

Proactive Peacekeeping for Effective Peace: Rethinking United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

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*Peux ce que veux. Allons-y.
Where there's a will there's a way. Let's go.*
LGen Roméo Dallaire

I. Introduction: The Challenges

Peacekeeping is one of the most important functions the United Nations provides for humanitarian crises at large, not only because of the importance of the operations but because of the UN's unique opportunity to act as an impartial catalyst in conflict situations. A humanitarian crisis requires a multidimensional resolution in order to successfully resolve the conflict, and this is best achieved through multilateral, international action. Multilateral conflict resolution requires not only initiative on the part of the United Nations but also a concerted effort to coordinate between NGOs, the people involved in the crisis, and influential members of the international community.

Peacekeeping operations, however, have usually reacted to the problem rather than develop proactive solutions to the conflict. By 'proactive' I do not mean 'preventative,' which refers to peacekeeping before conflict arises. 'Proactive' should be used to describe action taken based on certain information on new potential threats within an existing mission. I posit that proactive peacekeeping has the greatest chance of effectively assessing, managing, and stopping conflict, and I believe that five criteria should be met in order for any humanitarian operation to be successful.

Before I begin, however, I feel it is important to establish several definitions within the field of international humanitarian action, or more specifically peacekeeping operations. By "humanitarian action" I mean intervening in an interstate conflict that involves a massive human rights violation or poses a threat to international security; this is different than the international definition of "intervention," which precludes an

invasion with the use of troops. This is a very important distinction because it separates situations like Iraq from the discussion on peacekeeping missions; Iraq was an intervention as defined by international law and therefore does not constitute a multilateral peacekeeping effort. The term “multidimensional” refers to peacekeeping operations that target multiple aspects of the conflict—peace agreements, political resolution, humanitarian aid, infrastructure, and the promotion of elections, to name a few. There are few operations in today’s world that only target one aspect of peacekeeping, so it makes sense to discuss multidimensional operations. The term “multilateral” denotes the consent behind the operation and not necessarily a multilateral commitment of personnel. A state can act unilaterally in a humanitarian conflict if the international community approves of the operation. Finally, the “situational difficulty” of a conflict must always be taken into consideration. This refers to the constraints placed upon a peacekeeping operation by the parameters of the conflict itself; Rwanda, for example, had a higher situational difficulty than Namibia, one reason being the genocide involved in the former and not in the latter. No two situations are alike, and I do not wish the following criteria to serve a “cookbook” function. They are guidelines that offer structure for proactive peacekeeping but should not constrain the operation.

I believe it is imperative to address the following five criteria for a proactive peacekeeping operation. First, it is essential to assess the underlying nature of the problem correctly. Terms such as “genocide” and “civil war” are useless without an assessment of the underlying causes of conflict. A comprehensive assessment will lead to the second criterion, which is to determine the appropriate type of international action

needed for the situation. In this study we will be discussing the various facets of multidimensional action and the players needed to fulfill a multidimensional mandate. There must be an emphasis on communication between the United Nations, NGOs, and the indigenous population. Effective communication is an important tool in keeping the use of force as an instrument of last resort. A high level of communication between the actors in a conflict means the United Nations has a greater chance of effectively addressing the issue and containing any escalation of the conflict.

Once the two primary criteria are established, a peacekeeping operation must address the third criterion, which is to establish centralized leadership based in the field. This is best achieved through the fourth criterion, which is to communicate with and relinquish control to the local population. It is not practical or feasible for the international community to enter a conflict and simply provide aid; that is not the point of a multidimensional mandate. Finally, in order for the operation to be successful, time must always be a consideration. This may seem like a simplistic claim, but unfortunately missions often forget that time is of the essence. It is important to establish phases of the peace process, set aside time to catalyze a sustainable infrastructure (as opposed to just building it), and to communicate throughout the entire process.

In order to illustrate these five criteria I will examine three countries that have experienced peacekeeping in the past fifteen years—Namibia, Cambodia, and Rwanda. I will analyze the successes in Namibia, the mixed results in Cambodia, and the failures in Rwanda. We will then look at the UN peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and how the five criteria can be applied to deal with the

growing difficulty of the situation. MONUC in the Congo is currently the world's largest peacekeeping operation; the tragedy of the situation in the DRC is often overlooked by mass media and therefore by the public eye. The situational difficulty is high because of regional meddling, resource battles, and recent UN scandals, but the United Nations understands that something must be done because no one else will act. I believe that effective planning and leadership through the five criteria can ameliorate a potentially disastrous situation in the Congo.

Finally, we must reflect on the conclusions and implications drawn from the case studies. What has proven to be effective policy with multidimensional peacekeeping operations, and what can be improved? The goal is to find transferable, proactive features of successful operations, not just circumstantial success, and apply them to the future of multilateral action in conflicts like the conflict in the Congo.

There are, of course, serious external challenges to multilateral, multidimensional peacekeeping in addition to the constraints of the conflict. The three main aspects we will explore are the willpower of the United Nations' member states (which includes the limited budget of peacekeeping operations), bureaucratic inefficiency within the UN, and the situational difficulty of a conflict. Ideally, politics should not be involved in the resolution of humanitarian crises, but unfortunately they do play a part in the nature and speed of the response. It would be unwise to ignore these factors and risk an unrealistic mandate in the face of a humanitarian crisis. Every conflict is different and will require certain sensitivities, but each peacekeeping mission should have a solid operational foundation. I believe that applying these five criteria to

a peacekeeping mission greatly increases the operation's chance of success of proactively building a lasting peace.

II. Establishing a Successful Basis for Proactive Peacekeeping

In this new era of complex peacekeeping, it is important to establish a basic understanding of the problem so an operation can be as effective as possible. The first criterion, assessing the underlying nature of the problem, incurs better decision-making on what kind of operation is needed. This second criterion, determining the appropriate type of international action, lays the framework for proactive peacekeeping. Kofi Annan addressed the issue best when he identified the goal as establishing “peace-building components within peacekeeping operations.” (Kofi Annan, 47) The idea is to equip the mission with the proper tools to ensure a lasting peace and a sustainable solution.

Unfortunately, some of the most basic aspects of peacekeeping are often overlooked. Assessing the underlying nature of the problem seems trivial but if forgotten the operation cannot function properly; likewise, the United Nations must follow through with the appropriate type of international action or the mission will fail. Barnett and Finnemore accurately observe that “before individuals can know how to act, they must first define the situation and create a representation of the problem.” (Barnett & Finnemore, 148) These two criteria are explicitly linked to the situational difficulty of a peacekeeping operation; it is never enough to apply them universally and expect to see the success of Namibia or Cambodia recreated in a place like Rwanda. A situation such as the one in Rwanda can teach us a lot about the constraints within the peacekeeping system that play up the situational difficulty instead of minimizing it. The

first two criteria attempt to identify the situational difficulty and therefore properly address the conflict.

Criterion 1 : Assess the underlying nature of the problem

The first criterion of proactive peacekeeping is often influenced by the two most crucial constraints on the United Nations peacekeeping— a counterproductive, bureaucratic tendency and the fact that the UN is entirely dependent upon its member states.

The first constraint begins within the United Nations bureaucracy in New York, specifically the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). While this seems self-explanatory it is rarely self-evident, because the department is often accused of incompetency and inaccuracy. Roméo Dallaire, Force Commander of UNAMIR in Rwanda, painted a bleak picture in his dealing with the DPKO. He quoted sources claiming that “the culture of the UN was one of jealously guarded stovepipe fiefdoms where information was power (not the best way to run a complex, multi-national, multidisciplined and international organization that was always in the poorhouse).” (Dallaire, 52) Worse still, “critics charged that the DPKO was staffed by a bunch of incompetent boobs who kept bankers’ hours and disappeared when situations in the field came to a head. Canada’s Major General Lewis MacKenzie, who had led the UN peacekeeping contingent in Sarajevo, had heaped scorn on the DPKO for its generally negative attitude toward those in the field.” (Dallaire, 49) The default *modus operandi* was sadly ‘compartmentalized cooperation’ rather than communication.

Secondly, UN peacekeeping operations are entirely dependent upon member states’ contributions, most notably troops and financial support. Maurice Baril, one of the UN diplomats in charge of DPKO at the time of the Rwandan genocide, told

Dallaire that the operation “had to be small and inexpensive, otherwise it will never get approved by the Security Council.” (Dallaire, 55) Dallaire was shocked—Baril asked him to “‘situate the estimate,’ as we say in the military, to design the mission to fit available resources rather than to respond to the actual demands of the situation we were being sent to assess.” (Dallaire, 56) Given these two major roadblocks to UN peacekeeping, how can we assess the underlying nature of the conflict?

There are two important ways in which proactive peacekeeping can effectively deal with the first criterion. First, the people involved should actively promote a positive relationship between headquarters and those in the field from the beginning, so that what Dallaire described does not occur. The goal is not necessarily to overhaul the DPKO but to provide clear incentives to work with each other in New York and with their colleagues in the field. It is important to remember the constraint on resources and funding, but also to strive to find a solution that takes into account both the situational difficulty and the limitations on UN peacekeeping funds. In conjunction with this, the relationship should be based upon a freeflow of information. The Security Council and the DPKO should ask member states for as much intelligence as possible about the situation so that UN personnel in the field (in the early stages, most likely an Observer Mission) has as much leverage as possible. Likewise, the field team is responsible for accurately informing Headquarters about the situation on the ground so the Security Council and other governing bodies can make informed decisions. These goals are difficult to achieve and varied greatly in Namibia, Cambodia, and Rwanda. For better or for worse, the bureaucratic and member state constraints played out very differently in the three situations.

The conflict in Namibia had strategic importance for the great powers during the Cold War, which certainly worked in its favor when the United Nations assessed the underlying nature of the conflict. Goulding outlined the various considerations weighed by Europe, the United States, and Canada with regards to South African, Angolan and Cuban involvement in Namibia. (Goulding, 142-3) This debate facilitated the flow of information from the UN to the ground, since so many members felt they had a stake in the conflict. Great power interests created a clear picture of who was involved. The establishment of a ‘contact group’ comprised of Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the United States in the mid-seventies gave the international community ample time to negotiate with the factions and acquire as much information as possible. (Goulding, 139) This propagated a better understanding of the nature of the problem, which seemed to be a mix of regional and great powers meddling in Namibian affairs.

Cambodia shared similar privilege in terms of UN attention and member state involvement. The Paris Agreement created an unprecedented UN presence in the peace process, which allowed peacekeeping to start on a transparent and informed basis. The Agreement stressed the need for “peacebuilding” from the beginning and paved the way for a UN-monitored reconciliation between the warring factions. (Doyle, 118) The establishment of the Supreme National Council (SNC) through the Paris Agreement vocalized the need to recognize all the groups and bring them together in a national forum. The UN was a bit optimistic, however, in terms of how it viewed the factions working together; extreme cleavages still existed between the groups, something the SNC would later experience. In an effort to get everyone to the table, the UN may have

overlooked some fundamental problems between extremists like the Khmer Rouge and other groups wrestling for power.

Unfortunately, member states' willingness to engage in an operation in Cambodia colored the assessment of the underlying nature of the problem. John Sanderson, UNTAC's Force Commander, reflected on the fact that influential member states were reluctant to consider an enforcement operation in Cambodia, "even though there was a strongly held view in the West that some Khmers were guilty of gross crimes against humanity. The memory of Viet Nam was so strong in the American psyche that the mere suggestion of an enforcement operation in the former Indochina would have been sufficient to throw the Cambodian question out of the Security Council, particularly in a presidential election year." (Sanderson, 157) This certainly limited the UN's ability to properly address the second criterion of proactive peacekeeping, determining the appropriate type of international action, but could it be considered an advantage as well? The United Nations understood the severity of the problem and also took into account the constraints on UN peacekeeping. Is any action better than nothing? Before we can determine if this was effective, it is important to review the situation in Rwanda to understand what can occur when little information is available from the beginning.

As conflict developed in Rwanda and the surrounding regions, scholar Matthew Vaccaro maintained that "not enough accurate analysis was available to the [Security] Council," which led to "ill-informed decision-making." (Vaccaro, 377, 401) The conflict offered little strategic interest to the great powers within the Security Council, who were still reeling from disasters in Somalia and the Balkans. Howard Adelman

noted that a lack of information and interest labeled Rwanda as a “civil war” rather than the genocide it clearly became. (Adelman & Suhrke, 12) Member states were not willing to commit to another peacekeeping operation that could sour; consequently, the Security Council did not recognize the severity of the conflict.

Even if resource allocation or troop contribution were controversial, the sharing of information should be standard. The lack of available intelligence during the crisis in Rwanda was unacceptable. Dallaire clearly stated that “I had no access to models or any kind of doctrine covering the process for the development and approval of a peacekeeping mission at the UN, even though we asked repeatedly how it was supposed to be done.” (Dallaire, 81) Although Dallaire was an experienced military commander, he had little interaction with the United Nations and clearly needed a lot more direction. Worse still, UNAMIR was not given basic intelligence information. Dallaire “had no means of intelligence on Rwanda. Not one country was willing to provide the UN or even me personally with accurate and up-to-date information.” (Dallaire, 90) How can we expect to even field accurate observer missions if UN personnel do not have all the facts?

If the UN misunderstands the nature of the problem it could lead to a misallocation of resources, as we saw in Rwanda, where peacekeeping troops “sometimes came from nations that had little to no ethos regarding human rights, which raised a whole other set of problems.” (Dallaire, 91) The domino effect of a bad diagnosis led to the wrong treatment, and the operation had little chance of succeeding as the situation worsened.

Barnett and Finnemore come down hard on the way the United Nations handled the crisis in Rwanda. “Rwanda... was not an unfortunate mistake. It was the predictable result of an organizational culture that shaped how the UN evaluated and responded to violent crises.” (Barnett & Finnemore, 155) The United Nations was able to effectively assess the underlying nature of the problems in Namibia and Cambodia because the situations presented more incentives for member states to participate in resolving the conflict than Rwanda at the time of UNAMIR. It is not enough to leave it at that—the DPKO in New York and the Observer Mission should have shared more information with each other from the beginning, and perhaps the Security Council would have realized the incredible situational difficulty and properly labeled it as genocide.

The first criterion requires the utmost efforts at communication between headquarters in New York and the people on the ground. Dallaire attempted to relay as much information as possible to the DPKO, but “rarely did I get any response... Who really read this material in New York and what did they do with it?” (Dallaire, 208) The work of those in the field should never go unnoticed, and the people on the ground must understand the incredible strain put upon their colleagues in the bureaucracy itself.

Criterion 2 : Determine the appropriate type of international action

Once the international community assesses the underlying nature of the problem, the issue of the appropriate type of international action is the next focus point. The formation of any peacekeeping operation should address three key issues. First, it should use the information gathered to form a coherent understanding of the situational difficulty, which should be reflected in the operation itself. Second, the UN must determine what resources are available and which member states are willing to contribute to the mission. Third, the peacekeeping operation should use all the

information available to integrate proactive responses into the execution of the operation. Although it is difficult to incorporate all three of these aspects in every conflict, they should always be serious considerations, much like the important role impartiality plays in any peacekeeping operation.

As with the first criterion, member states' involvement in Namibia helped to determine the appropriate type of international action. The delay in implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (establishing a UN operation in Namibia) gave UNTAG years to formulate the operation, which allowed the UN to account for the evolving situational difficulty and facilitated the creation of a more flexible mandate. (Goulding, 141-2) As we will see in Section III, the flexible mandate promoted proactive peacekeeping tactics in the field, which included UNTAG's claim to fame, organizational adaptability.¹ Finally, the establishment of the 'contact group' opened the discussion of resource allocation at an early stage and facilitated the deployment of a sizeable UN peacekeeping operation.

Not every situation can benefit from an extended period of time to address the first two criteria for proactive peacekeeping; Cambodia's time frame was considerably more limited. The Paris Agreement requested a complex role from UNTAC, but as mentioned before, the Security Council would not consider an enforcement operation. The UN tried to break this into several components in order to effectively manage the responsibility, but John Sanderson believed it did not take into account the situational difficulty and was therefore ill-equipped to handle the situation. "The SNC was never set up to manage the development of the complex agenda that a full process of national

¹ Please see Howard, 107-117.

reconciliation demands,” partly because it was “weak and unrepresentative,” and partly because the parties chose to promote their interests rather than cooperate. (Sanderson, 162) Although the SNC looked good on paper, its implementation did not address the situational difficulty created by factions still in conflict with one another, and as a result the Council deadlocked rather than responding proactively to manage the conflict.

It is important, however, to understand UNTAC’s resource constraints when criticizing the international action taken in Cambodia. As Sanderson mentioned, the United States would not consider an enforcement operation in Cambodia, so perhaps UNTAC correctly identified its limitations and went forward with the best plan possible. It attempted to achieve its main goal of delivering “effective governance to Cambodia” through civil police and the establishment of a neutral political environment, which it completed with mixed results. (Sanderson, 163) UNTAC must still be commended for its progressive approach to a complicated problem and its attempts to get Cambodians to the polls as quickly and effectively as possible.

The UN was not so lucky in Rwanda. There was little room to consider situational difficulty within the implementation of the ‘appropriate type of international action’; the operation was not adaptable to the potentially explosive situation at hand. Dallaire stressed that they “needed to demonstrate that we were helping to create an atmosphere of security and abandon our reactive, defensive posture,” but the DPKO insisted that “UNAMIR’s role... should be limited to a monitoring function.” (Dallaire, 166-7) The lack of flexibility led to an ineffective UN force that ultimately had little power to change the situation.

This occurred for two reasons. First, the goal of the DPKO propagated that “in UN terms, the mission was to small, cheap, short and sweet.” (Dallaire, 89) Instead of changing the mission to fit the evolving circumstances, the UN continued to debate the issue in New York rather than face the reality on the ground. Dallaire was reduced to begging for things: “it maddened me that I was forced to fight a petty internal war over vehicles and supplies... The UN or Belgium should have resupplied me and quibbled about the cost later.” (Dallaire, 107, 181) The UN established UNAMIR more as an observer to the implementation of a peace agreement to end a civil conflict rather than a catalyst in resolving deeper issues of genocide and violence; the lack of information and member states’ willingness led to the wrong type of international action.

It is impossible to ignore the realities that confine any peacekeeping operation, because as Dallaire aptly noted the DPKO is dependent upon the generosity of donor nations. Per O. Hallqvist also described the UN to Dallaire as “a ‘pull system,’ not a ‘push system’ like... NATO, because the UN had absolutely no pool of resources to draw on. In a pull system, you have to ask for those rations, and no common sense seems ever to apply.” (Dallaire, 99-100) The lack of resources and the fact that it had few strategic interests to offer to powerful states made Rwanda a hard sell after the disasters in Somalia and the Balkans. This is always the excuse, however; if the first two criteria had been properly addressed, the cost of the mission could have been significantly reduced, both financially and in terms of saving lives.

Proactive peacekeeping was hard to come by when UNAMIR continued to react rather than take the initiative. The UN dealt with the issues after they occurred as opposed to taking a more proactive approach to peacekeeping in line with UN reform.

Dallaire felt like they “were losing the initiative as we rushed to protect the targets of the threats, instead of dealing directly with the threats themselves, weakening our ability to achieve other aims. By the end of January, having not yet received the phase-two deployments, I had in effect one company in Kigali doing the work of four.” (Dallaire, 161) UNAMIR was ill-equipped to deal with developing issues, especially when the genocide came to a head.

Dallaire also offered a very clear instance when the DPKO did not respond to the evolving situational difficulty:

“I had asked for more troops to deal with the changed situation in the south but had been told by the DPKO that I couldn’t have them because I hadn’t requested them in my technical mission report. How could I have, when the coup hadn’t yet happened?” (Dallaire, 131)

Resources were strained, to be sure, but this was an unacceptable response. Dallaire’s attempt at a proactive response to an impending crisis still got caught in the cogs of the UN’s massive bureaucracy.

Take, for example, Dallaire’s attempt to approach the operation through more of a military stance:

“I wanted a military headquarters and signals squadron, but Maurice told me that no troop-contributing nation would provide them. So I accepted the option of a small UN civilian communications section. This would mean that I would have no inherent headquarters support staff and communicators to run the command posts and operations centre. (This scenario would later cost me dearly.)” (Dallaire, 82)

UNAMIR did not establish the proper basis for proactive peacekeeping, mostly due to resource constraints on the operation; should it have gone into Rwanda at all? It was irresponsible to place peacekeepers in a situation where “no one would pay for ammunition... we would be reduced to throwing rocks.” (Dallaire, 215) Simply put, if

the United Nations could provide adequate resources for a peacekeeping operation, it must either seriously push its member states to contribute or reevaluate the nature of the mission. Howard Adelman noted that the UN tried to do just that in downsizing the operation at the height of the genocide. (Adelman, introduction) In retrospect this seems appalling, but at the time UNAMIR faced constraints beyond its capacity to effectively address the conflict, given its limited means. The goal, however, is to establish a basis for peacekeeping missions so that no operation has to face such a dilemma.

In short, the constraints of the mission dictated UN action in Rwanda as opposed to having the operation follow the developing situational difficulty. In the future, this means not only providing resources when they are promised but effectively allocating them to the appropriate avenues of conflict prevention and monitoring of the situation. I believe the most effective way to do this is by leading the operation from the field and by initiating the reform from there. This begins by putting the right people in place. This does not necessarily mean supplies or troops, which depend on the generosity of donor nations; humanitarian workers and legal advisers will gladly step in with a UN team to assess the situation and offer expert advice for an effective operation. This will not resolve the conflict immediately, but it can create a peacekeeping environment that is conducive to proactive responses to an impending conflict.

It is important to remember that all these components of the first two criteria come together to form a successful basis for proactive peacekeeping. The goal is to promote creative solutions and pragmatic approaches to peacekeeping problems that come before the United Nations. The great tragedy in Rwanda stained the hands of the UN, but hopefully in a way that will prevent this from occurring again.

Even if the first two criteria are effectively implemented, they do not guarantee the overall effectiveness of an operation. John Sanderson noted that although “UNTAC was a success insofar that it fulfilled its mandate on time and under budget,” it did not succeed in establishing a lasting peace or a stable environment throughout the country. (Sanderson, 156) We must therefore turn to the following two criteria—establishing centralized leadership based in the field, and communicating with and relinquishing control to the local population—to establish effective leadership for effective peace.

III. Effective Leadership for Effective Peace

Multidimensional peacekeeping operations require an incredible amount of coordination. The leadership and organization of a UN peacekeeping operation are probably the most important aspects of the mission’s success.

Ideally each operation is tailored to suit the conflict it is designed to resolve; there are three things, however, that I believe should be prevalent in any peacekeeping operation. First of all, I believe the leadership of the mission should be run from the field or as close to it as possible rather than making decisions from UN Headquarters. This will keep the decision-makers in close contact with the developing situation and their teams on the ground, as well as keep the UN Security Council well-informed. In conjunction with this, leadership should be centralized so that communication between the field offices remains strong and the UN can effectively work with non-governmental organizations and the local population. The third point, however, is that although the leadership is centralized, the mandate should be flexible to allow peacekeepers to be innovative and adapt to the situational difficulty of the conflict.

I believe these guidelines are lexically ordered; leadership based in the field increases the likelihood of centralized leadership and effective communication, which in turn allows for a flexible mandate. Although the mandate is constrained by Security Council decisions and peace negotiations, the goal is to promote flexible implementation of the mandate in the field; Namibia is an excellent example of centralized but flexible leadership *from* the field. Rwanda is an unfortunate example of the opposite, and Cambodia lies somewhere in between.

The UN has multinational resources available to its missions and has the greatest chance of impartially influencing change in a troubled situation. Jean Krasno places special emphasis on the UN's ability to gain leverage in the conflict through moral authority and trust. (Krasno, 52, 241) There is a fine line, however, between influencing the process and *running* the process, as we will see with UNTAC in Cambodia. William Durch is correct in noting that peace agreements are not "self-catalyzing" and that parties usually need the UN to show them that peace is preferable to war. (Durch, 22-3) The ultimate goal of any peacekeeping operation, however, is to ensure that those involved in the conflict ultimately take ownership of the peace process if it is to succeed.

It is important to remember that "the United Nations does not operate in a vacuum." (Krasno, 51) The situational difficulty of each conflict is especially problematic for the third and fourth criteria, and presents varying challenges to the UN mandate. Factors such as local parties' willingness to cooperate, UN members' willingness to contribute to the operation, and the nature of the conflict can complicate a peacekeeping mission, regardless of the quality of leadership. In spite of these

differences, the leadership of each UN peacekeeping operation should strive to minimize the effect of bureaucratic influences and focus on the task at hand. Steven Ratner believes that a “logical first step in the process would involve better coordination of existing peacekeeping, human rights, and election efforts... but this planning cannot and should not, however, produce a blueprint for all operations.” (Ratner, 270) The criteria should serve as guidelines for proactive peacekeeping.

The mission in Namibia combined the five criteria for proactive peacekeeping and yet managed to avoid the pitfalls of UN politics and of controlling the entire process. Cambodia was a “partial win on both conflict limitation and conflict resolution.” (Durch, 18) Although UNTAC established the Supreme National Council (SNC) and convinced 90 percent of the country to vote, it failed to achieve cooperation between the four factions and ended up running rather than catalyzing the peace process. Its failures were largely due to the inefficiencies in the mandate, such as insufficient emphasis on an effective rule of law and justice system, and the inconsistencies in UNTAC’s leadership structure. (Sanderson, 160) Finally, Rwanda demonstrated, “as graphically as possible, that UN peace operations remain voluntary associations of national units, not field armies.” (Durch, 21) Although the United Nations Secretariat is reliant upon its member states for troops and resources, it did not present its members with a clear plan of action that could have rallied support around the Rwandan cause. The failure to determine the underlying nature of the problem—genocide—hindered efforts to provide an effective peacekeeping operation. The mission also did not communicate with NGOs to coordinate an effective humanitarian effort.

Criterion 3: Centralized Leadership Based in the Field

Centralization is a key factor in determining a mission's success, simply because coordination is not possible without it. In order for any UN peacekeeping operation to be successful, its leadership must have as comprehensive an understanding of the conflict as possible. Since situations can change overnight, it makes sense to base an operation out of the territory its mandate is intended to protect.

UNTAG in Namibia was an excellent example of leadership based in the field. Ahtisaari, head of the UN mission in Namibia, met with his teams daily to stay up-to-date with every development in the situation. (Howard, 115) United Nations peacekeepers interacted daily with the Namibian population and therefore gained an advantage from Krasno's idea of leverage through moral authority and trust. Decisions were made on the ground and the UN managed the mission from the field. (Howard, 107) UNTAG *listened* as well as spoke, which enabled UN peacekeepers to fulfill the subsequent guidelines of effective communication and a flexible mandate. UNTAG established a specific timetable with explicit tasks for each branch, as well as "well-structured, widely dispersed offices." (Howard, 103, 112-3) UNTAG modeled its District Centres after the South African administrative divisions of territory (Lehmann, 31); this enabled the UN to work with the existing framework rather than create a disruptive environment.

The praise for the field-based leadership of UNTAG did not mean problems did not exist; Jean Krasno noted that political and other tensions existed all the way through the mission. (Krasno, 50) The UN's moral authority and strategic leadership placement

in the field, however, enabled the mission respond effectively to these tensions and minimize the negative effects on the peacekeeping process.

UNTAC in Cambodia only partially addressed the issue of centralized, field-based leadership. According to Goulding, Akashi made decisions from Beijing most of the time, which in itself produced mixed results; it kept him away from many bureaucratic fights within the UN (as we see with Rwanda), but he was not close enough to the conflict to truly understand the nature of the developments in Cambodia. (Goulding, 263) The process was regrettably one of “on-the-job training while implementing plans made by someone else... plans need to be prepared by the people who will be responsible for their execution.” (Jett, 184) The military and the civilian components of the UN operation had a dispute over logistics, which further detracted from effective cooperation. (Goulding, 257) A confusing chain of command created problems for the peacekeeping operation. Unlike in Namibia, the flexible mandate in Cambodia created what Goulding called “the usual jealousies... that the civilian directors still felt that they were denied their due role in policy-making.” (Goulding, 262) Doyle and Suntharalingam agreed—there were too many diplomats involved in the process and too few managers in charge of the peacekeeping operation. (Doyle, 133)

UNTAC also had positive effects on the situation in Cambodia. The Paris Agreement created the Supreme National Council, which brought the parties together and established leadership in the field. The UN also managed the military aspect well; Goulding noted that John Sanderson “seemed to be an effective Force Commander and the many nationalities were working well together.” (Goulding, 258) The UN mission retained power over the Council, however, and sought to control too much instead of

“facilitating” as Barton urged. (Doyle, 118) Although UNTAC’s goal was noble –to empower the people—the policies implemented as a result of the Paris Agreement created more of a UN “watchdog” environment than an effective facilitation of centralized leadership based in the field.

In Rwanda, bureaucratic indifference in the United Nations’ headquarters delayed implementation of an effective leadership strategy. (Barnett, 561, 575) UN officials and member states recalled failed operations in Bosnia and Somalia and were unwilling to commit troops they felt were at risk in Rwanda. While a delay in implementation helped solidify the structure of UNTAG in Namibia, the nature of the situation in Rwanda called for immediate action and the international community’s response was lethargic at best. By the time international action reached Rwanda, the emphasis was on military intervention and less on “effective policies geared toward conflict prevention and conflict resolution, development and peace.” (Miner & Guillot, 164) The combination of the high-risk factor to UN personnel and the focus on military intervention during the peace process resulted in a weak field-based leadership structure.

The constraints on UNAMIR were understandable considering the dire circumstances of the conflict—the UN’s apprehension to commit troops because of recent failures, for example, or the belief that military intervention was the best way to immediately take action against the impending violence. I would stress, however, that the lack of a cohesive, field-based *proactive peacekeeping* leadership hindered the overall success of the operation. In general, peacekeeping differs from peace enforcement (i.e. military intervention) in that it attempts not only to address the

immediate situation but to build towards a lasting solution. Without effective leadership in the field, it was impossible to coordinate between the military operation, the humanitarian aid organizations, and the UN presence in Rwanda. Worse still, “no one in DPKO had ever been to Kigali to see for themselves the surreality of a headquarters infiltrated by spies, the lack of security, the unworkable mishmash of languages.” (Dallaire, 207) The benefit of a centralized field-based leadership would include better and more accurate information of the conflict in question.

Criterion 4: Communication with and Relinquishing Control to the Local Population

Without central leadership and communication, humanitarian intervention becomes a free-for-all of NGOs and peacekeepers attempting to do the same thing – resolve the conflict—but unable to help each other achieve that goal. This occurred in Rwanda and its neighboring countries in the aftermath of the genocide because of a weak UN presence; the same situation currently looms in Darfur. Even if the United Nations is not accountable for non-governmental organizations, it must communicate with them to ensure the maximum efficacy of humanitarian aid. In Rwanda a lack of communication increased rather than ameliorated the situational difficulty. Likewise, the United Nations must always be in contact with the local population. Dallaire noted that in Rwanda “building a relationship of trust and cooperation with the local population was just as important as setting up roadblocks to check for smuggled weapons.” (Dallaire, 182-3) In any peacekeeping situation, this is the best way to ensure that effective peace can continue after the UN fulfills its peacekeeping mandate.

The relationship of trust and cooperation should begin with the local population’s comprehension of the UN’s presence and what the peacekeeping operation

intends to accomplish. In Namibia, for example, UNTAG's Information Programme, designed to educate the general public on the peace process, was extremely successful, which Ingrid Lehmann attributed to "the leadership of the mission." (Lehmann, 44) The mission incorporated international and local opinion, as well as the need for "mission-internal information dissemination," into a flexible program that adapted as the mission went on. (Lehmann, 46) Thus UNTAG created accessible information with which the Namibians could feel comfortable progressing into democratic elections.

Cambodia was an example of leadership without effective communication with all of the local factions, and the consequences of having the former without the latter. Marrack Goulding was shocked to see that Akashi's private office rarely shared memos from the Security Council with UNTAC in the field. (Goulding, 257) As Doyle and Suntharalingam eloquently state:

"Effective planning requires an effective dialogue between the Secretariat which sets standards and identifies resources and the 'field' that will be charged with implementing those standards, after defining local conditions. UNTAC planning seems at times to have suffered from a dialogue of the deaf." (Doyle, 132)

The same principle should apply to peacekeeping *during* the operation. A well-planned mission is only the first step in establishing a proactive peacekeeping operation; communication must continue throughout the UN's engagement in the situation, which should emphasize a strong relationship with the local population. In addition to the disparity between the Secretariat and UNTAC, the mission itself had flaws in terms of its relationship with Cambodia. Doyle cited discontinuity from the development of the peace plan to its implementation and language difficulties as two of the main issues that

affected UNTAC's authority in Cambodia. (Doyle, 133) The combination of too much UN control and a lack of centralized leadership did not give the parties any incentive to cooperate and the peace process broke down. Cambodians had the courage to vote, but the factions were not working together to create a functioning political system. The four different groups viewed the elections differently and the peace process lacked the "national reconciliation" necessary for the transition to a peaceful democracy. (Rasmussen, 34-5)

The situational difficulty of the Cambodian mission cannot be ignored; UNTAC did the best it could to thwart the major factions' attempts to terrorize potential voters. UNTAC gained Krasno's coveted leverage through trust by assuring the Cambodian people of a secret ballot, which resulted in a 90 percent voter turnout. (Doyle, 136) We must give credit to UNTAC's Information/ Education Division for its use of mass media to convince Cambodians to vote even in the face of death threats. (Lehmann, 58-9) The high voter turnout was due to the UN's incredible efforts.

The situation in Rwanda lacked communication even in its early stages on the ground. Ineffective leadership meant that UN groups and NGOs overlapped each other in terms of humanitarian aid services instead of organizing specific roles for each group. Rwanda was plagued by too many NGOs and factions of the United Nations who were not communicating with each other. (Vaccaro, 390; Natsios, 354) The lack of a coordinated and effective UN leadership team made communication difficult and proactive peacekeeping impossible. Shockingly, "the UN never did post a legal adviser to UNAMIR, which would create enormous complications later on, when the world was arguing over whether a genocide was actually happening." (Dallaire, 112) Instead of

emerging as a leader, the UN scrambled to react to the impending downward spiral of conflict. This in turn made NGOs feel like UNAMIR “had failed them” in terms of providing security from attacks; still, UNAMIR coordinated NGO efforts the best it could without the time to efficiently plan the operation, let alone its own operation. (Minear & Guillot, 82, 92) It is crucial to put the right people in the right place so that legal and humanitarian issues are properly addressed beyond the immediate conflict; when the dust settles, the UN must be in a position to reinstate peace agreements and effectively coordinate an appropriate course of action. Proactive peacekeeping is key in creating an environment conducive to effective peace.

In addition to the lack of coordination, the international politics surrounding the Rwandan situation further delayed action and impeded a cohesive leadership. Although the United Nations was composed of and relied upon its member states to fulfill its peacekeeping mandates, it should not have worked *against* its members, as it did in Rwanda. Not only was the United Nations slow to react, but member nations evacuated personnel quickly when the situation grew dangerous because at that point peacekeeping was not enough. (Minear & Guillot, 76) Worse still, argued Michael Barnett, the Security Council’s “façade of action” clearly demonstrated that it was not “up to the task of crisis management.” (Barnett, 575, 559)

UNAMIR did the best it could to coordinate its efforts with the NGOs, but did not have the moral authority to do so effectively. Minear and Guillot pointed out that the United Nations did function as an intermediary between the departing French troops and the new government. (Minear & Guillot, 80, 92) I would argue, however, that the

lack of multilateral influence over the conflict greatly hindered the long-term solutions of the issue, as we shall see with UNAMIR's exit strategy.

The UN in Rwanda also did not effectively engage the factions or the civilians. Dallaire noted that many discussions and negotiations shut out extremists (Dallaire, 132-3); "Mugenzi and his wing presented a much greater danger to Rwanda if they remained outside the process and continued to flirt with volatile elements such as the Interahamwe." (Dallaire, 140) Similarly, UNAMIR did not connect with the Rwandan people as UNTAG did in Namibia. Just as UNTAG used mass media to inform Namibians of the UN's presence and purpose, Hutu extremists used the radio to thwart UNAMIR's attempts at reconciliation. Dallaire lamented that "hate radio had led everyone inside its gates to believe that our Belgians had killed their president." (Dallaire, 241) Even the Force Commander realized that "UNAMIR was not well understood by the local population, and unless we took the initiative, we would continue to be the brunt of misinformation." (Dallaire, 163) The situational difficulty in Rwanda was much higher than in Namibia, but I believe radio broadcasts could have substantially increased the UN's popularity among Rwandans and possibly helped create an environment conducive to effective communication between the factions.

Simply put, the United Nations must do everything it can to ensure that its peacekeeping delegation continues to obtain information throughout the operation. Even if member states cannot contribute additional troops, information is priceless and intelligence is indispensable. This does not mean that countries should divulge top secret methods of obtaining intelligence; coordination and conventional satellite information is often enough to keep peacekeepers abreast of the situation. Rwanda was an

unfortunate example of extremists within the country gaining more knowledge than the peacekeepers supposedly sworn to uphold the peace agreements. The lack of information created a loss of local contact that in turn spurred serious consequences for the operation.

The United Nations can learn valuable lessons from the failures with UNTAC and UNAMIR. Communicating with the local population (especially the warring factions) is an ongoing process, not a static situation limited to peace talks. Likewise, effective monitoring of the developing circumstances will help the UN assess and adapt to the situational difficulty.

We can never underestimate the nature of the conflict's influence on the peacekeeping mission, or the fact that the United Nations continually enters the most difficult situations. (Durch, 23) UNTAG had approximately ten years to solidify its mandate and mission in Namibia, whereas UNAMIR was forced to act under not only severe international constraints but against an extreme case of genocide. UNTAC also faced the challenge of bringing highly hostile parties to the table in order to reconstruct Cambodia. Certain aspects of Namibia's success, however, proved to be proactively and effectively applicable. Even with international political constraints, UNAMIR could have benefited from a cohesive plan and decisive leadership in the field. UNTAC's leadership should have communicated more effectively between its military and civilian components as well as with the Cambodian people, instead of controlling the peace process and acting as the electoral authority. Goulding accurately assessed that "peacemaking and peacekeeping are not enough... there is also a need for peacebuilding." (Goulding, 265) Centralized, field-based leadership, communication, a

flexible mandate, and a realistic exit strategy contribute to peacebuilding and provide a solid framework for proactive peacekeeping operations.

Criterion 5: Time is of the Essence

This thesis has explored the importance of acting quickly, deliberately, and effectively in the face of an international crisis. The final consideration is to view that time is of the essence in the implementation of a peacekeeping operation. It cannot be expected to solve all the issues in six months; the point of a short mandate should be to bring flexibility and adaptability to the mission, not terminality.

Time is always a consideration, but it is especially important when planning the beginning and the end of a mission. Amadou Ly of Senegal (UNDP) gave Dallaire invaluable advice: “time was of the essence: the UN needed to get a peacekeeping mission on the ground as soon as possible to prevent [destructive] forces from increasing their grip.” (Dallaire, 60) Although the Arusha Accords created a precarious peace, they should have provided enough incentive to establish a stronger UN presence in Rwanda, albeit a modest operation in the face of extreme situational difficulty.

Likewise, John Sanderson attributed some of the failure of UNTAC to “leave [Cambodia] in a progressive democratic state” first to the fact that “the United Nations arrived too late” and that “should have stayed longer.” (Sanderson, 159-60) In general, time is of the essence when it comes to determining the effectiveness of a complex peacekeeping operation. The positive aspect of this, however, is that Sanderson’s assessment of UNTAC attributed its bad timing to the ineffective implementation of the first four criteria. “No effective planning” and a mission that was “forced into a template approach” instead of tailoring to the situational difficulty meant that the UN

arrived too late. (Sanderson, 160) Any operation has a greater chance of being effective and timely by taking a closer look at some of the key issues involved in these essential criteria.

Centralization and communication are always imperative to the success of a UN peacekeeping operation, but if the UN's control is too rigid the situation will not ameliorate, as we saw in Cambodia. The key is to combine this leadership with a flexible mandate that allows peacekeepers to adapt to their situations rather than be constrained by the mandate. Successful peacekeeping missions rely on "politically well-designed mandates" that address all the important issues without imposing a rigid agenda. (Doyle, 144) A successful mandate must also dictate a realistic exit strategy. The key element to an effective exit strategy is to leave the peacekeeping process in the hands of the people involved in the conflict. This must occur long before the UN mission can even conceive of leaving the situation, and can only be realistic if the mission has established a centralized leadership structure in the field, communicates within its ranks and with the indigenous population, and relies on a flexible mandate to work towards a solution to the problem.

Namibia became the prototype for the effective implementation of a flexible mandate. This arose from discrepancies within the mandate; uncertainties in the report meant flexibility of interpretation. This, along with the fact that the UN granted UNTAG "wide authority over the general operation," gave the staff the flexibility to implement the mandate as things developed in Namibia. (Howard, 104, 107) Centralized leadership provided structure of UNTAG, so the idea of "wide authority" never became ineffective. Peacekeepers could run field offices differently from one

another, thus adapting to the situational difficulty through a flexible mandate. (Lehmann, 33) UNTAG worked hard to appear impartial and to promote Namibians' active participation in the political process. (Howard, 110) UNTAG convinced the parties that non-violent elections were the most effective way of gaining power in Namibia, so that when the operation began leaving the country the proper political procedures were in place. This process began well before an end was in sight; UNTAG positioned itself in Namibian society as a *catalyst* between the Namibian conflict and an effective peace plan, not as the sole implementer.

Similarly, the Paris Agreement in Cambodia gave peacekeepers more flexibility with the mandate because its success did not depend on party cooperation, which facilitated implementing the military operation and a guaranteed secret ballot. (Doyle, 121, 127-30) The multidimensional mandate set the right tone for the flexible implementation, but it also hindered the process. Cambodia began with the same idea in mind but ended with a few discrepancies between its goals and their implementation. The Paris Agreement created the necessary structures to secure an eventual and realistic exit strategy, but the lack of party cooperation and excessive UN control of the peace process covered only the "minimum standards" for a long-term solution. (Doyle, 136) UNTAC did free the Cambodian people from foreign rule and empower them to vote, an incredible task in any peacekeeping operation. The problem, however, was that "UNTAC itself was the electoral authority," which did not create the necessary political structure or institutions to ensure stability in the future. (Goulding, 255) If UNTAC had managed the mission better from the field and employed Cambodians in the peace process rather than simply empowered them, this would have legitimized the elections

for the parties and hopefully fostered cooperation in the Supreme National Council instead of dividing the factions.

The fundamental problem with the flexibility of the mandate materialized in the later stages of the operation, when the Khmer Rouge refused to cooperate with the disarmament program. Initially UNTAC's success, independent from party cooperation, was seen as a positive factor; in the long run, however, it meant that the flexible mandate could not enforce a key part of the long-term solution. Goulding noted that "peacekeeping can succeed only if it is founded on a solid agreement between the parties." (Goulding, 259) UNTAC's flexible mandate created a loophole through which the Khmer Rouge could avoid cooperation. Doyle suggests "institutionalizing reconciliation," which could be extremely conducive to proactive peacekeeping. (Doyle, 143) Institutionalizing reconciliation can ensure that parties must listen to each other and to the community, thus remaining involved in and responsible for the peace process.

Ideally, a mandate provides a timetable in which the objectives should be met and it proposes action to resolve specific aspects of the conflict in question. In Rwanda these two aspects were not solidified by the UN mandate; Vaccaro noted that the timetable was "unrealistic" and the mission was "reactive, not proactive." (Vaccaro, 372, 396) The same political issues that hindered the formation of a definitive leadership structure also affected UNAMIR's mandate. The response was a "then familiar peacekeeping operation," not tailored to the extraordinary case of genocide. (Minear & Guillot, 70) The United Nations did not have much experience dealing with

such a large humanitarian crisis, and this is reflected in the mandate's inability to address the situational difficulty.

The UN mandate in Rwanda was not all gloom and doom. It did evolve over time to adapt to the progression of the situation. (Minear & Guillot, 74) The UN attempted to learn from its mistakes and launched UNAMIR II after the end of the war. UNAMIR II had a clear three-part strategy that enabled it work effectively to resettle displaced persons, develop the country's infrastructure, and "mete out justice for crimes against humanity." (Vaccaro, 393) The mission was based in the field, had a clear but flexible mandate, and attempted to engage Rwandans in the peace process, although it has struggled in establishing Rwanda's infrastructure. Although UNAMIR II developed after the crisis, I believe it was a good example of how the four criteria for effective leadership lead to more effective peace solutions. UNAMIR realized that its mandate could not effectively deal with the conflict in Rwanda given the external circumstances and moved aside to allow French troops to launch Operation Turquoise. This was the worst possible exit strategy scenario for a UN mission, because the options were limited, the outcome bleak, and there was no 'backup plan.' (Vaccaro, 381) As Barnett pointed out, a situation where peacekeepers were at risk clouded the political goal of the operation and led to what Minear and Guillot called "confused decision-making." (Barnett, 568; Minear & Guillot, 76) Suddenly the primary focus became getting out. The lack of centralized, field-based leadership, communication, and a flexible mandate led to the failure of UNAMIR. (Minear & Guillot, 159)

Although we should commend the French for taking action in a desperate situation, Operation Turquoise offered only a French solution to the problem rather than

the desired advantages achieved through a multilateral solution proposed by John Barton. (Barton, 368) Even with UNAMIR's controversial withdrawal, the United Nations understood that under the current political constraints it could not help the situation and reluctantly turned to the French for further intervention. This was to be commended in a system where bureaucratic power struggles threaten to undermine peacekeeping operations' success, but the goal should be to create an environment for an operation that will not require a last-resort, biased replacement like Operation Turquoise.

The primary lesson to be learned from all three missions' mandates is a straightforward question—was the mandate the right one? (Minear & Guillot, 92) Addressing the issues is not enough; a mandate must offer pragmatic solutions and allow UN peacekeepers to implement its strategies in ways that work with the indigenous system rather than against it.

Unfortunately peacekeeping addresses a human issue with a political solution, because the United Nations is a political, bureaucratic tool, for better or for worse. The goal is to reform its policies towards peacekeeping operations so that the UN becomes a proactive and effective force in resolving humanitarian crises. Despite the flaws I still believe the UN is the best solution once it can shift a few of its priorities.

IV. An Effective Future for UN Proactive Peacekeeping

Where To Go From Here: The Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo has a tumultuous history and faces a problematic future in terms of violence, political instability, and ethnic conflict. Its huge territory needs international support to gain control of an increasingly dangerous situation. The UN became involved because the region was in jeopardy and it “was

probably beyond the general capacity of any external force to manage this generalized firestorm once it was underway,” but the United Nations “had no option but to make the attempt, regardless of how well- or ill-equipped it was for the task. The inescapable truth was that no other actor, whether state or international organization, was either willing or able to do so.” (MacQueen, 96) Today, the UN has the potential to dramatically improve the situation in the DRC; it is therefore important to examine what has developed so far and what can be done to promote proactive peacekeeping.

The United Nations certainly has the chance to try and implement some of the successes it experienced and to learn from its mistakes towards its mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The realistic expectations and limitations discussed must always be taken into account, but I believe the criteria can be applied to the current situation in the DRC, despite the operation’s difficult aspects, so that UN peacekeepers can be more effective with the limited resources available.

When the United Nations first intervened in the former Belgian colony, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld handled the situation well by co-opting African armies with the capacity to intervene into the UN’s multilateral effort, so they became unavailable for unilateral involvement on behalf of the various Congo factions. (MacQueen, 41) The UN’s role in the Congo, however, soon became complicated as it struggled to determine the difference between direct policing and training a force in the absence of any local authorities competent to restore order.

The first phase of UN involvement in the Congolese region ended in June of 1964 because it accomplished the formal mandate, “though at a high cost in both lives and resources... The Congo state was unified under an ostensibly stable central

government.” (MacQueen, 57) The situation was far from ideal, however; ethnic and regional cleavages still threatened to undermine any efforts at proper independence from colonial powers or democratic governance.

The subsequent rise of Mobutu and the creation of Zaïre further plunged the region into desolation and conflict. The struggle between Mobutu and Kabila engaged a myriad of regional actors which soon created what Madeleine Albright would describe in the UN Security Council as Africa’s “first world war.” (MacQueen, 88; SC/6789, 24 January 2000) In the wake of the disasters in Somalia and Rwanda, the Security Council hesitated to plunge into a complex peacekeeping situation where “there was clearly no peace to keep;” it deferred action to regional agencies such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). (MacQueen, 89) While this was less than ideal leadership from the UN, there were (and still are) political issues to address before peacekeeping could be effective, which now leads to a discussion of the five criteria for proactive peacekeeping.

The first criterion, assessing the underlying nature of the problem, was well established by Jeremy Ginifer at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. In 2002 he cited six causes of the conflict in the DRC. First, the presence of foreign forces destabilized the country. Second, the proliferation of armed groups targeted civilians, perpetuated violence, and contributed to the third factor, which was weak government. Fourth, the “illegitimate exploitation of natural resources by foreign forces and armed groups... [was] draining the DRC’s resources and prolonging motivations to remain in the DRC.” (Ginifer, 122) Fifth, regional fiefdoms and ethnic fracture lines exacerbated the conflict. Finally, the lack of substantial international commitment to the DRC

further weakened efforts to promote effective peace in the region. His assessment of the situation was an excellent starting point for determining the first two criteria—what kind of issue was at stake, and the appropriate international action required to effectively address the conflict.

Kofi Annan addressed some of the issues surrounding the second criterion, and called for large-scale international action in 1999. He understood the complexity and the necessity for a large UN presence to resolve the situation in the DRC when he approached the Security Council in July:

“In order to be effective any peacekeeping operation, whatever its mandate, will have to be large and expensive. It would require the deployment of several thousands of international troops and civilian personnel. It will face tremendous difficulties and will be beset by risks.” (UN S/1999/790, 15 July 1999)

Norrie MacQueen noted that one of the first things the Secretary-General proposed was the “immediate authorization for a group of ninety military liaison officers to work both inside the DRC and in the capitals of other countries involved in the conflict... these observers would act as an intelligence source for the Secretary-General.” (MacQueen, 91) Annan attempted to avoid one of the major pitfalls of the Rwandan conflict by establishing a well-positioned information system that could relay accurate information to the United Nations. Three weeks later the Security Council unanimously accepted Annan’s proposal and Security Council Resolution 1258 came into effect August 6, 1999, establishing MONUC (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en RD Congo). (UN S/RES/1258, 6 August 1999)

While the first two criteria appear to be well-established, it is essential to re-examine the numbers Annan proposed. The DRC is about the size of Western Europe;

“several thousand” international troops would barely cover a territory the size of the Belgium! MONUC began too modestly to make a sufficient dent in the conflict.

The operation also hit several major roadblocks due to opposition within the DRC. First of all, Kabila obstructed the entrance of the MONUC liaison officers into the DRC. Second, even though the Security Council approved the second phase of Annan’s proposal and authorized the dispatch of up to 500 observers, they met the same resistance as the first phase and the Lusaka ceasefire agreement appeared to disintegrate. (MacQueen, 91) While MONUC managed to enter the DRC and establish its operation, the lack of communication created significant problems down the line.

2003 marked the beginning of a considerable increase in UN influence in the DRC. The Secretary-General issued a special report on May 27, which assessed that “the peace process had now moved beyond the Lusaka framework and begun a new chapter that would require the comprehensive engagement and assistance of the United Nations and the international community.” The new mandate is distinctively more aggressive. As of October 1st, 2004, the Security Council authorized MONUC to protect civilians “under imminent threat of violence.” (www.monuc.org/) This extended well beyond the traditional peacekeeping ‘ceiling’ of the use of force only in self defense, and could potentially promote the third criterion, centralized leadership based in the field. The number of troops remained small relative to the size of the territory, so organization and coordination became even more crucial to MONUC’s success.

The extended mandate did a good job of fulfilling the first two criteria, but it did not address key issues regarding the implementation of a field-based operation and relinquishing control to the local population. Although as early as 2002 Ginifer

recognized that “momentum for peace and development... will have to come from the grass-roots,” proactive measures to ensure this transition were often put aside in favor of addressing problems as they arise, as Dallaire noted in Rwanda. For example, military liason operations took precedent over many information programs aimed at educating the public, instead of working the two agendas together to create a safer environment for proactive peacekeeping. (Ginifer, 127) Balancing the military and civilian components can offer better security and a more effective agenda for peace, especially given MONUC’s limited resources.

The most recent events surrounding the UN presence in the DRC have produced mixed results. In March of this year, MONUC responded aggressively to violence against its own peacekeepers by standing its ground and using effective force to quell the conflict. (Lacey: *New York Times*, 12 March 2005) Although this approach was extremely effective, it harbored the opinion voiced in the International Herald Tribune in 2004, that MONUC would “have been better advised to have taken the side of the loyalist troops [to the government] from the beginning” instead of “negotiating with the insurgents.” (Evans, 26 July 2004) In this new century, is the UN prepared to deploy peacekeeping missions that “take sides” and risk the foundation of impartiality that provides the organization with the opportunity to get involved in the first place?

The new reality of peacekeeping bends the traditional sense of ‘impartiality.’ Limited resources and difficult circumstances require negotiation, cooperation, and sometimes coercion on the part of UN peacekeeping towards warring factions. MONUC’s actual mandate asserts that the Security Council gives the operation the power to fulfill the mandate “within its capacity and without prejudice” to assist the

transitional government in establishing a stable state. (www.monuc.org/mandate) While this addresses impartiality it also circumvents it by employing the term “without prejudice.” Negotiation is a realistic consideration of conflict resolution and an essential part of proactive peacekeeping, especially if an operation has limited resources. The proactive measures required to establish a successful, field-based operation conducive to relinquishing control to the local population may conflict with traditional impartiality.

Ironically, I believe MONUC can avoid completely sacrificing impartiality by implementing the same journalist’s recommendation that the “UN radically improve its capacity for monitoring movements of weapons across Congo’s borders... for early-warning of possible violence.” (Evans, 26 July 2004) Proactive measures have the best possible chance of providing the UN with accurate information to deal with the issue as quickly and effectively as possible. At the heart of the conflict lies the interplay between the various states in the region and their interference in Congolese affairs. Much like in Namibia, the ethnic issues at stake spill across national borders and involve all the governments in the region. It is not enough to disarm the various factions, because as Ginifer correctly asserted, “it cannot be taken for granted that they will conform to the will of their ‘backers’ with a stake in the conflict—even if the latter sign up to a new political settlement.” (Ginifer, 124) In order to break down this coalition of violence, the UN should continue efforts to disarm, but also to distribute information through the media (especially the radio) and discuss its presence with the population and the factions.

Another important factor currently restricts the implementation of the fourth criterion. The main reason I believe MONUC is currently ill-equipped to deal with relinquishing control to the local population is because of the recent accusations against UN peacekeepers of sexually abusing the women and girls they were supposed to protect, which are incredibly serious allegations. (*New York Times*: 12 March 2005) Combat situations are emotionally damaging and incredibly trying on the forces committed to a peacekeeping operation, especially if troops are acting as an “impartial” agent in the conflict. While it is important to be sensitive to these burdens, abusive behavior is unacceptable. Kofi Annan addressed the issue eloquently in his recent report:

“I will work to strengthen the internal capacity of the United Nations to exercise oversight of peacekeeping operations, and I remind Member States of their obligation to prosecute any members of their national contingents who commit crimes or offences in the States where they are deployed. I am especially troubled by instances in which United Nations peacekeepers are alleged to have sexually exploited minors and other vulnerable people, and I have enacted a policy of “zero tolerance” towards such offences that applies to all personnel engaged in United Nations operations. I strongly encourage Member States to do the same with respect to their national contingents.” (*In Larger Freedom*, pt. 113)

The solution, according to the *Washington Post*, is now to order MONUC’s troops not to “fraternize” with the local population. (Wax, 28 March 2005) Although this addresses the short-term issues regarding the sexual abuse, it is counterproductive in the end because it ignores the relationship of trust and communication required to promote effective peace in the DRC. MONUC should focus on security and information before diving into complex civil issues such as self-governance and elections, but the promotion of former paves the way for the effective implementation of the latter. The

UN should certainly be ashamed of these accusations, but the proper response is dialogue, not embarrassment.

It is impossible to go back in time and recreate a peacekeeping operation with these exact five criteria in mind, but it is possible to set a new precedent holding states accountable for proper proactive peacekeeping. Time is still of the essence, and I believe any UN presence in the DRC will have to be a long term commitment, possibly longer than any previous UN operation. A step back towards centralized leadership based in the field could begin to repair the damage done by sexual exploitation through troop retraining and serious consequences for inappropriate behavior. The goal should be to reestablish communication and trust between the peacekeepers and the local population, through mass media and through a mutual understanding of each group's role in resolving the conflict. The year of reform highlights "our shared responsibility" to create a more secure world; the United Nations must swallow a bitter pill when it comes to MONUC, but once it does I believe the DRC will see its commitment to resolving the conflict and will step up to the challenge set forth by UN peacekeeping.

Allons-y: The Year of Reform

Peacekeeping is the most prominent feature of the United Nations' activity worldwide today. UN peacekeeping missions receive a lot of criticism from the international community because of their controversial nature and the mix of successes and failures. Scholars and politicians alike agree that UN peacekeeping must undergo reform in order to respond better to humanitarian crises around the world. The Brahimi Report raises some important questions but fails to address effective ways in which to

implement change. The new focus in the international community is on “human security” and the well-being of individuals within a state (Bellamy and Williams 1, 1).

This notion of *proactive peacekeeping* fits well with the current debates about general UN reform emerging this year. The report from the Secretary-General’s high-level Panel released in December 2004 highlights some of the important constraints on peacekeeping operations. Many of the Panel’s complaints reflect the criteria discussed in this thesis, the main problem being that “peacekeeping fails when resources and strategies are not commensurate to meeting the challenge they pose.” (*A More Secure World*, 70) The Panel follows in the footsteps of the Brahimi Report in enforcing impartiality and force as a last resort, but it also refreshingly tackles the idea of responsibility to UN peacekeeping as an “effective and accepted instrument of collective security.” The financial and resource constraints are understood, but the Panel places special emphasis on the developed States’ responsibilities to “do more to transform their existing force capabilities into suitable contingents for peace operations.” (*A More Secure World*, 69)

Kofi Annan’s report, to be reviewed by member states in September 2005, echoes many of the Panel’s recommendations. He lists peacekeeping concerns under the “Freedom from Fear” section, which shows the importance of the need for effective peacekeeping. Annan “appeal[s] to Member States to do more to ensure that the United Nations has effective capacities for peacekeeping, commensurate with the demands that they place upon it.” (*In Larger Freedom*, pt. 112) While this is still an attempt at top-down reform (as opposed to reform from the field), the Secretary-General effectively

addresses the double standard imposed on UN peacekeeping—save the world but don't spend any money.

Both the high-level Panel and Annan focus on the new concept of a Peacebuilding Commission, which the Secretary-General proposed as an initiative for Member States to create an intergovernmental committee “as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office within the United Nations Secretariat.” (*In Larger Freedom*, pt. 114) The Panel recognizes that “failure to invest in adequate peacebuilding increases the odds that a country will relapse into conflict.” (*A More Secure World*, 71) The creation of a Peacebuilding Commission and Support Office could eliminate future conflict in both areas where the UN already invested resources and new hotspots. Annan continues on to say that he does not believe that “such a body should have an early warning or monitoring function, but it would be valuable if Member States could at any stage make use of the Peacebuilding Commission's advice and could request assistance from a standing fund for peacebuilding to build their domestic institutions for reducing conflict, including through strengthening the rule-of-law institutions.” (*In Larger Freedom*, pt.1 15) The idea is that if the United Nations follows through with effective monitoring, UN peacekeeping will be infinitely more productive.

Why, then, are most attempts at reforming UN peacekeeping centered around New York rather than in the field? The focus must be on efforts from the ground rather than the massive bureaucracy.

I believe the goal with UN peacekeeping reform should be to create a coordinated network between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Security Council, and regional actors. In order for this to function properly, two things must take

place. First, we must address the issues between the DPKO and the Department of Political Affairs. The Brahimi Report understands that bureaucratic inefficiencies directly affect the success of any peacekeeping mission, but unfortunately the analysis ends there. Second and most importantly, the bureaucracy must focus its attention on the task at hand in the field and coordinate with regional actors to ensure maximum effectiveness and efficiency. Any reform within the UN bureaucracy should be done with the field operation in mind; power struggles between the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs need to be effectively addressed in order to guarantee effective decision-making that will translate into successful peacekeeping.

The three principles of traditional peacekeeping should remain at the forefront of any UN mission, regardless of whether it is authorized under Chapter VI or Chapter VII—peacekeeping requires the consent of the local parties, restricts the use of force to self-defense, and prioritizes impartiality (Brahimi Report, ix). It may seem contradictory to advocate for only self-defense with Chapter VII mandates, but if this principle remains paramount the UN has more of a chance of maintaining impartiality; the goal is to stop the violence, not perpetuate it. Chapter VII mandates utilize the use of force but should never abuse it. The definitions of these terms may change with the times, as impartiality seems to with MONUC in the DRC; however, the underlying philosophy of the UN's moral authority should remain strong.

We must also keep the topic of UN use of force in mind, because it is the most pressing issue. I do not believe that a UN standing force is either feasible or desirable for three reasons. First of all, “both pragmatists and visionaries are aware that the recent political environment is not conducive to the immediate establishment of a UN standing

force” (Langille, 244). I do not believe we will see an international consensus towards a UN standing force anytime soon, simply because member states and their citizens are unwilling to turn over troops to UN command. This leads to the second point, which is that a UN standing force would require funding that the UN does not have. Member states are already reluctant to commit troops to peacekeeping missions; a standing force requires not only members’ willingness but also resources and funding that may detract from their domestic military concerns. Finally, a UN standing force undermines any impartiality in UN peacekeeping, which should remain a central consideration. Field-Marshal Lord Carver aptly states that “in peace-keeping, and even more in peace-enforcement, there is always a danger that the UN force might become merely a reinforcement to the weaker side” (*New York Review of Books*, 3). Although peacekeeping always runs the risk of protecting the weak, I believe it is more likely to occur with a UN standing force than with other peacekeeping mechanisms.

I believe reform should focus on streamlining peacekeeping operations to be *proactive* in order to avoid the pitfalls of a standing force and to further coordinate the efforts of the UN with influential regional actors. Herbert Howe demonstrates that although they mobilize quickly, regional forces lack many of the qualities necessary for successful peacekeeping, thus prolonging the conflict. (Howe, 175) Proactive forces can address the issue of responding quickly to international crises without the hefty budget needed for a standing force. Member states are more likely to contribute troops and resources to a rapid deployment force not only because of the lower costs but also because the troops would still be under their command. (Langille, 232) I believe the best way to coordinate a rapid deployment force is to organize it by region and combine

the efforts of the UN with regional actors willing to play a prominent role in peacekeeping. The key is to mobilize proactive peacekeeping through communication.

The benefits of coordinating regional resources and willingness to act with UN expertise and oversight are numerous. UN peacekeeping provides centralized coordination of peacekeeping operations, expertise in peacekeeping mechanisms, and promotes adherence to international law and codes of conduct. Regional actors can contribute their specific knowledge of the conflict without bearing the burden of the entire peacekeeping mission, which can create complications as we saw with ECOMOG in Liberia. This also offers the best chance of avoiding the power politics of larger states and the tension between the United States and UN policies. Finally, reform focused around *proactive peacekeeping* requires cooperation between UN headquarters and the field-based operations while keeping the focus on the peacekeeping operations at hand.

I envision my recommendations as a subset of the general United Nations reform proposals that emerged this year. My goal is to take past experiences, positive and negative, and create a comprehensive framework for proactive peacekeeping in the future. I believe it is important to revamp the existing system before launching new ideas like rapid deployment or preventative forces. A new and improved form of proactive peacekeeping should work in tandem with Annan's vision of a Peacebuilding Commission and heightened collective security worldwide.

The question of UN reform is a difficult one, and the answers offered are often idealistic and difficult to implement. The reforms and criteria I proposed are certainly difficult, but I believe they are necessary in order to ameliorate the UN's role in international affairs now and in the future. Resolving issues between the DPA and the

DPKO can streamline inefficient bureaucracy; coordinating regional actors will bring the UN closer to achieving an effective rapid deployment force, which is essential to the success of future peacekeeping missions. The UN is a large organization, but I sincerely believe that if the United Nations wants to remain at the forefront of peacekeeping it must focus on the task at hand—to promote proactive peacekeeping for effective peace.

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