the Paradigm and Obstacles

It should not come as a surprise that the structural reforms necessary to enable aid to take on this role of peacemaking have not taken place yet. For development and humanitarian aid to become instrumental in preventing and resolving intra-state conflicts, a number of fundamental changes in the nature of the current aid regime and relief work need to take place. First of all, development aid regime has to re-expand its approach to development on a systematic basis to incorporate further non-economic aspects of development, including peace, human rights and ethnic relations (Urvin 1999: 55). Increasingly, international donors and multilateral organizations have realized the need to expand their Cold War development framework to include social, environmental and political dimensions of development. Yet, the centrality of peace to sustainable development remains a missing link in this framework. In the face of the

devastating effects of violent conflicts on the development prospects of a country, it is fundamental for the international donor community to re-expand its development framework and prioritize peace and peaceful ethnic relations within this framework

Second of all, the traditional divide between relief, development and conflict resolution work has to be reconsidered. Since conflicts do not take place in isolation from political, economic, and social realities, relief work cannot continue its presence in conflict situations by denying its effects on these realities. Instead, it has to equip itself with the necessary tools from development and conflict resolution fields in order to make a positive effect on the conflict. Also, the traditional conflict resolution paradigm that conceptualizes the transition from emergency to long-term development as a linear continuum has to adapt itself to the realities of conflict situations. Most intra-state conflicts do not conform to a linear pattern, chronology or order in their evolution. Instead, pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict phases may take place at the same time in different geographical locations, or the conflict may oscillate between these three phases continuously. In order to respond the reality of conflicts in the most effective way, the linear conflict resolution paradigm has to be altered so that “emergency relief, rehabilitation work and development assistance all co-exist in times of conflict and crisis, and interact in [numerous] ways” (OECD-DAC Guidelines 1997: Article 96).

Third, and last of all, international community’s conflict response mechanism has to become multifaceted and far-sighted. Preventing or resolving a conflict that has political, social, economic, historical and cultural roots cannot be achieved overnight or solely through political means. Aid as a peacemaker can only succeed if it is one of many parts of a cohesive and sustained conflict response mechanism. Intra-state conflicts take place at all levels of the society, involve multi-actors, and they have multifaceted causes and effects and thus the

international community's response to prevent or resolve conflicts has to take place at all these levels and incorporate highly multifaceted means and instruments. Such multi-faceted and long-term conflict response mechanism requires intensive cooperation and coordination among international and local actors at all levels. These three major policy changes are not only necessary for international aid' becoming a peacemaker but they are also challenges that the international community should overcome in order to take on a more successful role in preventing and resolving intra-state conflicts.

The international community's involvement in Burundi in the last decade is a perfect illustration of the limited capacity of the traditional aid and relief regimes in taking on the role of a peacemaker. In the past decade, although the international community has become extensively involved through diplomatic channels in Burundi in order to attenuate the possibility of another Rwanda-like scenario occurring here (Sollom&Kew 1996: 246), neither the pre-conflict pressures could prevent the outbreak of the conflict nor the peace attempts since 1993 could bring an end to the conflict. Outside the political channels of diplomacy, foreign assistance has been the only other channel of international influence in Burundi.⁶ Yet, this channel has been left almost completely unexplored as a tool for peacemaking. While the scope of pre-conflict development aid was largely limited to infrastructure building and economic structural adjustment, the bulk of the external aid since 1993 has been spent towards the provision of relief assistance to the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons.⁷ Although a handful number of projects that challenge the traditionally separate spheres of relief, development and conflict management has taken place in Burundi, a structural re-thinking of the development and relief assistance has not emerged yet. The continuation of the conflict as well as of the international

commitment to resolving the conflict make Burundi a good case for analyzing the potential of using foreign aid as a tool for conflict management.

Structure of the Paper:

Through the five main sections of this paper, the reforms necessary to utilize foreign aid as a peacemaker and the practical implications of these reforms will be analyzed in further detail at different stages of the conflict cycle. Based on the theoretical foundation established in the first and second sections on the causes of intra-state conflict and the role of aid as a peacemaker in addressing these causes, the international community's involvement in the pre-conflict and conflict periods in Burundi will be analyzed with the aim to make constructive recommendations. In the first section, aid will be placed within the general frameworks of the causes of intra-state conflicts and the role of the international community in responding to these conflicts. In the second section, the relation between aid and conflict will be discussed in further detail. In the third and fourth sections, the specifics of utilizing aid as a peacemaker in the pre-conflict and conflict phases will be discussed. In the concluding section, limitations on the immediate implementation of these recommendations will be explained and a possible course of action will be discussed. The case of Burundi will be incorporated into the analysis throughout all the five sections. The evolution of the conflict in Burundi and the general observations about the nature of the external involvement will be discussed in the first two sections while the nature and effects of the aid regime since 1990 will be incorporated into the discussions of the third and fourth sections. The concluding section will give an overview of the current state of the conflict in Burundi and make recommendations for future aid programs in the conflict and post-conflict stages of the Burundian conflict.

SECTION I:**INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY****Ia.) Understanding Conflict:**

Conflict is an integral part of every society where interests and expectations of its members disagree. It is often a positive force that enables change to take place through the peaceful resolution mechanisms existing in the society. Yet not all conflicts are –or can be– resolved through peaceful means. In some cases, parties who perceive their goals to be mutually exclusive resort to violent means in order to achieve these goals. When the parties decide that peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms are futile because they are either incapable of bringing about a necessary major change in the society or they are part of an overall system to be changed, then conflict is taken to a violent and destructive level. If these issues that underlie the conflict are of concern to a significant portion of the society and if these issues are central to their basic human needs, then the conflict and the accompanying violence is more likely to have widespread effects.⁸ It is these violent and destructive forms of conflict that are of concern to the international community.

Ib.) Intra State Conflicts and the International Community:

Among a number of reasons why such intra-state conflicts are of concern to the international community, two reasons stand out: regional stability and humanitarian concerns.

Weakening of the state control, proliferation in the number illegal activities -including arms and minerals smuggling-, and massive displacement of civilians certainly do not to respect the state borders and cause instability outside the country in conflict. The Great Lakes region and the turmoil that embroiled the countries in the region since the end of the Cold War is the best example of how instability in one country can have detrimental effects in the neighboring states. Thus, the international community has an interest in managing an intra-state conflict at its earlier stages before the regional stability is troubled. Humanitarian concerns also underlie the international community's involvement to intra-state conflicts. In the face of the massive human sufferings that occur as a result of intra-state conflicts, the international community does not perceive non-action to be an option.

Having eliminated non-action as an option based mainly on the reasons of regional stability and humanitarianism, the international community has responded to the intra-state conflicts of the last decade in a number of different ways, which ranged from carrying out a full-scale military intervention to using diplomatic channels and from imposing economic sanctions to sending food aid. The effectiveness and appropriateness of this range of responses differed in each conflict creating an immense pool of experience for the international community to learn from. Among the many lessons drawn from the successes or failures of these international responses, the need to refrain from 'quick-fix' responses and to fully understand and address the root causes of a conflict emerged as the hardest-learned and probably one of the most fundamental lessons. As stated by Ould-Abdallah, who was the UN Special Envoy to Burundi between 1993 and 1995, in order to be effective in preventing or managing a conflict, the international community must "dig deep to be able to understand the current problems in light of broader historical, geographical, economic, demographic, religious, and ethnic issues [and]

identify the real root causes of the crisis and distance itself from the all-too-common urge to find a ‘quick fix’ or to ‘do something’ irrespective of its long-term impact on the situation” (Ould-Abdallah 2000: 111).

Ic.) Causes of Intra-State Conflicts:

Building a comprehensive understanding of the causes of intra-state conflicts is indeed central to drawing an action plan for the international community in addressing these causes. As a result of the importance of the causes of intra-state conflicts in determining the nature of the international mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, this topic has been studied extensively in the conflict literature. The multitude of the causes that play a role in the outbreak of a violent conflict makes a complete analysis almost impossible. While fully aware of the incompleteness of all accounts of the causes of intra-state conflicts, a framework that combines Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation, Galtung’s theory of structural violence, and Davies’ theory of J-Curve can explain to a significant degree the root causes of intra-state conflicts.

A perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities form the main pillar of the theory of relative deprivation. The threat of such a discrepancy to erupt into violence depends on the pervasiveness of this perception, the degree of effort previously invested in the attainment of the goal and the perceived closeness of the attainment of the goal (Gurr 1972: 39,42). As relative as this perception may be, most often the discrepancy is the result of the presence of a serious degree of structural violence in a society. In other words, the structural establishment of the society encourages an unequal distribution of economic and political power, which consequently creates unequal life chances (Galtung 1969: 171). Structural violence manifests itself among other things in the shape of illegitimate or repressive

regimes, discrimination against ethnic or other social groups, poorly managed religious, cultural or ethnic differences, and widespread illiteracy, disease and malnutrition. Looking at it from the perspective of basic human needs theory, structural violence in a society brings about a poverty of subsistence, protection, affection, participation, and identity for certain members of a society who belong to certain identity groups.⁹

Recognizing that not all long-lasting conditions of structural violence and widespread relative deprivation erupt into countrywide violent conflicts, there needs to be explanation for the ‘spark’ that triggers violence and sustains it. Davies’ J-Curve theory fills this gap in explaining the triggering factor in the outbreak of a violent conflict. Davies argues that when rising expectations about a future change of the conditions of structural violence are followed by their effective frustration, violent conflict is imminent (Davies 1972: 68). Sudden turn of events that changes the positive course of events and consequently frustrates the risen expectations of a group become the spark that unleashes the anger and frustration accumulated as a result of a history of structural violence and unmet basic human needs.

In most intra-state conflicts, the issues of relative deprivation, structural violence, and frustration of rising expectations become less visible because identity politics tend to establish the language of the conflict solely in terms of ethnicity or religion. The conflict in Burundi, where the violence has been perceived to emerge as a result of the ethnic hatred between the Hutus and Tutsis that has its roots in primordial or colonial times, is no exception to this trend. Although most academics today agree that looking for the causes of the present violence solely in primordial or colonial times is misleading, the conflict continue to be viewed by most policy makers and the international media as an ethnic struggle for power detached from its underlying political, economic and social causes (Ngaruko&Nkurunziza 2000: 6). In reality, identity-based

conflicts most often involve struggle for meeting the biological needs for food, shelter and clothing, and the socio-psychological needs for identity, security, recognition, participation and autonomy (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1998: 10) while identities and history become the terms in which this struggle is fought. In other words, at the level of the masses intra-state conflicts represent people's desire to put an end to the long periods of structural violence.

In forming its understanding of intra-state conflicts, the international community has often overlooked these deep-rooted causes of the conflict at the level of the masses and limited its analysis to the overly simplified idea of "ethnic hatred". It has instead focused at the leadership-level of the conflict in explaining the conflict and thus limited its sphere of action to this level. Intra-state conflicts have been perceived to be mainly the manifestations of incompatible personal or sectarian ambitions of the elite to preserve or to gain political and economic power. Thus, negotiations and external pressure on the power-holding elites have been the main tools of international peace-making efforts. Only recently a number of scholars and practitioners have come to the realization that intra-state conflicts occur at multi-levels and the sustainability of the peace depends on addressing all these levels.

Id.) The Causes of the Burundian Conflict:

The recent conflict in Burundi cannot be fully understood if it is isolated from the outbreaks of violence that occurred since the country's independence. The episodes of violent conflicts that occurred in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1991 can be viewed as a sequence of events where structural violence caused by the predation by power holders led to rebellions triggered by those excluded, and in turn, the army as the defense of the system of predation violently repressed the rebels along with civilians of that group (Ngaruko&Nkurunziza 2000:8). What

these outbreaks of violence left behind as a legacy has been a collective memory of repression and martyrdom for the Hutu population of Burundi. Subsequent governments' rejection to carry out impartial investigations that looked into acts of violence committed against civilian populations in these conflicts created a feeling of further injustice and thus, in turn, strengthened this memory of martyrdom. For the Hutu population, the preoccupation in the last three decades have remained the fact that the guilty parties in 1972 and in 1988 have gone unpunished (EIU 4th Quarter 1988: 6). In light of these earlier outbreaks of violence, the intra-state conflict since 1993 cannot be viewed as an independent event. It is another episode of violence in the history of Burundi but only this time the better-organized nature of the rebel groups made the 'military solution' of quick and violent repression unsuccessful.

Looking at the economic and political characteristics of Burundi through the three-tier framework introduced above brings to surface a pattern of structural violence that has prevailed along two different lines of division: Hutu versus Tutsi and urban versus rural. Although the political and economic discrimination along urban-rural lines have not transformed itself into a violent conflict, the current conflict that has taken on an ethnic identity certainly reflects some of the characteristics of the urban-rural division. The focus of the analysis given here, however, will be mainly on the ethnic line of division. Thus, the different manifestations of the structural violence in the economic and political spheres will be analyzed through ethnic lenses.

In the economic sphere, structural violence manifests itself among other things in the form of widespread poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition and epidemic diseases that is disproportionately distributed along different groups. In the case of Burundi, it would be misleading to underline the economic discrimination along ethnic lines without drawing a complete picture of the overall suffering of the Burundians. For most Burundians, the basic

human need of subsistence has been barely met even before the conflict. In 1993, Burundi ranked as the 12th poorest country in the world and had a \$220 average per capita annual income. While only 41% of boys and 25% of girls of primary school age were enrolled in school in 1982, the infant mortality rate was nearly 123 per thousand.¹⁰ It has been one of the most densely populated areas on the continent yet virtually 94 per cent of its population was rural involved in agriculture, herding and related pursuits in 1993 (Leatherman 1999: 133). Furthermore, In 1987, more than 90 per cent of available arable land was already under cultivation (EIU 2nd Quarter 1987: 25). The dependency of most of the population on land, the scarcity of land and the high levels of population growth have made the land issue and its disproportional ownership among ethnic lines one of the major manifestations of structural violence and thus a major source of ethnic tension in the rural areas (Lemarchand 152).

Exacerbating the tensions resulting from resource scarcity was the continuous pattern of discriminatory distribution of government assistance between the Tutsis and Hutus. The Fifth Five-Year Plan of Burundi, for example, allocated 98 per cent of gross fixed capital formation to a geographical area made of Bujumbura, the capital city and its surrounding areas, and the southern province of Bururi out of the 15 provinces of the country (Ngaruko&Nkurunziza 2000: 7). Although this may appear as an issue of not an ethnic but regional character, it is interesting to note that Bururi has come to be associated with the Tutsis since President Buyoya and his predecessors Michel Micombero and Jean-Baptiste Bagaza are from this province (EIU 4th Quarter 1987: 25). Similarly, the population of Bujumbura has traditionally consisted of disproportionate numbers of Tutsis.

The manifestation of the structural violence that systematically put the Hutus at a disadvantage was especially vivid in the political and social spheres. The political exclusion of

the Hutus from the single-party system of Burundian politics dominated by Tutsi elite reached extreme levels with the 1972 massacre where most Hutu with 4 or more years of high school education were either killed or forced to leave the country (Ngaruko&Nkurunziza 2000: 11). Consequently, Hutus were left with no political or administrative power in Burundian politics. The co-option of some Hutus into positions of power remained cosmetic and inadequate. For instance, in 1985, there were 4 Hutu out of 20 members of the Central Committee of the then state Party, UPRONA; 2 Hutu out of 15 governors of province; 1 Hutu out of 22 ambassadors; and no Hutu among the country's prosecutors (Ngaruko&Nkurunziza 2000: 11). Exclusion from educational opportunities which is at the heart of the overall exclusion in Burundi, has continued for the 85 percent majority [Hutu] population despite some reform efforts by Buyoya after 1987 (EIU 4th Quarter 1988: 6). The massive disparities in the deployment of educational resources to different provinces of the country have again favored the Tutsi-dominated province of Bururi (Jackson 2000:3). Although no statistics are available, in his recent report on education in Burundi, Tony Jackson stated that anecdotal evidence from a number of sources indicated that the national university was a largely Tutsi institution, with a small number of Hutus. Hutus were likewise in a minority among the academic staff (2000: 21)

Structural violence in Burundi has also taken the shape of continuous military repression that became exceptionally violent in the 1965, 1972 and 1988 conflicts. Having become a predominantly Tutsi institution, the military increasingly became the defense arm of a repressive Tutsi government. The government, on the other hand, became increasingly exclusionary through the 1980s and acquired a strong rent-seeking and clientist character (Ngaruko &Nkurunziza 2000: 12).¹¹

What actually brought about the violent reaction of the Hutus in 1993 and triggered the recent conflict was Ndadaye's assassination. As argued by Davies, when rising expectations about a future change of the conditions of structural violence are followed by their effective frustration, violent conflict is imminent (1972: 68). In the case of Burundi, the assassination of Ndadaye by the military "destroyed the hopes of hundreds of thousands of Hutu that the time has come when they would no longer be treated as political pariahs –or worse" (Lemarchand 1996: xiii). Having been excluded from the control mechanisms of the country for more than three decades, the sudden extermination of Hutu expectations of a better future with the democratic elections predictably had devastating effects. As described by Lemarchand in the outbreak of the conflict "the announcement of Ndadaye's death hit the countryside with the force of an earthquake. A blind rage suddenly seized Frodebu militants and peasants alike in almost every province, and they killed every Tutsi in sight" (1996: xxvi).

It is on this background of structural violence and the frustration of rising Hutu expectations that the current conflict erupted. Understanding these underlying causes and events are fundamental in assessing the role of the international community in preventing and resolving the conflict. More importantly, the role of aid in the pre-conflict and conflict stages cannot be fully understood outside of this context.

SECTION 2:

AID & CONFLICT

The introduction of any type of resource into a resource-scarce environment inevitably affects and changes that environment. The initial effects and changes mostly take place in the economic structures of the recipient environment. However, economic changes cannot be

separated from its social and political affects in a society. Change or the prospect of change in the economic structure certainly affect the social and political power relations in a recipient environment. These effects are especially dramatic where either the recipient environment already hosts tensions in its social and political spheres over the distribution of the existent resources or a full-scale conflict is underway. Since foreign aid,¹² be it developmental or humanitarian, constitutes one of the major channels of resource insertion into developing countries, it naturally has significant power to affect the recipient environment.

This power of aid as an agent of social and political change has been highly neglected by the donor community until recently. The widespread donor assumption has traditionally been that aid remains politically and socially neutral since its goals are either humanitarian or limited to changing economic performance of a country. In constructing development programs, donors have traditionally focused on the economic capital of a country but have largely ignored the political and social ramifications of the re-distribution of assets and opportunities. The implicit distributional implications of aid were hardly ever taken into account in the designing and implementation stages of development programs. In constructing relief programs, both donors and relief agencies have traditionally focused on the distribution of emergency needs to save lives but have largely ignored the military and social ramifications of the insertion of high quantities of goods into a conflict area. The consequences of such a limited perception of development and relief have been dramatic especially multi-ethnic societies polarized along lines of exclusive identities. In these settings, all kinds of outside intervention are highly vulnerable to sentiments of identity politics. Especially when the outside actors are unaware of the identity politics present in a society, the geographic allocation of aid and the identity of its beneficiaries can easily exacerbate the tensions along lines of identity.

As a result of the international community's unawareness of aid's power in affecting the social and political environment of the recipient country, the experience so far has mostly been in the shape of negative effects. There has been a growing literature on the negative consequences of inserting development or relief aid into conflict-prone or conflict-ridden countries. Among the negative effects of aid cited in this literature have been its diversion for military purposes, its contribution to the increase of resources to prosecute conflict, its distributional effects and potential of increasing inter-identity competition, its potential for creating dependency, its role as a legitimizer of the fighting forces, and its reinforcing affects on the war economy. (Prendergast 1996: 17-36; Anderson 1999: 37-55). Consequently, there has been increasing caution on behalf of the donors and NGOs to prevent the harming effects of aid in the recipient countries.

Certainly, the incorporation of a structural thinking into the aid regime about preventing the negative effects of aid on the social and political power relations in the recipient environment should be the first step of utilizing aid as a peacemaker. In other words, in order for the aid to become a peacemaker, first its potential as a "warmaker" should be eliminated. Yet, preventing aid's negative effects is only an indirect measure of peacemaking. In order to actively pursuit conflict prevention and conflict transformation through the aid mechanism, the international community has to move beyond the indirect "do no harm" measures and apply direct measures for making peace through aid.

In the following two sections on the possibilities of utilizing aid as a peacemaker, both the "indirect" and the "direct" measures will be addressed in order to provide a structural framework for implementation. As stated earlier in Section I, intra-state conflicts have their causes and effects both at the leadership and the grassroots levels. Consequently, preventing the emergence of a violent conflict has to address the causes at both of these levels. Thus, in

analyzing the practical means of incorporating a peace dimension into aid programs, the leadership level and the projects at the grassroots level will be studied separately. Relevant to the practical implications of utilizing aid as a peacemaker is the nature and capacity of the actors involved in the conflict prevention efforts. International actors who are active at the levels of leadership and grassroots will be significantly different. While the lines between these levels are not definitively drawn and thus frequently crossed by international actors, at the leadership level mainly states and multilateral institutions and at the grassroots level nongovernmental organizations prevail as the key international actors.¹³ Thus, in the next two sections the current conflict in Burundi will be analyzed at these two levels.

Also used as a line of demarcation in the analysis is the phase the conflict is in within the cycle of conflict. While the focus of this paper will be on the pre-conflict and conflict stages of the Burundian conflict, the difficulty and the danger of dividing intra-state conflicts into clearly defined phases is recognized. Not only the historical continuance of conflict in Burundi since independence makes it difficult to define the pre-1993 period as pre-conflict,¹⁴ but also since 1993 Burundi has not been in war –and thus so in peace- in a geographical totality.¹⁵ “Contrary to a belief widespread among outside observers, a country in crisis is never totally at war or totally at peace at the same time” (Ould-Abdallah 2000: 79). At periods when certain regions were embroiled in violence in Burundi, in most regions normality would prevail (Ould-Abdallah 2000: 79). The absence of a clear division of the phases of conflict does not mean that at a given point in the conflict neither of the measures recommended for pre-conflict or for conflict –and also for post-conflict- should be applied. Instead, based on the awareness that a country in conflict is not totally in a pre-conflict, conflict or post-conflict stage, specific measures should address conditions, not phases in their totality. Thus, the division of the next two sections into

pre-conflict and conflict stages is mainly for purposes of study and so should be looked at with this understanding.

AID AS A PEACEMAKER:

	PRE-CONFLICT	CONFLICT
LEADERSHIP-LEVEL	Indirect: -peace assessment -"do no harm"	Indirect: -peace assessment -"do no harm"
	Direct: -preventive development -capacity building -conditionality	Direct: -sticks&carrots -institutional development
GRASSROOTS-LEVEL	Indirect: -peace assessment -"do no harm"	Indirect: -peace assessment -"do no harm"
	Direct: -"promotive approach" -"pre-emptive approach" -capacity building -addressing the root causes	Direct: -capacity building&empowerment -investing in stable pockets -building bridges across identities

SECTION III:

AID AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION:

Utilizing Development Aid as a Peacemaker in the Pre-Conflict Stage

IIIA.) The role of the international community at the Leadership Level

In the face of the extreme violence and destructiveness of intra-state conflicts, the international community has recently been attempting to shift its focus from the conflict stage to the pre-conflict stage. In the pre-conflict stage, possible actions that the international community can undertake can be grouped in two categories based on the proximity of a perceived conflict: structural prevention and operational prevention. According to the definition provided by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, “structural prevention” requires long-term planning and thinking, while “operational prevention” takes place in the face of immediate crisis (Carnegie 1997: xviii).

IIIA-a) Operational Prevention and Aid:

As desirable as operational prevention may be due to its short-time frame, effective international action in the face of an immediate crisis faces numerous problems. First of all, the difficulties with determining the proximity of a conflict from a long list of countries-at-risk and with resolving extremely complex factors through quick-impact diplomatic actions become further exacerbated with the lack of a strong-enough political will on the side of the international actors. Similarly, the emergency of conflict situations in certain parts of the world often overwhelms the prevention efforts in other parts where the threat of destruction is not as imminent. In these circumstances that limit the ability of the international actors to prevent

conflicts, aid's capacity to serve as a peacemaker is highly restricted. While the long-term positive effects of aid on peace through the promotion of sustainable and just development are not immediate enough, aid as a tool of influence lack adequate muscle in the face of a conflict.

The conflict in Burundi was a case where operational prevention efforts of the international community failed as the spurs of violence following the assassination of Ndadaye spread rapidly and transformed itself into a violent intra-state conflict.¹⁶ Having given political and economic support for the first multi-party democratic elections of the country, the international community was unprepared for the sudden turn of events. The remarkable concentration of global attention made Burundi the focus of a long train of distinguished visitors, high level delegations, and special rapporteurs (Leatherman 1999: 125). Yet, neither the UN Special Envoy's political efforts to bring peace back nor the initiatives of regional and international leaders proved adequate in the special context of Burundi to control the extremist dynamic unleashed by Ndadaye's assassination (Weissman 1998: 7). Following the failure of the diplomatic efforts to bring about a quick peace and having eliminated military intervention as an option, the international donors attempted to use Burundi's dependence on aid as a tool of influence.¹⁷

Through 1994, most of the infrastructural aid from bilateral donors was frozen. The World Bank was extremely cautious as the conflict spread and decided to discontinue the structural adjustment credit in 1995. As the settlement on the issue of presidency became central to the conflict in 1994, most foreign donors made the settlement of the issue of the presidency their main condition for the resumption of assistance (EIU 1994: 34). None of these attempts to use aid as a stick to convince the Burundian government to de-escalate the conflict was effective. Despite Burundi's extreme dependence on aid at the time, the Burundian government chose to

lead its escalatory politics and lose the receipt of foreign assistance which amounted to just over 25 per cent of its Gross National Product (Leatherman 1999: 134).

IIIA-b.) Structural Prevention and Aid:

Most of the shortcomings of aid as a peacemaker in the case of Burundi is as a result of the difficulties attached to preventing a conflict when it is imminent. Aid as a peacemaker is certainly a more effective strategy when used as part of structural prevention than as a last minute, 'quick-fix' attempt. As opposed to operational prevention, structural prevention requires long-term thinking and leaves no space for predictions about imminent conflicts. Instead of quick-impact political solutions that are necessary for operational prevention, underlying causes of a conflict become the major concern for the external actors. It is within the framework of structural prevention that development aid can be institutionalized successfully as a peacemaker.

The relation between development and peace is certainly not a new phenomenon. Advocating stability and peace has been central to the aid regimes since the Marshall Plan. Yet, the assumption has simply been that the development process would automatically bring peace and stability. The evidence in the last five decades has proven the contrary. The process of development by its very definition means a process of change towards the improvement of the life of an individual, group, or state (Colletta&Nezam 1997: 3). The process of change in the social, economic and power institutions inherently carries the potential to trigger conflicts in a society. More significantly, the very way the 'game of development' has been played out in an almost ritualistic manner between governments and bilateral agencies has often contributed to patterns of exclusion, inequality, frustration, cynicism, and thus potential for conflict (Urvin 1999: 49). As it stands today, the development aid system is still in favor of a narrow economic

technical approach that neglects the social and political power relations in a society. Having defined development in terms of economic data, the donors have traditionally neglected the importance of social and political factors as defining factors for a sustainable and peaceful development. Ironically, most of the intra-state conflicts of the post-Cold War era have had social and political problems, shaped partially by economic factors, as their underlying root causes.

Donor community's involvement in Burundi was no exception to this narrow economic understanding of development. During the ten years preceding the outbreak of the conflict in 1993, the foreign aid sent to Burundi was to a large extent limited to the fields of infrastructure building, energy sector and rural development. The major bilateral donors during this same period were France, Belgium, West Germany, and the Arab countries. Among the major projects undertaken with external aid were construction and repair of roads to increase the accessibility of the mostly rural territories, construction of hydroelectricity projects, forestry projects,¹⁸ and rural development projects that mainly involved irrigation. At the macro-level the trend of the Burundian economics during the 1980s was modest growth, inflow of aid, accumulation of foreign debt, and the extension of the infrastructure (EIU 4th Quarter 1985: 7). Civil society building, education, creation of employment opportunities, and the diversification of the economic sector¹⁹ were rarely mentioned in the development programs of the bilateral donors. Similarly, the ethnic dimension of the projects was taken into consideration neither at the planning nor the implementation stages.

The involvement of the World Bank and IMF in Burundi during the second half of 1980s certainly became more controversial in its effects than bilateral assistance. Following a period of resistance of the Burundian government, the increasing debt problem and the low levels of

increase in real economic growth levels forced the Bagaza government to enter the first structural adjustment program with the World Bank and the IMF in 1986 (EIU 3rd Quarter 1986: 6). The three initial goals announced by the program were improving the incentives for production by removing constraints to growth and by redirecting the economy toward more reliance on market forces, promoting private sector development and investment, and increasing the efficiency of public resource utilization (Englebert&Hoffman 1994: 14). The economic results of the six-years of structural adjustment in Burundi were increased level of unemployment, decreased levels of GDP growth, decreased levels of real capital growth, and increased levels of average deficit-to-GDP ratio (Englebert&Hoffman 1994: 54).²⁰

The devastating effects of the deterioration of economic indicators of Burundi through the years of structural adjustment were exacerbated by the social and political consequences of these reforms. In their planning and implementation of their policies, neither the World Bank nor the IMF took into consideration the short-term social and political consequences of the structural adjustment reforms. As argued by Goudie and Neyapti in their report for the Development Centre of OECD, structural adjustment programs have implicit distributional implications. “[These] reforms which suppress centralized, administrative control over resource distribution in favour of market-based systems [...] will entail simultaneous repercussions on distribution [...]. They will create winners and losers among specific groups within the economy” (1999: 27). In societies where opportunities of education and employment have structurally been dominated by one ethnic group, these reforms are most likely to create the winners from this dominant group and reinforce the disadvantaged position of the oppressed group. Indeed, in the case of Burundi, fully unaware of the implications of their policies on ethnic relations, the World Bank celebrated the emergence of a small elite group of private

owners (Englebert&Hoffman 1994: 17). Not surprisingly, this elite was predominantly the Tutsi elite that historically had access to financial capital. In short, the structural adjustment programs advocated by the World Bank and the IMF starting from 1986 not only represented a period of decline at the macroeconomic level but it also brought about further tension into the ethnic relations of the Burundian society.

IIIA-b1.) Peace Assessment & ‘Do No Harm’:

In establishing a structural prevention mechanism that incorporates development aid as strategic tool, the traditional definition of development must be put under closer scrutiny. As structural violence fundamentally constitutes the characteristics of a conflict-prone country and its scope is not limited to economic underdevelopment, then development should be expanded to encompass the other aspects of structural violence. Issues of human rights violations, income inequality, authoritarianism, humiliation, political and economic exclusion all characterize structural violence, and thus all create the basis of a violence-prone society. In order for development aid to address the root causes of a conflict, then the meaning of development should be extended to include justice, social equity, political inclusion, and respect for human rights.

Based on this more encompassing definition of development, foreign aid regime can formulate means for promoting peace in conflict-prone societies. Simply increasing aid or changing the beneficiaries of aid will certainly not address the extreme levels of structural violence prevalent in conflict-prone societies. A new approach that is sensitive to the potential of violent conflict is necessary in both the planning and the implementation stages of an aid projects in order for the aid to be able to challenge the institutions of structural violence. At the planning stage, an extensive assessment of social, political, and economic issues that underlie the

fault lines of tension should be employed to ensure that the project will not exacerbate the existing tensions or create new tensions between groups and thus weaken the peace.²¹

IIIA-b2.) Preventive Development

As important as this indirect measure of “peace assessment” is in incorporating a peace element into current aid policies, its role as a peacemaker will remain limited if it fails to go beyond recognizing the conflict and reducing the negative effects that aid could have on inter-identity relations. The incorporation of the notion of a “preventive development” (Nicolaidis 1996: 55) into the development assistance is fundamental for aid to take on a more active role as a peacemaker. Conceptually, preventive development would not only transform the traditional project-oriented development assistance that often excludes the weaker minority communities (Rupesinghe 1995: 35) but it would also “reduce the risk that people on the economic margins of their societies will see their future stake in a ‘war economy’” (Bryer&Cairns 1998: 33). By highlighting the problems of unequal resource distribution, disparities in the distribution of economic and political power, and the opportunities for education and employment, preventive development would aim to encourage substantial changes that would diminish social tension formed across lines of discrimination and marginalization.

The international donor community’s involvement in Burundi in the decade before the recent conflict almost totally lacked a preventive development dimension. As most of the aid projects concentrated on massive infrastructure projects, the possibility of addressing the disparities in the distribution of power and opportunities was not a consideration for the donors. Even these massive infrastructure projects could incorporate a peace dimension if they intentionally aimed to improve the access of the disadvantaged rural areas in the North to the

national markets. However, most projects continued to focus on the southern provinces, which were predominantly Tutsi. Unawareness was not the only obstacle to using aid as a peacemaker. Political conditions of the country and the repressive nature of the regime made any statements by external representatives concerning the injustice and discrimination in the society would have serious political repercussions. Even things as simple as a statement in the USAID report on the potential dangers of a Tutsi dominated military would be deleted by the US Embassy because of its harming effects on the relations with the government.²² Under these conditions, implementing a project with a clearly-defined goal for improving ethnic relations and social conditions would require a high degree of cooperation and determination on the side of the donor states, which was absent in the case of Burundi.

IIIA-b3.) Capacity Building:

As important as the type of the foreign aid is in addressing structural violence in a country and indirectly preventing outbreaks of violent conflicts, the process of a project's implementation plays a fundamental role in shaping the nature of the inter-ethnic power relations. Participatory approaches that foster civil society, promote cooperation among fault lines of tension, and aim for building capacity for peaceful co-existence should become a main pillar in the implementation of development projects. Encouraging civilians' participation in the planning and execution of a project would not only reduce the risk of creating dependency but it could encourage integration among divided groups by providing them with incentives for cooperation. The capacity of a society to use its mechanisms to make joint decisions and resolve social conflicts is a fundamental asset for preserving peaceful coexistence. Development projects can encourage the utilization and improvement of such social capacity through different

means. By encouraging local ownership of the projects both by including the voices of the target populations in the designing stage and by establishing local decision-making and implementation mechanisms at the later stages, development projects could prevent the danger of creating dependency and instead strengthen communal self-confidence and capacity, both of which are fundamental assets for a peaceful society.

In the case of Burundi, the international donors' concentration on massive infrastructure projects represents an exclusively state-to-state way of planning and implementing development projects. Not only that capacity building and participatory approaches were not among the considerations of such projects, the very nature of these massive projects would have made the inclusion of participatory approaches extremely difficult. Even aid packages for "rural development projects that were intended to have more direct effects on the local rural populations mainly consisted of irrigation and road projects that were planned by government employees in Bujumbura and carried out with no direct contact with or effort to include the local communities.

IIIA-b4.) Conditionality

The potential of donors and multilateral aid institutions in promoting peaceful coexistence in the recipient environment extends further than the influence of its individual projects. While specific projects planned and implemented with the objective to mitigate the level of structural violence are inherently limited in their scope of influence, donors and aid agencies have the possibility to use conditionalities to induce the adjustment of state policies with extensive effects in exchange for granting economic benefits. By no means the recommendation of attaching conditionalities to aid assistance with the aim of changing the

recipient government's policies claims to be groundbreaking. Conditionality has been part of the aid regime for the last fifty years while its objectives have been transformed over time from a foreign policy/military focus to a domestic/governance focus. During aid negotiations, bilateral donors and multilateral aid agencies already bring issues such as reduction of military budgets and promotion of 'good governance' that have significant impact on the preservation of internal peace.

A systematic and well defined "peace conditionality" have, however, not been incorporated into the aid negotiations yet. Potentially, the instrument of aid conditionality can be used to address the conflict-prone policies in a more direct fashion. It can be geared at inducing the recipient government to adopt peaceful approaches to identity disputes and to undertake reforms that target discriminatory and exclusionary law and practices in their countries. A possible scheme that would minimize the politicization of state-specific peace conditionalities would connect the disbursement of funds directly to thresholds of political risk assessments on the basis of the capacity of the recipient country to deal with incipient conflict peacefully" (Nicolaidis 1996: 48). Although such schemes could effectively influence the domestic policies of a government that directly fuel future intra-state crises, numerous substantial arguments exist against the establishment of such schemes and make their appeal disputed.

The concept of state sovereignty, the absence of a strong enough international will, the problems with necessary institutional reform, ineffective cooperation among the donor states are all obstacles that exist in the way of the realization of an aid regime that includes within its mechanism a conditionality for peace. The concept of state sovereignty stands out as the most vocal argument against the extension of existing conditionalities to include a peace element. The interference of the wealthy donors in the domestic policies and actions of the country with the

aim to alter them according to a “Western” political model draws strong criticism both from the recipient governments and some Western academics.

The argument of state sovereignty that is against the establishment of a “peace conditionality” and the execution of development projects with a peace component in the forefront, however, should be analyzed with a thorough understanding of the counterfactual. If reforming the present aid regime to incorporate a peace dimension helps to prevent future conflicts, the perceived disadvantages will be repaid many times over in the prevention of military peacekeeping operations, refugee crises, relief and reconstruction operations. State’s loss of territorial control and the collapse of its mechanisms during intra-state conflicts would diminish its sovereignty to a degree that is incomparable to what “peace conditionality” would be perceived to cause.

Another consideration in analyzing the validity of the argument that rejects “peace conditionality” on the basis of state sovereignty should be the changing definition of state sovereignty in the international arena. The absolute nature of state sovereignty based solely on the de jure international recognition of the state existence has been put under increasing scrutiny. Among other trends, the increasing power of international law and the unprecedented changes globalization brought to the definition of state borders have transformed to a certain extent the absolute nature of state sovereignty based on its de jure international recognition. Empirical sovereignty, which bases the legitimacy of a state on the ability of its institutions to make the necessary decisions addressing the needs and interests of the society, to enforce them throughout its territory, and to manage conflicts within its institutional framework, has become a frequently pronounced term (Chazan 1999: 39). In other words, especially since the end of the Cold War, sovereignty has less often been considered as a given characteristic of the state and more often

been based on the fulfillment of certain criteria by the state. Thus, in the case of a state that creates and/or preserves a structural violent system that increases the potential of a destructive conflict in the future, the sovereignty of the state can no longer be treated as absolute.

The argument against “peace conditionality” based on the absence of an efficient cooperation among international donors should also be thought with the counterfactual in mind. The kind of cooperation and institution-building that the aid reform would entail would be minimal when compared to the level of international cooperation and institutional capacity required by the emergency response to intra-state conflicts. Thus, although reforming the present aid regime to incorporate a peace dimension that involves peace assessment, preventive development and peace conditionality may pose difficulties in terms of sovereignty, international cooperation and institutional capacity, the reformed regime's preventive capacity makes it an extremely worthwhile effort.

IIIA-c.) Aid to Burundi Prior to 1993:

The bilateral and multilateral aid regimes in Burundi is representative of some major characteristics of the conditionality policies attached to foreign aid in the 1980s. In the first half of the decade, the goals of aid provided by bilateral donors were limited to the direct economic effects of the projects. The conditions attached to the mainly infrastructure-focused aid projects concentrated on creating economic benefits for the private companies of the donor nation, and thus included provisions regarding limitations on the ‘nationality’ of the contracting companies. The introduction of extensive conditionalities to international aid emerged primarily with the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and the IMF. Burundi’s first structural adjustment program introduced in 1986 contained 45 conditionalities while the second program contained 94 (Englebert & Hoffman 1994: 21). The content of these conditionalities, however,

was almost totally limited to economic policies (Englebert & Hoffman 1994: 21). They were almost exclusively on the initiation of the liquidation process and related economic issues such as fiscal policy, trade liberalization, exchange rate management, price and market deregularization (Englebert & Hoffman 1994: 21).

During the second half of the decade, there emerged an overall trend where the bilateral donors started to question the success of the aid regime as a considerable number of countries that had been recipients of large amounts of foreign aid failed to improve their economic performance. A growing number of donors became convinced that in the absence of a political and social environment prone to development, foreign aid would continue to be futile. Thus, the initial focus on economic conditionality and the SAPs shifted to political conditionality towards the end of the decade.²³ The failure of the SAPs and bilateral donor projects in the first half of the decade was increasingly perceived to be the result of the “institutionally barren ground” (Nunnenkamp 1993: 9) in the recipient countries. Consequently, bilateral donors and multilateral institutions shifted their focus to changing the political environment of the recipient countries.

The aid regime in Burundi also changed in line with this overall change in donor goals. This transformation of aid manifested itself in its most extreme form when France, a main donor of Burundi's, declared to condition its aid to democratic progress in the country (Ngaruko & Nkurunziza 2000: 14). Other donors soon followed trend and pushed democratization as the condition for the continuation of –or increase in- their aid packages. Although the political conditionality of democratization was perceived to be a positive decision of the donor countries, soon the narrow definition attached to democratization proved to be

detrimental for Burundi. The donors' condition of democratization was in fact an inflexible demand for multi-party elections in Burundi.

This narrow definition of democratization overlooked two significant aspects of Burundian politics. First of all, the donors did not foresee that multi-party elections in the ethnically polarized context of Burundi could only mean party creation along ethnic lines and predictably Hutus who had the demographic advantage would come to power. The Hutu rule would directly threaten the Tutsi-dominated military, which would, in turn, attempt to regain political power with a coup. This sequence of events was predicted by Buyoya and many other observers, including the Economist Intelligence Unit. For the EIU observers, the detrimental effects of a multi-party were so predictable that in 1990 they confidently supposed that the Western governments who were pressing for multi-party elections would soon concede to Buyoya's demands for single-party elections (EIU 2nd Quarter 1990: 10). Yet, the donors' continued their insistence on multi-party elections, which brought about the pre-escalation of the current conflict.

Secondly, the Western donors' myopic focus on multi-party elections brought about a almost total disregard for the human rights violations, absence of justice for past crimes committed by the army, and the violent repression of Hutu revolts in 1988 and 1991. While the events in 1991 where "the search for Palipehutu culprits rapidly into a manhunt, resulting in the blind massacre of Hutu for no other reason than they happened to be Hutu" (Lemarchand 1996: 157) received absolutely no reaction from the international donors, the limited pressure put on the Burundian government following the mass killings in August 1988 was short-lived. The halt that the bilateral donors put on their aid programs lasted no longer than 5 months, the World Bank continued its loan disbursement "with caution" (EIU 4th Quarter 1988: 6). Although, the

aid 'stick' brought about no change in the official explanation of the conflict, which denied the military's ethnic killings, donors overlooked the ethnic conflict and not only continued with their programs but made new commitments (EIU 1st Quarter 1989: 1,6).

Having failed to use aid as a stick to change Buyoya government's behavior, the donors transformed their policies and this time attempted to use aid as a carrot. The attractive incentive of increased aid convinced President Buyoya about the need to cultivate the support of the donor community through a high profile policy of ethnic reconciliation and national unity in the aftermath of 1988 (EIU 4th Quarter 1989: 7). Although these actions remained cosmetic and thus dissatisfactory among the Hutu majority, the donor community continued the flow of aid funds (EIU 4th Quarter 1989: 7). Indeed, the international community continued its pressure for political change both through creating incentives of aid increase and through threatening punishments of aid decrease. These attempts of bringing about a peaceful Burundi, however, were bound to fail. Not only because the donors' narrowly focused on multi-party elections but also because cosmetic changes by the Buyoya government were accepted as satisfactory moves leaving issues of human rights and justice that are fundamental for peaceful co-existence outside the conditions of aid.

The international community's involvement in a conflict-prone society presents challenges that go beyond diplomatic efforts. In such societies, foreign aid continues to be a vital line of influence on the recipient environment. Aid has the potential to change the political and social elements in a society not only through the indirect effects of economic change, but also through building local capacities and encouraging governmental reforms through conditionalities. While aid has the potential to act as a peacemaker in conflict-prone societies, in order for this potential to be realized the international community has to develop a more

comprehensive understanding of aid that moves beyond the Cold War framework and utilize it in the most effective way through increased cooperation and coordination.

IIIB) The Role of the International Community at the Grassroots Level:

Although to a large extent operational and structural prevention have evolved to be included within the responsibilities of governments and international organizations, the degree to which civilians become involved in the outbreak and continuation of an intra-state conflict has made the international efforts at the grassroots level increasingly important. The realization of the centrality of grassroots work in promoting peace and development has brought about a shift of focus in foreign aid from state-to-state programs to state-to-nongovernmental organizations. The NGOs have been accepted to have better access to target communities, who had traditionally not benefited from aid programs as a result of top-down state policies. Consequently, international nongovernmental organizations have become the recipients of significant amounts of bilateral and multilateral aid to be spent for their projects in the developing world.²⁴ This recent shift of focus to nongovernmental organizations has also altered the nature of international preventive mechanisms to a significant degree. While the aforementioned reforms of donor policies at the planning and implementation stages of development projects continue to play a crucial role in diminishing societal polarization in conflict-prone countries, the actions of NGOs working at the grassroots started to play an indispensable role in establishing strong social institutions that can divert violent conflict even when communal tensions are high.²⁵

IIIB-a.) Promotive Approach:

Bock and Anderson's insights from their extensive experience working in conflict-prone societies provide helpful guidance about the means through which NGOs can use aid to prevent communal conflicts (1999). In their article titled "Dynamite Under the Intercommunal Bridge: How Can Aid Agencies Help to Defuse It?" Bock and Anderson explain two major approaches about the means through which NGOs can prevent communal conflicts. "Promotive approach" would aim to create a foundation of trust between people of varying identities and engendering an appreciation for communal harmony (327). In other words, promotive projects are people-to-people projects designed to promote 'good-will'. The range of activities that fall under this approach range from inter-communal business and micro-enterprise development projects that build on shared economic interests to conflict management workshops, public forums and cultural-sport events organized across identity lines to emphasize peace and co-existence. Aid programs that are designed to promote good will among different groups have been initiated by NGOs mainly as an ad hoc reaction to the conditions of the conflict-prone societies that they found themselves in. Thus, a broad theoretical umbrella for such projects are far from being established.

Extensive information on the NGO involvement in Burundi in the pre-conflict period was unavailable at the time of this research. An analysis of the information that was available demonstrated that most NGOs that were in Burundi prior to the conflict were focused on maternal and child health care and social welfare work.²⁶ Only in the second half of the 1980s as a result of the expanding scope of NGO activism worldwide, projects with a focus on development and strengthening local organizations became widespread.²⁷ The methodology of

these projects, however, did not include a systematic promotive approach that directly aimed to support peaceful co-existence.

IIIB-b.) Preventive Approach & Capacity Building:

In assessing the potential of promotive projects in preventing conflicts, it is fundamental to be realistic with regards to the realities of a conflict-prone society. As Bock and Anderson rightly points out, promoting the construction of inter-identity bridges on its own is often ineffective in preventing communal conflict. Looking at war-torn countries, it is not uncommon to find out that a significant number of multiethnic communities were fully integrated and harmonious before the outbreak of violence.²⁸ Often even such communities would be drawn into the conflict as a result of a dynamite put under the inter-communal bridge by those who have something to gain from communal violence (Bock&Anderson 1999: 329). In recognition of the vulnerability of cross-communal bridges in times of conflict, Bock and Anderson suggest “pre-emptive approaches” that are designed to divert and prevent conflict when communal tensions are high and violence seems imminent by preparing people to dispel communal passion when it flare up. Among other things, building ‘durable capital’ in the form of local institutions of decision-making and conflict resolution through inclusive and interconnecting committees for project implementation, and building human capital through leadership training and education would give communities the ability to identify and discard these dynamites put under the inter-communal bridge. Thus, they would be able to preserve their community as an enclave of peace even in the midst of violent intra-state conflicts.

As valuable as Bock and Anderson’s insights about promotive and pre-emptive approaches are for NGOs working in conflict-prone societies, their assumption about the causes

of communal violence limits the applicability of these approaches to all situations. By focusing on the dynamite intentionally placed under the inter-communal bridge as the source of violence, Bock and Anderson overlooks the role of genuine anger and frustration towards deep-rooted inequalities and exclusionary politics in triggering the outbreak of a violent conflict. As argued before, most of the intra-state conflicts find their roots in the social, economic and political problems of that society. Consequently, although projects that aim to inculcate a sense of belonging among an inclusive group, to foster disciplined information processing as means of filtering out inflammatory rumors, and to strengthen interconnecting rather than competitive structures contribute to the preservation of peace (Bock&Anderson 1999: 336), they continue to leave the root causes of violent conflicts intact.

In analyzing the causes of the current conflict in Burundi, it would be a daunting task to attempt to rank structural violence and the power struggle of the greedy elite in terms of their level of contribution to the outbreak of the conflict. Certainly the extent to which elite-led, politico-ethnic rivalry for power and economic and social advancement has become entwined with mass killing is a distinguishing element in the Burundian conflict (Weissman 1998: 4). Yet, it would be misleading to think that in the absence of the decades-long poverty, economic and political exclusion of the Hutus, and the legacy of violent repression of the army, the struggle for power among politico-ethnic elites would have brought about an intra-state conflict that continued for over seven years. Thus, the success of promotive and pre-emptive approaches in preserving peaceful coexistence would be limited if this broader context of structural violence is not taken into consideration in their methodology.

IIIB-c.) Addressing the Root Causes of the Conflict:

NGOs' awareness of the broader political, economic and social context of injustice and exclusion in the country of operation is crucial in order for the aid channeled through them to contribute to the prevention of a violent conflict. Having the access to grassroots level allows nongovernmental organizations to have a direct impact on the social and economic conditions of the recipient environment. Once a thorough understanding of the causes of a potential conflict is established, NGOs' capacity for direct impact is a highly valuable asset in working towards conflict prevention. NGOs' success as peacemakers will be limited as long as conflict prevention is perceived to be a positive side effect of the overall development projects. In order for NGOs to be effective in conflict prevention, they need to adopt peacebuilding as part of their primary goals and incorporate this dimension in planning and implementing their projects. In other words, they have to expand their mission from limited developmental goals and work towards assisting the local communities in changing the social and economic conditions of the structurally violent society that they live in.

The need to make a leap in capacity of bilateral donors, multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to prevent conflicts proves to be more fundamental than ever with more crises and violence as the future trend in sight. Although diplomatic efforts stand central to the practice of operational prevention, the international community is in need of a more systematic and effective scheme. Structural prevention that is founded on the ideas of preventive development and building capacities for peace have to be institutionalized in the international aid regimes in order to change the pessimistic trend that has been prevalent in the post-Cold War era.

SECTION IV:

AID AS A TOOL FOR RESOLVING CONFLICTS:

Utilizing Development and Relief Aid as a Peacemaker in the Conflict Stage

IVA.) The role of the international community at the Leadership Level

Traditionally the international community's role in times of intra-state conflict has been limited to providing diplomatic channels for reaching a peace settlement between the parties. Among other actors, UN convoys, regional leaders, nongovernmental organizations, and high level delegations intervene in the conflict to initiate talks, or to mediate or facilitate the existing talks between the parties to the conflict. In this context, aid carries significance as an avenue of contact and a tool of influence. In cases where the state in conflict isolates itself from the international channels of communication, meetings for aid programs and packages constitute the only opportunity of contact. Furthermore, the threat of discontinuing bilateral aid and the promise of starting or increasing aid become primary strategic tools for bringing about a positive change in the actions of the state concerned.

IVA-a.) Sticks & Carrots:

In Burundi, the international community did not hesitate to use aid as a stick in the early phases of the conflict. Less than a year after the start of the conflict in 1993, most infrastructural aid was frozen and structural adjustment credit was discontinued. The ineffectiveness of this initial move to push the Burundian government to take steps toward peace brought about the unified decision of the European Union and the United States under the "New Transatlantic Agenda" to freeze all non-emergency aid to the country until internal security conditions

improved (EIU 2nd Quarter 1996: 33). At this point, the total of EU and U.S. funds constituted 25 per cent of Burundi's GDP (EIU 2nd Quarter 1996: 33). Although the devastating effects this would have on the Burundians were predicted, the international donor community unified in its decision to use the bargaining tool of aid.²⁹ Before the effects of this move could be seen on the Burundian government, Buyoya seized power in a coup.³⁰

Six years into the conflict, both the international community and Burundi's neighbors who imposed strict sanctions in the aftermath of Buyoya's coup, came to the realization that aid as a bargaining tool fell far from achieving its intended results. Instead, the economic and social capacity of the Burundian society to transform itself out of the conflict was being undermined. Thus, instead of using as a stick, the international donor community started to use it as a carrot. A new trend emerged where donor states and multilateral aid organizations made promises for substantial amounts of aid whenever they sensed that the stalemate in the peace negotiations could be tipped towards a peaceful settlement. The World Bank resumed its international assistance last year with a \$35 million emergency recovery credit following a confidence-building agreement with the Burundian government (EIU 2nd Quarter 2000: 2). While some bilateral donors have already increased their aid, most donors have chosen to hold off the fulfillment of their promises until a full peace agreement is in view (EIU 2nd Quarter 2000:2). The most recent Donors' Meeting in Paris on December 11-13 represented the pinnacle of this new trend of using aid as a carrot. During this meeting \$440 million was garnered for reconstruction most of which were announced to be conditional on the implementation of the Arusha agreement and other reforms.³¹

IVA-b.) Institutional Development:

As the experience in Burundi has also demonstrated, as problematic as funding a government that is violent and abusive in its actions during an intra-state conflict is, cutting aid lines completely will only serve the purposes of isolating, alienating and further polarizing a country. Aid can not be put totally in the hands of an illegitimate and repressive government if it in fact aims to promote peace and human development. Yet, aid that targets the civilian population can be rechanneled to different actors working in the same environment such as international and local nongovernmental organizations. Also, targeted programs that aim to benefit the long-term sustainability of the peace efforts can continue to involve the government and build its capacity as an inclusive political institution. Such programs would involve incorporating long-term developmental programs into bilateral relations during conflicts. Maintaining key institutions in the infrastructure and welfare sectors (Fitzgerald 1997: 9), and creating or strengthening other state institutions should become one of the main pillars of state-to-state aid during conflict. An aid policy that promotes institution building during a conflict forms the foundations for a speedy and successful reconstruction. Thus, the gap between the separated phases of conflict and peacebuilding should be filled and the “groundwork for longer term development must be laid during the emergency phase along with the earliest efforts at rebuilding and reconciliation” (Fagen 1994: 5).

USAID’s ‘Great Lakes Justice Initiative’ is an example of such pioneering projects where a donor state incorporated a long-term thinking into its conflict projects and recognized the importance of strengthening state institutions that would become instrumental in bringing and preserving peace. Under the framework of this initiative, USAID helps nongovernmental organizations in Burundi that are working to improve the system of justice, promote the rule of

law, and foster economic empowerment.³² This project is especially valuable since the incapacity of the justice system to prosecute the human rights violations that took place in 1972 and 1988 conflicts was one of the root causes of the outbreak of violence in 1993. The increased capacity of the Burundian judicial system would not only build up the Hutu trust in the system but also guarantee that the human rights violations of this war will not go unpunished.

As the experience of the international community with intra-state conflicts of the post-Cold War era has demonstrated, using aid as a stick and thus cutting the lines of all types of funding aside from humanitarian relief going into a country has often aggravated the conflict further and deteriorated both the state's and the society's capacity to pull itself out of the war and reconstruct the country. In the case of Burundi, for example, the international community's decision to cut funding to the government in the aftermath of the outbreak of violence in 1993 until 'total security' was attained proved detrimental for government stability and in part brought about the coup of 1996 (Ould Abdallah 2000: 83). As also demonstrated with experience, the international community's attempts to build the capacity of the state and the civil society to sustain the peace once it is reached has proven fundamental for the success of the peace agreements. Thus, the international community has to prepare itself to take on a more active role with a long-term vision in its efforts to bring about peace in conflict-ridden countries. Aid will become the key tool in carrying out this active role if utilized successfully.

IVB) The Role of the International Community at the Grassroots Level

The last decade has set a problematic precedent regarding the role of international community in the course of an intra-state conflict. Not only that the international community has limited its involvement at the leadership level mainly to diplomatic efforts in the form of mediation and facilitation, humanitarian efforts at the grassroots level has been strictly in the form of relief aid.³³ Humanitarian action has been solely limited to the “emergency assistance and protection activities carried out devoid of extraneous agendas” (Minear&Weiss 1995: 21). Based on this limited definition, relief work has been separated from rehabilitation and development efforts, which were seen as the subsequent phases on a linear path of transition.³⁴ The absence of a long-term thinking with a broader perspective has brought relief work under increasing scrutiny of the scholars and practitioners.

IVB-a) Changing Paradigms of Relief Work:

From this phase of criticism, a new trend of thinking has emerged in the academic world that diverged from the traditional linear approach to humanitarian aid (Hortzman 1999; Roche 1996; Minear&Weiss 1995; Commins 1996). Instead of a continuum of relief, reconstruction, and development a more integrative approach emerged that was in favor of blurring the lines between stages of conflict and post-conflict. Since the idea of a continuum did not conform to actual situations of conflict, which follow no set pattern, chronology or order, this new trend emphasized that emergency relief, rehabilitation work and development assistance should all co-exist in times of conflict and crisis (OECD-DAC Guidelines 1997: Article 96). Figure 1, taken from Chris Roche’s article on “Operationality in Turbulence”, demonstrates the integrative approach of this new trend.

Currently, the advocates of a broader understanding of the humanitarian enterprise focus on the practical aspects of such a change in the way of humanitarian thinking. Linking humanitarian enterprise with the fields of conflict management, human rights protection, and development is no longer a ‘radical’ idea in conflict literature. More practitioners argue for the desperate need for a broader understanding of humanitarian enterprise that links it more integrally to conflict management, human rights protection, and development” (Minear&Weiss 1995: 212). The actual question is now about how to go about such integration. The main challenge remains the institutional division that exists between relief-development-rehabilitation work and the difficulties of cross-institutional cooperation.³⁵ The goal remains overcoming the functional distinctions of the various agencies involved and to integrate, rather than merely coordinate, relief, rehabilitation and development objectives within the framework of a long-term strategy (OECD-DAC Guidelines 1997: Article 96).



IVB-b.) Relief Assistance in Burundi

Understanding the traditional division between relief, development, and conflict management due to linear thinking about war to peace transition plays a fundamental role in explaining the nature of international relief efforts in Burundi that has been continuing for more than seven years now. The outbreak of violence in Burundi in 1993 was soon followed by an

inflow of international nongovernmental organizations into the country. The single-digit numbers of NGOs mainly doing development work prior to the conflict jumped to 23 by April 1994 and reached over 80 by the end of the year (Ould-Abdallah 2000: 126). Many of these NGOs came to Burundi chiefly because they had to leave Rwanda after the outbreak of the genocide there in 1994 (Ould-Abdallah 2000: 84). Few of these NGOs arrived with a detailed plan for rendering assistance; most of them seemed to be looking for work and be contracted by the UN (Ould-Abdallah 2000: 84). In the absence of a thorough understanding of the political, social, and economic conditions of Burundi, most NGOs went ahead with their standard relief operations.

The majority of the activities undertaken by the international NGOs in Burundi since 1994 have been distribution of food and non-food items including firewood, blankets, and plastic sheets, and the provision of food inputs and health-related services.³⁶ Among the numerous projects that are being carried out currently, only a handful of them, which will be looked at later, incorporate some kind of a peace dimension into their planning and implementation. In the absence of a long-term comprehensive humanitarian thinking, it becomes difficult to envision aid as a peacemaker in Burundi.

IVB.c) Aid as a Peacemaker in the Midst of Conflict:

In times of conflict, humanitarian aid remains the most important avenue of contact among the international community, the conflicting parties, and civilians in the war zones (Prendergast 1996: 143). Ignoring aid's wider impacts and potential to contribute to peace would be removing one of the most important policy instruments from the hands of the international community. The potential of aid in the midst of a conflict to act as a peacemaker depends mainly on the relief

organizations active in the country to fully understand the impact of their work on the dynamics of the conflict. As discussed in Section II, the insertion of economic resources into a conflict zone carries major threats. Relief aid can exacerbate and prolong the conflict, among other things, through the diversion of the relief aid and the reinforcement of war economy. It can also damage the survival capacity of the society by the distorting local markets and production, and creating dependency. Even in a country like Burundi, which used to be self-sufficient in food production before the current conflict, the free distribution of food materials by relief agencies has had detrimental effects on the local economy (Ould-Abdallah 2000: 126).³⁷ In addition to its direct effects on the well being of the people, the deterioration of the economic capacity of a society diminishes economic alternatives outside of war economy and thus further weakens its capacity to preserve peace.

Before establishing the framework through which the potential of aid as a peacemaker can be put into effect, one has to understand the practical implication of indirect measures that are put into effect to prevent aid's negative effects on the conflict. For this type of indirect prevention to be effective, first of all relief agencies must integrate explicit analyses of conflict, political impact, and human rights effects throughout planning, design, and implementation including sensitivity to the latent tensions a project might activate (Prendergast 1996: 121). Conflict resolution organizations that are active in the country or individual conflict resolution experts can be the source through which these analyses can be done.³⁸ Such organizations and experts can also provide training for the relief personnel who are working in the midst of a conflict on basic conflict resolution skills and assist relief organizations in their potentially conflictual interactions with the community when distributing aid.³⁹

As demonstrated in the previous section on pre-conflict phase, indirect measures that aim to prevent the negative effects of aid on the conflict have a limited scope in terms of promoting the resolution of the conflict through peaceful means. In order for donors and relief-providing agencies to move beyond the limited scope of indirect peacemaking measures, there is the need for a structural rethinking of methodology and goals of humanitarian assistance that is provided in conflict areas. The definition of relief that has traditionally been limited to emergency assistance and protection activities has to be expanded to reflect its extended effects on the dynamics of a conflict and its long-term consequences on the prospects of peace and development in the recipient country. Promotion of peaceful coexistence should be integrated consciously into the methodology of relief agencies. Among possible approaches that can expand the present methodology to include conflict management are building local capacity for peace, investing in pockets where support for peace exists, and promoting cooperative action –as opposed to competitive action- across different identity groups.

IVB-c1.) Capacity Building & Investing in Social and Human Capital:

In areas of violent conflict, the severe destruction of the economic capital by the warring parties often overwhelms the efforts of international agencies in preserving the basic infrastructure of the country. The consequent unwillingness of international donors to invest in economic capital in conflict areas transforms itself into an overall hesitancy about funding investments of all forms in areas of conflict, which in turn distresses the prospects of peace and development.

Underlying this hesitancy of the international community is a limited understanding of the term ‘investment’ and ‘capital’. Traditionally in development literature, both of these terms

have been associated with infrastructure building and economic capital. As fundamental as economic dimension could be to peace and development, without the presence of social and human dimensions, development and peace efforts are bound to falter in the long-term. Thus, social capital- the norms, values, and social relations that bond communities together as well as the bridges between communal groups and the states (Colletta & Cullen 2000: 4)- and human capital are key building blocks of sustainable development and peaceful coexistence.

In the midst of violent conflicts, although both social and human capital remain vulnerable to destruction, efforts for their preservation are more likely to be effective than economic capital. Since the source of both social and human capital is in individuals and groups made up of individuals, resisting their direct destruction through violence is more likely to be successful. Thus, the focus of international community's investment should be more on social and human capital especially in places where economic investment is not viable.

Investing in the social and human capital of a country in conflict can take various forms. In building the capacity of the individuals to assist in the process towards peace, assistance projects that have the primary aim to contribute to the normalization of education facilities take the lead. Provision of training for new teachers, funding for education materials and construction of destroyed facilities constitute most of these efforts. Also, the local staffing of international NGOs offers significant opportunity for local knowledge to be used and improved.

In building the capacity of different groups of identity to work together during and after the conflict, the process through which humanitarian assistance is carried out gains greater importance than the content of the project (Agerbak 1996: 29). The inclusion of the local intercommunal mechanisms of decision-making at the planning and implementation stages not only makes the projects more successful in addressing the needs of the society, but it also

promotes communication and trust between different groups (Maynard 1999: 168; Prendergast 1996: 112). In cases where such mechanisms are already in place, international NGOs should provide them with the necessary logistical and institutional support. In cases where such mechanisms do not exist, their creation should be facilitated through providing institutional support to local authorities and elders with genuine interest in protecting civilians from violence (Reen & Wilson 1994: 220).

Among the projects undertaken by the international relief agencies in Burundi, a number of ad hoc projects exist that have contributed to the social and human capitals of the target communities. ActionAid, for example, became actively involved in the creation of multi-ethnic committees that became instrumental in the process of need-assessment and the distribution of emergency supplies in the Ruyigi commune. Action Aid also created a center in the same commune that has provided vital training for community groups and partner organizations in peace keeping and reconciliation.⁴⁰ With a similar mindset, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) became involved with a multi-ethnic group of thirty-six young men who were previously involved in the conflict. When this group emerged SFCG asking for support in their desire to contribute to peace, this conflict resolution organization assisted them with institutional skills, training, and dialogue sessions. After two years, this youth group is now actively involved in local peace efforts through public demonstrations and awareness campaigns. In the most recent crisis in early March, the members of this group organized themselves to assist CARE in distributing emergency needs in Bujumbura Rurale.⁴¹ Although the emergence of such groundbreaking projects is a promising development, as long as they remain ad hoc responses to the needs on the ground and fail to be transformed into structural rethinking about the goals of

humanitarian assistance, their positive effect will be fall far from contributing to the resolution of the conflict.

IVB-c2.) Investing in Stable Pockets of Peace:

Even in the midst of the most violent intra-state conflicts, pockets of peace always exist. These pockets of peace emerge either because the commune is outside the geographical scope of the conflict or because the commune successfully resists against warring parties to remain outside the conflict. In either case, these relatively secure communes emerge as locations where the international community can make vital investments for improving the existing economic, social and human capital. The active presence of the international community in these communes and the projects undertaken cooperatively not only improves the well-being of the members of this commune, but it also strengthens the capacity of the commune to continue to stay outside of the conflict.

There has already been a recognition by international NGOs that some intervention is possible in these stable pockets. Yet this recognition has not transformed itself into a shift in perspective of donors but remained as localized responses to local situations (Holtzman 1999: 22). In Burundi, for example, while in a number of communes NGOs have started projects of reconstruction and long-term development as early as 1996, the assistance provided by the donor community has continued to be almost totally emergency relief-oriented until last year.⁴² The delay in donors' response to the realities on the ground has caused funding difficulties for the NGOs' efforts in these communes. Thus, the need for a major shift in donor perspective remains crucial for the preservation and proliferation of these stable pockets of peace.

IVB-f.) Building Bridges Across Identities in Times of Conflict

The idea of building bridges across identities in times of conflict emerges as an extension of the idea of investing in social capital of a society for the creation and preservation of peace. Essentially, relief and development projects need to be planned and implemented in a way to foster interdependence and cooperation between different groups (Prendergast 1996: 12). Due to the de facto geographical separation of different groups in times of conflict, humanitarian aid has often been provided in relation to the division in the society rather than in relation to and in support of the connectors (Anderson 1999: 23). Thus, emergency assistance has often reinforced the lines of division between different groups instead of attempting to bridge them.⁴³

More recently, there has been increasing experimentation with humanitarian assistance projects that aim to decrease the level of distrust between different groups. One major trend in these projects has focused on intercommunal trade and exchange. In times of conflict when most economic opportunities disappear, the promotion of economic enhancement opportunities by the international NGOs carries important potential for peacemaking. Not only intercommunal economic activities in the form of trade and exchange would keep open lines of communication with the other identity-groups, but the security requirement of commercial activities has the potential to bring about stability to target areas (Prendergast 1996: 12). The people involved in such activities would have a high stake in the continuation of the commerce and thus take all necessary means to keep the destabilizing effects of conflict out of their region. Similarly,

economic projects that require continuous interaction to take place between different groups can gradually diminish distrust and stereotypes along lines of identity.

A number of NGOs in Burundi have recently implemented projects that create economic opportunities with the goal to build bridges between different groups. An inter-ethnic women's cooperative within the National Council of Churches (CNEB) has been created with the goal to promote peace and understanding.⁴⁴ Among the many intercommunal agricultural projects this women's cooperative have undertaken is the distribution of goats to vulnerable women, on condition that when the goat breeds, the "mother" must hand over the kid to another woman of a different ethnicity. The two women remain in contact through the tie they have established with the goat, which promotes closer relations between women of different ethnic groups. Another similar project has been undertaken by Search for Common Ground with funding from the British Embassy in Bujumbura. Under this project, micro-credit was made available only to applications that were submitted by Hutus and Tutsis together or to projects that were aiming to benefit both Hutus and Tutsis in a certain community.⁴⁵ By imposing this condition on the micro-credit project, SFCG was aiming to promote inter-communal relations through the provision of economic incentives.

Opportunities for promoting peace through humanitarian assistance are indeed numerous even in the midst of a violent intra-state conflict. In order for the international community not to miss these opportunities, the traditional approach to humanitarian aid that focuses solely on 'saving lives until tomorrow' has to be transformed. First of all, the lines of demarcation that exist between the different phases of a conflict have to be removed. No country in crisis is in total peace or in total war at one given time. In most cases, pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict conditions exist at the same time in the same country. Thus, the international

community's response has to remove its categorical mindset and learn to respond to conditions of pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict at the same time. Secondly, the lines of demarcation have to be removed between the fields of relief, development, human rights and conflict resolution. A conflict consists of multi-faceted factors that require solutions at political, social, economic and cultural levels. Isolated solutions can have only limited success if they are not coordinated and incorporated within a larger umbrella with efforts in the other levels. Finally, the ideas that underlie a number of ad hoc humanitarian projects that currently incorporate a long-term peace dimension have to be transformed into a structural way of thinking for the international relief efforts.

SECTION V:

OBSTACLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

As promising as the potential of aid as a peacemaker is, institutional and situational obstacles and the challenges are not absent from the process through which this potential can be realized. Among the major institutional challenges are the absence of necessary expertise, the existing institutional divisions between relief, development, and conflict resolution organizations, and the absence of an overall coordination in international peace efforts. Among the major situational obstacles, on other hand, are the difficulties posed by the security and staffing situations on the ground and the absence of ripeness in the community for peacemaking projects.

➤ **Absence of Expertise:** A significant level of expertise in the field of conflict analysis and resolution is necessary in order for relief and development organizations to incorporate a peace dimension into their projects. Currently, almost all relief and development organizations lack

such expertise. Consequently, some practitioners have suggested that their efforts should be limited to indirect measures for promoting peace because they are not equipped to actively take on a peacemaker role and thus may cause more harm than good (Menkhaus 1995). As plausible as this argument may sound, the current absence of such expertise does not mean that such expertise cannot be acquired. Through the engagement of outside experts in field projects and cooperation with conflict resolution organizations who can provide such services, the problems related to the absence of conflict resolution expertise can be reduced significantly.

➤ **Institutional division between relief, development and conflict resolution organizations:**

As a result of the institutional evolution of international involvement in conflict-ridden countries, the current status quo is deeply divided along lines of project types. This division is not solely institutional but it also reflects itself on the mindset of people who work in these fields.⁴⁶ As most relief workers focus on substantive work that is result-oriented, most people working in the field of conflict resolution focus on dialogue-based projects that are process-oriented. Also, this institutional division is highly desirable for funding reasons because funds availability depends to a certain extent on having specific expertise in a certain field.⁴⁷ As fundamental as alliances of competent agencies in the fields of relief, development, and peace are (Roche 1996: 22), overcoming the present divisions and establishing effective cooperation will certainly be a difficult process.

➤ **Absence of an Overall Coordination of International Peace Efforts:** As stated several times throughout the paper, aid's potential as a peacemaker is bound to fail if it is not part of an overall international peace effort that is both political and economic in its content. Unfortunately, in those countries towards which donor governments perceive little geo-economic interest, aid policy often replaces foreign policy (Bryer & Cairns 1997: 370). Aid stripped of diplomatic

efforts will only have a limited influence on the peace process. Both regional and international organizations must build up their capacity for coordinated action at all levels in order for conflict prevention and peacemaking efforts to bear fruit.

➤ **The situation on the ground; Security, Staffing, and Local Capacity:** As is the danger with most theoretical work, the situation on the ground in conflict areas will inevitably not fit the clear-cut picture provided in this paper. All relief and peace efforts will be limited by the absence of security in areas of conflict. Gaining access to certain parts of the country will remain an ongoing struggle for the UN and NGO workers in the country.

Staffing, which can be an opportunity for building human capital for all identity-groups can become a big challenge in the absence of adequately trained members of a certain group. Ideally, decisions about whom to hire to staff projects should be made with the goal of supporting the participants' capacities both locally and vis a vis other dominant groups in their own societies (Anderson & Woodrow 1998: 78). The demographics of a conflict, however, make such decisions difficult. In the case of Burundi, for example, while most UN agencies and international NGOs are concentrated in Bujumbura as a result of the security situation, the historical exclusion of Hutus from educational opportunities and the recent flight of many Hutus out of Bujumbura have meant that Hutus qualified to work in international agencies are not in adequate numbers. With Bujumbura becoming "Tutsified",⁴⁸ to preserve their ethnic balance in staffing, a number of NGOs are looking into the possibility of expanding their permanent services to other parts of Burundi where there are more Hutus.

Empowering local capacities for peace and development can also become problematic once it is applied to conflict situations. Most donors continue to require extremely elaborate processes of accounting as a condition for providing funding. Most local NGOs lack such

capacity, which make them unfavorable candidates for bilateral project funding.⁴⁹ To overcome this mainly bureaucratic obstacle in building local capacity for peace, a number of international organizations have started to provide training on accounting to local NGOs in Burundi. Also, lobbying efforts continue to pressure bilateral donors to take into consideration the conditions on the ground when they are setting their conditions for funding. In order for theoretical tools to become practical ones, difficulties that arise as a result of the specific conditions of a conflict-ridden country should be thoroughly understood and the theory should be adapted to those conditions to the extent possible.

➤ **Absence of ripeness in the community for peacemaking projects:** Both promotive projects in the pre-conflict phase and cross-communal projects in the conflict phase carry the potential for backfiring if the community is not ‘ripe’ for such projects. A development project, for example, that requires people from different identity groups to work together, instead of building better relations between the communities can exacerbate the tensions if both communities continue to prefer war to peace. In other words, if the demand for peace is totally absent in a society, then the chances of making peace remain extremely dim.

If permanent peace will prevail in Burundi, it ultimately has to come from the Burundians. The international donor community must recognize that they cannot “bring” development or “make” peace for Burundians (Anderson 1995: 30).⁵⁰ The role of aid as a peacemaker is ultimately limited to supporting the capacity of Burundians to work towards the goals of peace and development.

CONCLUSION:

In early March, a new wave of violence swept Bujumbura Rurale. Following the new round of Arusha Peace Talks in December that brought about an atmosphere of optimism in the international community, the outbreak of this new crisis came as a shock to many international observers. Consequently, pledges of reconstruction aid that were made by the donor community in December to encourage the peace process have been put on hold until the violence subsides.

The failure of the international community to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda has made Burundi the focus of and a test case for international diplomatic efforts for peace for the past five years now. Although international observers continue to remain hopeful about the success of Arusha talks to end the war, Burundians perceive Arusha to have become too separated from the Burundian reality and thus unlikely to bring about the long-wanted peace.⁵¹ If the international community does not shift in the near future its solely diplomatic focus at the leadership level to a multi-faceted response mechanism that can address the complex reality of the conflict, Burundi will soon indeed join the list of case studies on failed peace efforts. What is urgently needed in Burundi is a new paradigm of peacemaking that is capable of addressing the root causes of a conflict at both the leadership and grassroots levels.

As part of this new paradigm of peacemaking, development and relief aid have an immense potential to take on a central role in supporting the local capacities for peaceful coexistence. Aid not only possesses the ability to make the economic, social and political conditions of the recipient environment more conducive to peaceful coexistence, but it also has the power to influence governmental decisions that affect the peace process. Before the outbreak of a conflict, aid projects can play extensive role in addressing the root causes of a conflict through its direct effects on the distribution of economic and educational opportunities, and

through the imposition of conditionalities on the state to encourage the improvement of ethnic relations. Furthermore, at the grassroots level, aid projects can build the capacity of communes to prevent the outbreak of violence and assist their efforts in addressing the antagonistic resentments through peaceful means. Once a conflict breaks out, aid can continue supporting local efforts in sustaining the social capital for peaceful coexistence. The process through which humanitarian aid is introduced can help preserve the peace in stable pockets, build the capacity of individuals and communities for peaceful coexistence, and build bridges across groups which were destroyed by the conflict.

All these efforts of peacemaking can become part of aid regime once the donors and NGOs acknowledge aid's potential as a peacemaker and take on a more active role that is beyond transferring funds from one country to another. In other words, the traditional models of development and relief have to be transformed into new paradigms that address the realities of pre-conflict and conflict situations. This paper has attempted to analyze the means through which aid's potential as a peacemaker can be realized. It is my hope that this work may contribute not only to a better understanding of aid and peacemaking, but also to continuing efforts of peacemakers in Burundi.

¹ According to World Bank reports, fifteen of the twenty poorest countries in the world have experienced significant periods of conflict since the 1980s and more than half of all low income countries have been involved in major civil conflicts since 1984 (Colletta&Nezam 1997: 7). Another statistic quotes that as of mid-1998, 20 of the world's 35 poorest countries were wither in or had recently emerged from a civil war (Green &Ahmed 1999: 189)

² These numbers are based on the information provided by OCHA-Burundi and quoted in *Out of Sight, Out of Mind* (Hiddlestone 2000).

³ The information is available on World Bank website at www.worldbank.org/afr/bi2.htm

⁴ In his article on the role of development in conflict processes, Hauge points at the isolation of the field of development studies and the field of conflict studies from each other as part of this problem (1999: 11).

⁵ Among these recent writings, John Prendergast's *Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa* (Lynne Rienner, 1996) and Mary Anderson's *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace –Or War* (Lynne Rienner, 1999) have been especially influential.

⁶ In most conflicts, international military involvement- or the threat of it- is a third source of influence in addition to the political and economic channels. Yet, in the case of Burundi, the possibility of an international military involvement became out of question with the Western powers strong statements about the undesirability of a military involvement.

⁷ The 2000 Financial Year Budget of USAID assistance to Burundi is a good illustration of this distribution of international aid. Of the \$40 million assistance, \$22.7 million was spent on food aid and \$13.3 million was spent on disaster assistance while only \$0.5 million was spent on development assistance. (www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2000/fs0000907.html)

⁸ The number of casualties and displaced people used in defining minor-armed conflict, intermediate armed conflict, war, and major war are often arbitrary and differ from source to source. An example is the report from the Conflict Data Project at the Uppsala University titled *States in Armed Conflict*: minor armed conflict is where the number of battle-related deaths is below 1,000, intermediate armed conflict is where it is more than 1,000 during the course of the conflict but fewer than 1,000 in any given year, war is more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in any given year. (Sollenberg 1999: 9)

⁹ Poverty of subsistence manifests itself as insufficient income, food and shelter; poverty of protection manifests itself as bad health systems, violence and arms race; poverty of affection manifests itself as authoritarianism, oppression, and exploitative relations with the natural environment; poverty of participation manifests itself as marginalisation and discrimination; and poverty of identity manifests itself as the imposition of alien values upon local and regional cultures, forced migration and political exile (Bremner 1994: 5).

¹⁰ The figures are from World Bank data that were quoted in EIU Annual Supplement for 1985.

¹¹ Excluded from the government were not only the Hutus, but also powerless and poor Tutsis in Burundi.

¹² This is the definition of foreign aid that will be used for the purposes of this paper. The definition "a transfer of concessional resources from one government to another or from a government to an international aid agency or a nongovernmental organization, which, in turn, transfers those resources to poor countries" is used in Carol Lancaster's *Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done* (1999: 36).

¹³ The involvement of the bilateral donors and multilateral organizations at the grassroots level is increasingly significant with most of their funding being channeled through international and local nongovernmental organizations.

¹⁴ Interview with Susan Collin Marks, Search For Common Ground, March 12, 2001.

¹⁵ Interview with Susan Martin, Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, March 2001.

¹⁶ There are some arguments that state that the preventive diplomacy in Burundi was successful as it prevented Burundi from becoming another Rwanda (Ould-Abdallah 2000, introduction).

¹⁷ In 1993, Burundi's long-term debt was 111 per cent of its GDP(EIU Country Report-4th Quarter 1994)

¹⁸ Forestry projects were mainly carried out with the aid from the French government. These Projects included protection and regeneration of forests in Burundi.

¹⁹ In 1984, 90 percent of Burundi's export revenue was dependent on coffee, which had highly volatile market prices making economic predictability difficult.

²⁰ The GDP growth fell from 4.6% in the early 1980s to 3.6% in 1992, the real capital growth fell from 1.5% to 0.3%, and the average deficit-to-growth ratio increased from 13.8% to 15.74%. Although complete data on unemployment rates were unavailable, it was stated by the World Bank that there was a slowdown of employment in the public sector while the absorption of labor by the informal and formal sector was very low (Englebert&Hoffman 1994: 50, 74).

²¹ Concepts similar to “peace assessment” have been introduced in Esman (1997) as ‘ethnic impact statements,’ in Chayes&Chayes (1996) as ‘ethno-national assessment,’ and in Schmitz (1992) as “peace conditionality.”

²² Interview with Glenn Slocum, consultant for USAID and former Former USAID Field Director of Burundi, February 21st, 2001.

²³ The pioneer document in this field was *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth* (November 1989)

²⁴ In 1994, for example, in more than 50 per cent of World Bank approved projects, some sort of nongovernmental organization involvement was present. Although this number does not give a clear indication of the depth of this involvement, it still demonstrates the trend (www.worldbank.org). Also, bilateral donors are increasingly providing grants for nongovernmental organizations and cooperating with nongovernmental organizations in implementing their projects (www.dfid.gov.uk, www.usaid.gov).

²⁵ Also, a limited number of nongovernmental organizations emerged in the last decade that work solely in the field of conflict prevention, among which are Search for Common Ground and Institute for MultiTrack Diplomacy. Their projects are mostly focused on providing conflict resolution training and peace education, encouraging local capacities for peace, and promoting non-violent conflict resolution methods through radio programs, theater, and art. Their activities are not the focus of this section because their projects do not address development or humanitarian relief.

²⁶ Most international NGOs that are currently in Burundi started their activities since 1993. Information on other NGOs that were involved in Burundi for longer than a decade, such as Catholic Relief Services, lacked detail and was considerably limited.

²⁷ Catholic Relief Services, for example, changed the scope of its projects to local empowerment and civil society building in 1986.

²⁸ Stories of close friends from Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim background in Sarajevo turning into enemies were fairly common in the Yugoslav War.

²⁹ Initially, France and UNESCO stated their opposition to the freezing of aid. In less than 3 months after this declaration, France also halted its aid.

³⁰ The reaction of the regional and international community to the military coup was strong. The most drastic step was taken by Burundi’s neighbors who imposed tight sanctions on landlocked Burundi. Neither the sanctions nor the discontinuing of aid could bring about the necessary steps towards peace by the Buyoya regime.

³¹ Following is a summary of the major pledges made by bilateral donors and international organizations. The information is based on the reports of Pan African New Agency and an annex to the draft strategy paper prepared by Glenn Slocum for USAID:

-World Bank pledged \$40 million credit to be spent towards employment creation projects and public works whose target groups will be construction workers, inter-city truck drivers, seasonal workers, and other vulnerable groups. Among the expected beneficiaries are the youth, returning refugees, and demobilised combatants.

-France pledged 50 million francs to reinforce programmes it is supporting under the bilateral co-operation framework with Burundi.

-Belgium pledged \$24 million, including \$4.5 million for reintegration, \$2.7 million for social rehabilitation, \$1.8 million for economic credits, and \$4.5 million for labor-intensive projects

³² The information is taken from *USAID Fact Sheet: USAID Assistance to Burundi*, www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2000/fs000907.html.

³³ During 1997-1998, only \$3 million worth of aid was transferred for purposes other than emergency relief. For further detail on the distribution of aid among different areas, see *Aid Activities in Africa 1997-1998: Credit Reporting System*, Paris: DAC-OECD.

³⁴ A good illustration of this linear separatist thinking is USAID’s definition of transition. It defines transition as a rapid change from relief operations to reconstruction and sustainable development operation. (Similie 1999: xix)

³⁵ Interview with Kimberly Maynard, Consultant on international development and relief, February 20, 2001.

³⁶ The information regarding the type of relief activities in Burundi is based on the activities of ICRC, Jesuit Refugee Services, CARE-Burundi, Catholic Relief Services, Doctors Without Borders, International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, Relief International, Concern Worldwide, and World Vision as available in their webpages.

³⁷ Some Burundian women’s cooperatives, for example, that used to sell indigenous cotton oil found themselves unable to compete with the imported cooking oil provided through humanitarian aid (Ould-Abdallah 2000: 126)

³⁸ Interview with Kimberly Maynard, February 20, 2001.

³⁹ Interview with Susan Collin Marks, Search for Common Ground, March 12, 2001.

⁴⁰ The information is from the Fact Sheet produced by ActionAid on Burundi, which is available at www.actionaid.org.

⁴¹ Interview with Sally Chin, Search for Common Ground, March 12, 2001.

⁴² Among the projects that are being carried out in stable pockets are rebuilding of houses through intercommunal efforts, rehabilitation of water systems, schools and health centers, and restocking of selected communes with the appropriate livestock.

⁴³ Nat Colletta, the Director of the World Bank Post-Conflict Unit, argues that long-term refugee camps, for example, where millions of dollars of international assistance is spent, are inherently ethnically homogeneous and thus prolong the conflict and make the chances of reintegration of different groups into the same community dim. Once cut off from all types of contact with the other groups in these camps, dangerous myths and stereotypes emerge about the other groups creating extreme distrust. Lecture on April 4, 2001, American University.

⁴⁴ This project is based on an account titled "Doing it For the Kids: Goats, Crops, and Inter-Ethnic Cooperation" in *Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Conflict and Displacement in Burundi*, (Hiddleston 2000: 13).

⁴⁵ Interview with Sally Chin, March 12, 2001.

⁴⁶ Interview with Bernard Mayer, Center for Dispute Settlement, April 12, 2001.

⁴⁷ Interview with Bernard Mayer, April 12, 2001.

⁴⁸ Interview with Glenn Slocum, February 21, 2001.

⁴⁹ Interview with Jonathan Dworken, USAID Burundi Desk Officer for Refugees and IDPs, February 16, 2001.

⁵⁰ Interview with Glenn Slocum, February 21, 2001.

⁵¹ Interview with Glenn Slocum, February 21, 2001.

Bibliography

- Agerbak, Linda. (1996). "Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Doing Development in Situations of Conflict," in *Development in States of War: Selected Articles from Development in Practice*, Deborah Eade, ed., London: Oxfam, 26-32.
- Anderson, Mary B. & Bock, James G. (1999). "Dynamite Under the Intercommunal Bridge: How Can Aid Agencies Help Defuse It," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 36, no. 3, Sage Publications, 325-338.
- Anderson, Mary B. (1999). *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-or War*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Anderson, Mary B. & Woodrow, Peter J. (1998). *Rising from the Ashes: Development Strategies in Times of Disaster*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Anderson, Mary B. (1993). "Development and the Prevention of Humanitarian Emergencies," in *Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in Times of War*, Thomas G. Weiss & Larry Minear, eds., Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 23-38.
- Ball, Nicole & Friedman, Jordana D. (1997). "The Role of International Financial Institutions in Preventing and Resolving Conflict," in *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention*, David Cortright, ed., MD: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 243-264.
- Ball, Nicole. (1992). *Pressing for Peace: Can Aid Induce Reform?* Policy Essay 6, Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council.
- Bastian, Sunil & Bastian, Nicole. (1996). "Development NGOs working in an Ethnic Conflict," *Appropriate Technology*, Vol. 22, No. 4, 27-29.

- Bremner, Davin. (1994). "Development's Catch-22: No Development without Peace, No Peace without Development," *Track Two*, Vol. 3, No.1, Centre for Intergroup Studies, 1-5.
- Bryer, David & Cairn, Edmund. (1997). "For Better? For Worse? Humanitarian Aid in Conflict," *Development in Practice*, Vol. 7, No. 4, Oxfam UK and Ireland, 363-374.
- Burton, John W. (1997). *Violence Explained: The Sources of Violence and Crime and their Prevention*. New York: Manchester University Press.
- Byrne, Sean & Ayulo, Michael J. (1998). "External Economic Aid in Ethno-Political Conflict: A View from Northern Ireland," *Security Dialogue*, Vol 29, No. 4, 421-434.
- Caine, Glenda. (1998). "Training for Peace," in *From Conflict to Peace in a Changing World: Social Reconstruction in Times of Transition*, Deborah Eade, ed., Oxfam Working Paper, Oxford: Oxfam G.B., 125-127.
- Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. (1997). *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
- Chazan, Naomi, et al, eds. (1999). *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*. Colorado: Lynne Publishers.
- Colletta, Nat & Cullen, Michelle L. (2000). *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Colletta, Nat & Nezam, Taies. (1997). *The Role of Development Assistance in Conflict Prevention, Transition and Reconstruction*. Institutional and Social Policy, Africa Region. Washington, DC: World Bank, photocopy.
- Cortright, David. 1997. "Incentives Strategies for Preventing Conflict," in *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention*, David Cortright, ed., MD: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 267-301.
- Commins, Stephen. 1996. "In the line of Fire: Development in Conflict," in *Development in States of War: Selected Articles from Development in Practice*, Deborah Eade, ed., London: Oxfam, 8-14.
- DAC-OECD. (1999). *Aid Activities in Africa, 1997-1998: Creditor Reporting System*. Paris: OECD.
- Davies, James C. (1972). "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in *Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research*, Ivo K. Feierabend, Rasolind L. Feierabend, and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 67-84.
- Duffield, Mark. (1994). "The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies and International Aid," in *War & Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*. Joanna Macrae & Anthony Zwi, eds., New Jersey: Zed Books, 50-69.
- The Economist Intelligence Unit. *Quarterly Economic Review of Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi*. 1982-1993; *Quarterly Economic Review of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi*. 1993-1997. London: EIU Press.
- The Economist Intelligence Unit. *Quarterly Economic Review of Burundi & Main Report on Burundi*. 1997-2000. EIU Database.
- Eller, Jack David. 1999. *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Englebert, Pierre & Hoffman, Richard. (1994). "Burundi: Learning Lessons," in *Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from Case Studies*, Ishrat Husain and Rashid Faruquee, eds., Washington, DC: The World Bank.

-
- Esman, Milton J. (1997). *Can Foreign Aid Moderate Ethnic Conflict*. Peaceworks 13. Washington, DC: USIP Press.
- Esman, Milton J. (1990). "Economic Performance and Ethnic Conflict," in *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies*. Joseph V. Montville, eds., Lexington: Lexington Books, 477-492.
- Fagen, Patricia Weiss. (1994). "After the Conflict: A Review of Selected Sources on Rebuilding War-torn Societies," War-Torn Societies Project, Occasional Paper 1, November 1994, www.unrisd.org/wsp/txt/wsp-op1.txt.
- Fitzgerald, E.V.K. & Stewart, Frances. (1997). "Editor's Introduction," *Oxford Development Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 5-10.
- Fitzgerald, E.V.K. (1997). "Paying for the War: Macroeconomic Stabilization in Poor Countries Under Conflict Conditions," *Oxford Development Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 43-65.
- Galtung, Johan. (1969). "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1969, No. 3, 167-192.
- Green, Reginald Herbold & Ahmed, Ismail I. (1999). "Rehabilitation, sustainable peace and development: towards reconceptualisation," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 189-206.
- Goudie, Andrew & Neyapti, Bilin. (1999). *Conflict and Growth in Africa: Southern Africa*. Paris: Development Centre of OECD.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. (1972). "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," in *Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research*, Ivo K. Feierabend, Rasolind L. Feierabend, and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 31-57.
- Gutlove, Paula. (1999). "Health Brigades for Peace: Integrating Health Care with Conflict Prevention and Community Reconciliation," in *Training to Promote Conflict Management: USIP-Assisted Training Projects*. David Smock, ed., Peaceworks 29, Washington, DC: USIP Press, 11-16.
- Hauge, Wenche. (1999). "The Role of Development and Environmental Change in Conflict Processes," in *Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict: Types, Causes, and Peace Strategies*, Hakan Wiberg and Christian P. Scherrer, eds., Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate, 106-121.
- Hiddleston, Trish; Martin, Susan Forbes & Watson, Rachel. 2000. *Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Conflict and Displacement in Burundi*. Report of Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children. www.intrescom.org/wcrwc/index/html.
- Holtzman, Steven. (1999). *Rethinking Relief and Development in Transitions from Conflict*. Occasional Papers, Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement. Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions Press.
- Hook, Steven W. (1998). "'Building Democracy' through Foreign Aid: The Limitations of United States Political Conditionalities, 1992-1996," *Democratization*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 156-180.
- Human Rights Watch. (1997). *Stoking the Fires: Military Assistance and Arms Trafficking in Burundi*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- International Alert-DFID Concept Note. (2000). *International Alert's Great Lakes Women's Peace Programme*. Photocopy.
- Jackson, Tony. (2000). *Equal Access to Education: A Peace Imperative for Burundi*. London: International Alert Press, photocopy.
- Kaldor, Mary. (1999). *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

-
- Keen, David & Wilson, Ken. 1994. "Engaging with Violence: A Reassessment of Relief in Wartime," in *War & Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*. Joanna Macrae & Anthony Zwi, eds., New Jersey: Zed Books, 209-221.
- Khadiagala, Gilbert M. (2000). "Europe in Africa's Renewal: Beyond Post-Colonialist," in *Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux*, John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild, eds., Colorado: Westview Press, 83-109.
- Khan, Rasheeduddin. (1978). "Violence and Socioeconomic Development," *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 30, No. 4, 834-857.
- Lancaster, Carol. (1999). *Aid to Africa: So Much to Do, So Little Done*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Leatherman, Janie. (1999). "The Shock of the Familiar: Discerning Patterns in Burundi's Cycles of Violence," in *Breaking Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises*, Janie Leatherman, William De Mars, et.al., eds., West Hartford, CN: Kumarian Press.
- Lederach, John Paul. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: USIP.
- Lemarcand, Rene. (1996). *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*. New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Lichbach, Mark Irving. (1989). "An Evaluation of 'Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?' Studies," *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations*, Vol. XLI, No. 4, 431-470.
- MacFarquhar, Emily & Rotberg, Robert I. (1996). "Introduction," in *Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies*. Robert I. Rotberg, ed., MA: World Peace Foundation, 1-13.
- Martin, Susan. (2001). "Burundi: A Case of Humanitarian Neglect." Conference Paper presented at the 7th Research and Advisory Panel of International Assistance for the Study of Forced Migration, January 7-11, photocopy.
- Maynard, Kimberly. (1999). *Healing Communities in Conflict: International Assistance in Complex Emergencies*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Menkhaus, Ken. (1995). "Conflict, Peacebuilding and International Aid: The State of the Debate," *Life&Peace Review*, February 1995, 10-13.
- Miller, Robert. (1992). "Introduction," in *Aid as Peacemaker: Canadian Development Assistance and Third World Conflict*, Robert Miller, ed., Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1-31.
- Minear, Larry & Weiss, Thomas G. (1995). *Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Minear, Larry. (1995). "A Conceptual Framework," in *The Challenge of Development within Conflict Zones*, Terrance Lorne Mooney, ed., Paris: OECD.
- Minear, Larry & Weiss Thomas G. 1993. *Humanitarian Action in Times of War: A Handbook for Practitioners*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Nicolaidis, Kalypso. (1996). "International Preventive Action: Developing a Strategic Framework," in *Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies*. Robert I. Rotberg, ed., MA: World Peace Foundation, 33-65.
- Ngaruko, Floribert & Nkurunziza, Janvier D. (2000). *An Economic Interpretation of Conflict in Burundi*, draft article, photocopy.
- Nunnenkamp, Peter. (1995). "What Donors Mean by Good Governance: Heroic Ends, Limited Means, and Traditional Dilemmas of Development Cooperation." *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 9-16.

-
- Nzangola-Ntalaja, Georges. (1998). "Ethnic Identification in the Great Lakes Region: the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda and Burundi," Paper Prepared for Conference on *Shifting African Identities*, photocopy.
- OECD-DAC. (1997). "DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation," www.oecd.org/dac/pdf/eguide.pdf.
- Ould-Abdallah, Ahmedou. (2000). *Burundi on the Brink: A UN Special Envoy Reflects on Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington, DC: USIP Press.
- Pan-African News Agency. "World Bank Approves \$40 million credit for Burundi," January 24, 2001; "Donors Pledge to Give \$440 million for Reconstruction," December 13, 2000; "Belgium Grants 1 Billion Francs to Burundi," December 11, 2000. www.allafrica.com.
- Prendergast, John. (1996). *Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Rapkin, David P. & Avery, William P. (1986). "World Markets and Political Instability within Less Developed Countries," *Cooperation & Conflict*, Vol. XXI, No. 2, 99-117/
- Reinicke, Wolfgang H. (1996). "Can International Financial Institutions Prevent Internal Violence? The Sources of Ethno-National Conflict in Transitional Societies," in *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations*. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, eds., Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press.
- Reyntjens, Filip. (1995). *Burundi: Breaking the Cycle of Violence*. Minority Rights Group International Report, Manchester: Manchester Free Press.
- Roche, Chris. (1996). "Operationality in turbulence: the Need for Change," in *Development in States of War: Selected Articles from Development in Practice*, Deborah Eade, ed., London: Oxfam, 15-25.
- Rothkopf, David J. (1998). *The Price of Peace: Emergency Economic Intervention and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Scherrer, Christian P. (1999). "Conflict Management and the Process of Escalation: Timing and Types of Responses," in *Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict: Types, Causes, and Peace Strategies*, Hakan Wiberg and Christian P. Scherrer, eds., Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate, 165-184.
- Schmitz, Gerald J. (1992). "CIDA as Peacemaker: Integration or Overload," in *Aid as Peacemaker: Canadian Development Assistance and Third World Conflict*, Robert Miller, ed., Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 89-106
- Slocum, Glenn. (2001). "Summary to Other Donor Assistance and Plans," A Draft Annex to the strategy paper prepared for USAID, email.
- Similie, Ian. (1999). *Relief and Development: The Struggle for Synergy*. Occasional Paper 33, Watson Institute for International Studies, www.brown.edu/Departments/Watson-Institute/Publication/OP/OP33.pdf.
- Sollenberg, Margareta & Wallensteen, Peter. (1999). "Armed Conflict, 1989-1998," in *States in Armed Conflict 1998*, Margareta Sollenberg, ed., Report 54, Uppsala: Uppsala University.
- Sollom, Richard A & Kew, Darren. (1996). "Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Prevention in Burundi," in *Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies*. Robert I. Rotberg, ed., MA: World Peace Foundation, 235-259.
- Staub, Ervin. (1990). "Moral Exclusion, Personal Goal Theory, and Extreme Destruction," *Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 46, No.1, 47-64.

-
- Urvin, Peter. (1999). "Development Aid and Structural Violence: The Case of Rwanda," *Development: the Journal of the Society for International Development*, Vol. 42, No. 3, September 1999, 49-56.
- U.S. Committee for Refugees. (1998). "Burundi: A Patchwork of Displacement," in *The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced*. Roberta Cohen & Francis M. Deng, eds., Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- U.S. Committee for Refugees. (1995). *Burundi's Uprooted People: Caught in the Spiral of Violence*. Issue Paper, Washington, DC: USCR.
- Weissman, Stephen R. (1998). *Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International Diplomacy*. Peaceworks 22. Washington, DC: USIP Press.