

**Bosnian Youth: The Excluded Segment of the Population with the Most
Potential for Transformative Peacebuilding**

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Abstract

In this paper I discuss the potential for youth's role in conflict transformational peacebuilding processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). I lay forth the current state of BiH through giving background to the 1990s conflict in the Balkans and purporting Bosnian politicians still thrive on rhetoric continuing ethnic divisions in the country. BiH's widespread economic and societal problems affect youth severely and this paper focuses on systemic higher education issues and widespread youth unemployment as hindrances for this promising segment of the population to advance peacebuilding processes.

I introduce John Paul Lederach and Johan Galtung's theories of conflict transformation as a way to approach peacebuilding efforts in the country. Rather than addressing the surface episodic violent conflicts that arose in the 1990s, peacebuilding in BiH should focus on the deep seeded ethnic divisions pervasive in Bosnian society. Drawing from Lederach and Galtung's theories of conflict transformation, I propose youth have the ability to build peace in BiH in a constructive and positive way.

A broken higher education system and high levels of youth unemployment are two major obstacles blocking youth from participating in peacebuilding efforts in the country. Given their potential to transform conflicts in a constructive way, youth need to be given special attention when examining how to progress BiH into a prosperous and peaceful country. Through creating a regionally competitive higher education system and combating alarming rates of youth unemployment, the country's government and international community can utilize youth in further peacebuilding efforts.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

My friends, brothers Anto and Jasmin and their best friend Nedim, live in the city of Tuzla, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Anto and Jasmin both finished high school, but neither received their university degrees. Nedim completed his first three years of high school and after his professor handed him a “menu” of grades and how much each cost on the first day of his last year of high school, he dropped out. Jasmin, an amateur photographer, would like to finish his university studies and tried to this past academic year, but after he paid for his online classes the university told him it as not offering them anymore and did not provide a refund. Anto, the only one of the three men who has a regular job, gets paid 10 Bosnian Convertible Marks (about \$7) for eight hours of work. Estimates place unemployment in BiH at over 35% and similar to many countries, this number is higher for young Bosnians (CIA World Fact Book). Anto, 27-years-old, and Jasmin and Emir, both 25-years-old, were all children during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War.

Many Bosnians face many hardships since the end of the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s including widespread unemployment, inability to easily travel outside the country, and the physical and psychological rebuilding of their country. Youth in the country experience the same hardships, but also experience unique adversity. Children and teenagers during the war and now youth, 18 to 29 year olds, experienced varying degrees of trauma depending on where they lived. From losing family members, to being displaced from their homes, to living in a city under siege during their formative years of development, youth in the country were merely generally powerless children during the war.

Unfortunately, those same children who lived through devastating war are citizens with little input on shaping their country’s future. Bosnian youth face staggering rates of

unemployment and for those who wish to pursue a university degree, a broken higher education system offers no guarantee of a high quality degree. Those who are employed have little job security, if any at all. BiH's "gray market," comprised of "under-the-table" operations and businesses, employs adults and youth with meager pay and no promise of job security.

Unemployed, whether educated or not, youth have few means to contribute to Bosnian society in a productive way. According to one young adult in the country, "Decisions are made for [youth] by people who do not have an idea of what we are faced with on a daily basis" (Cilliers 189).

Kept out of the public sphere through unemployment and an inefficient higher education system, youth's voices are silenced in the country.

"Youth" is a term defined differently by various scholars and institutions including the United Nations. In this thesis, I define youth as the age group between 18 and 29. This age range is appropriate for this analysis, because 18 is the age that many societies consider a person an adult. Similar to the United States, Bosnians typically graduate from high school at age 18. My friends in Tuzla, all in their twenties, still lived at home with their parents, a result of both cultural expectations and financial instability. Higher education opportunities or employment options did not offer the autonomy to them as those opportunities and options offer to many American and certainly Georgetown University students, such as myself. Those in this age group are compelling to observe, because they were either children or "coming of age" during the Bosnian War. Although the long lasting effects of the war on the country as a whole may be studied, I am interested in examining how the war and its resulting structures affected and continue to affect this group of people.

The Bosnian War, one of the Balkans Wars of the 1990s, was partly fueled by tensions among the three main ethnic groups. Although the concentration of Croats is in Croatia and the

same for Serbs in Serbia, Croats and Serbs comprise a large portion of BiH's population. Although a census has not been conducted since before the war, estimates place Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) at 48.1% of the population, Serbs at 37.1%, and Croats at 14.3% (CIA World Factbook). The war, while extremely complex, was largely waged by Serbs against the Bosniaks and Croats who declared independence from the state of Yugoslavia, of which they were all independent republics. It has been difficult to estimate the number of casualties from the Bosnian War because of the numerous missing people, refugees, and civilian deaths due to indirect causes of the war (such as freezing to death or dying from hunger). According to the Research and Documentation Center (RDC) in Sarajevo, BiH's capital, almost 100,000 people died during the war, and at least two million fled their homes. One shocking number the RDC released was that over 80% of civilians killed during the war were Bosniaks. The war ended with the internationally crafted Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), which successfully ended physical violence in the country, but created a large, complex government.

The Dayton Peace Accords, named so because they were created in Dayton, Ohio, ended the physical violence in BiH. However, with the end of physical violence came the rebirth of structural violence in the country. Fourteen years after regional leaders, including Slobodan Milosovic, the leader of Serbia who would later wage a war in Kosovo, signed the DPA, its gaping flaws have come to full light. Most strikingly, the DPA essentially rewarded the Bosnian Serb para-military and guerrilla forces (supported by the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army), by splitting the country of BiH into two geographical entities that effectively function as autonomous states within one country. Starting with just the name, Republika Srpska or the Serbian Republic and Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the DPA failed to create an ethnically sensitive solution to the war and in effect "rewarded" ethnic cleansing, the method the

Serb forces used to remove non-Serbs from areas desired by Serb control (Tuathail 145). The DPA “also sowed the seeds of instability by creating a decentralized political system that undermined the state's authority” because each entity has its own parliament as do each of the ten cantons (states) in the country of four million (McMahon & Westin). As a result of the structure of government set up by the DPA, BiH has a weak central government and strong entity governments 14 years after it was signed.

In this thesis, I propose that more effort should be directed towards educating and training BiH's young adult generation, specifically ages 18-29, to take an active role in its country's peacebuilding efforts. I examine why this age group in BiH is such an important part of steering BiH on the path to constructive and positive peace. The regional and international communities should take a vested interest in this group as a new means of continuing the peace process. Of course, I do not propose to rest progress of BiH solely on the shoulders of young adults; rather, I suggest utilizing them as willing participants in bringing about progress in the country.

Youth have the potential to pose a unique role in post-conflict, peacebuilding efforts. “Peacebuilding efforts” is a broad term, encompassing a wide range of activities, from the drafting of political documents, to the end of violent conflict, to an NGO's promotion of civil society. The international community has largely developed peacebuilding efforts in BiH without consulting regional leaders and certainly without consulting Bosnian youth. Peacebuilding efforts have failed to move the country into a positive direction and have avoided the major underlying conflict in BiH: ethnic tensions. Rather than reconciling the ethnic tensions, many internationally-sponsored peacebuilding efforts, such as the DPA, encourage separation of ethnic groups.

In this thesis, I provide a context for the current troublesome situation in BiH including a close examination of the DPA. Next, I discuss peacebuilding, conflict transformation, and youth's potential in participating in conflict transformative peacebuilding. Johan Galtung theorizes that youth have the potential to have a significantly positive effect on peacebuilding efforts. Other conflict transformation and peacebuilding theorists, such as John Paul Lederach support this argument, as do researchers who have spent time in BiH. Youth are positioned in so that they can look beyond ethnic tensions and transform the country for the benefit of all peoples, but they have not been given the opportunity to do so thus far.

The first section of this thesis provides important geopolitical context for the rest of the thesis. First, a basic discussion of the rich and complex history of BiH is integral to understanding its current situation. Next, I provide a brief overview of the war, which ended less than 15 years ago. It left the country both physically and psychologically damaged. In the following section I examine the DPA, the peace agreement that not only ended the war, but set up the structure for its current government and stipulations for significant international involvement in the country. The DPA has directly and indirectly affected the lives of all Bosnians. Next, I examine the current political situation in BiH to illuminate the persisting ethnic tensions in the country that have yet to be addressed. The political situation in the country is largely indicative of the ethnic conflict in the country at large.

After giving the context for the arguments in the thesis, I describe its theoretical basis, a conflict transformational view of peacebuilding. In this section, I explore why the DPA failed to solve any deep-seeded conflicts in the country. I highlight how youth have the potential to be extremely instrumental in the peacebuilding efforts in the country as in all countries—developing, transitioning, or advanced—youth are invariably the future of their country. It is the

group that will succeed the adults in running and making decisions for the country. In BiH, it is important that youths' capacities are built early so that they are able and willing to positively transform the conflicts in their country. Next, I examine the higher education system as a product of a broken government. I argue higher education is a major force in youth's lives and therefore needs to be reformed into a positive influence. After I examine the higher education system, I explore the reasons for high youth unemployment in the country and its negative effects on youth and the country at large.

In this thesis I set out to accomplish specific goals, but recognize the importance of further research on related subjects. I do not put forth ways the education system can be reformed or youth unemployment can be eradicated. Instead, I highlight how they fail youth and why these two aspects of youths' lives are important to address in light of their potential role in a conflict transformational view of peacebuilding. Another dimension only briefly addressed in this paper is the differences in the role of young women and young men; rather than a gendered analysis, I focus on youth as a cohesive group. Despite their inattention in this thesis, both of these important issues should be explored in order to successfully incorporate youth into the peacebuilding process in the country. In addition, I generally do not separate youth into ethnic categories. Although this is a partially conscious decision, insufficient data does not allow for examination of each ethnic category in regards to the analysis undertaken in this thesis.

Chapter 2. Looking Back in Order to Move Forward:

2.1 Why War Happened

In order to examine why the war in BiH, and in other parts of Yugoslavia, even occurred, it is important to take into account Yugoslavia's rich, and often violent history. What is particularly important to highlight in a discussion of BiH's past are the ways that ethnic groups, or nationalities, have interacted with each other in region. Kathleen H. Hawk offers a concise, and perhaps oversimplified, version of BiH's history (Hawk 59-82). For the purposes of this paper a detailed examination of BiH's history before the late nineteenth century is not necessary.

Slavic peoples began to settle in the Balkans in the sixth and seventh centuries. Subsequently, the kingdoms of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia were formed and as power struggles developed, Croatia and Serbia split control of Bosnia in the ninth century. Hungary ruled the region in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and around the turn of the thirteenth century Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia each regained independence (Hawk 59). In the late fourteenth century, "the Ottoman Turks began conquering the area and, by the mid 1400s, dominated the entire region" (60). The Turks possibly posed the most significant developments in ethnic, national, and religious tensions in the region's early history. Whereas Serbs viewed the Muslim Turks as "alien occupiers," Bosnians welcomed them and converted to Islam in an attempt to keep their land (60).

In 1878, Bosnia came under Austrian-Hungarian rule, the same year that Serbia became independent from ? (Hawk 60). The legacy of Turkish rule was significant and long-lasting. According to Stephen Burg, this legacy was of "deep social cleavages along ethnoreligious lines, as well as a society steeped in military traditions and values" (17). Although the region included three distinct kingdoms for centuries, the Turkish rule resulted in "cultural and religious

differences that were tolerated in everyday life [that] became markers for clashing political agendas and the emergence of distinct national ideologies” (17). After World War I, a new nation-state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes emerged as a “voluntary union of the Slavic groups in the area and was accepted by the international community” and Serbia’s monarchy ruled over the new nation (60). In 1929, an absolute monarchy came into power and the country’s name changed to Yugoslavia.

While consolidating power and changing the country’s name was an effort towards unification, Yugoslavia experienced the reemergence of ethnic tensions during World War II as Italy and Germany invaded the region. The three main ethnic factions fighting both their occupiers and each other were the Croat-dominated “Ustashe,” who allied with Nazi Germany; the “Chetniks,” who represented the Yugoslav government, dominantly Serb, in exile; and the “Partisans,” led by Communist Jozep Broz Tito (Hawk 60). WWII saw the death of almost two million Yugoslavs, half of the casualties caused by other Yugoslavs. After the war, Tito became the country’s leader and subsequently abolished the monarchy and established the Communist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Tito’s Yugoslavia has been described as “six republics, five nationalities, four languages, three religions, two alphabets, and one Tito” (Hawk 61). With such complicated factors, it may be surprising that the country was relatively unified during his rule and saw little ethnic tensions, compared to the previous century. After solidifying his control over Yugoslavia, comprised of the republics of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, BiH, Macedonia, and Montenegro, Tito increasingly granted each republic relative autonomy (Baumann 17-18). According to Ian Oliver, Tito was “the only man who has ever been able to make these hostile peoples that populated the six republics be civil to one another” (6). Although he put himself in power for life, Tito was viewed

as a benign ruler compared to the strict communist Stalin, from whom he eventually broke ties. Tito's style of communism, which became known as "Titoism," allowed individuals to own limited amounts of land and for workers to locally manage factories and businesses (Schuman 29). For a time, Tito's Yugoslavia seemed to be a successful country. For the first time in the region's history, the majority of its citizens prospered economically and a Yugoslav passport gained a person access to more countries than any other passport during his rule (Baumann 18).

As many Yugoslavs enjoyed the benefits of Tito's relaxed communism, Bosnian Muslims were in a precarious position. Tito only recognized five nationalities: the Slovenes, the Croats, the Serbs, the Macedonians, and the Montenegrins (Schuman 30). Influence by his communist ideology, Tito encouraged Yugoslavs to abandon their religious identity. Specifically, he attempted to have Bosnian Muslims renounce Islam and declare themselves either Croats or Serbs. Whereas in 1953 Bosnian Muslims could not identify themselves as such, but rather "Yugoslav, nationally undeclared," by 1971 the census allowed them to identify as Muslims (Bauman 18-9). This change reflected the increasing recognition and autonomy Bosnian Muslims received throughout Tito's rule. At the same time, however, the republic of BiH was the only republic in Yugoslavia to lack a majority of any single nationality. Its relative ethnic harmony was complimented by its economic prosperity as a result of the rich natural resources and central location within Yugoslavia (Schuman 32).

By the 1970s, Yugoslavia experienced rising economic problems and its citizens' responses had nationalist undertones at times (Hawk 61). As Tito entered the last decade of his life and rule over Yugoslavia, he created the model of government that would come into effect after his death (Schuman 34). Tito's unique vision called for not another president for life as he was, but rather a rotating presidency. Yugoslavia would still be a socialist country, but as was

the case under Tito's rule, the republics would have a large amount of autonomy (Baumann 21). Such a system discouraged any one republic from becoming too powerful and also allowed the republics to succeed from Yugoslavia if they wished.

After his death in May 1980, Tito's envisioned system of government took effect. Despite the economic highlight of the 1984 Winter Olympics held in Sarajevo, Yugoslavia had persistent political and economic troubles (Schuman 36-7). By the end of the 1980s, economic woes that began during Tito's rule only grew and unrest among the republics increased. As Yugoslav workers grew increasingly frustrated with their central government in Belgrade and went on frequent strikes, the Berlin Wall fell and, country by country, communist governments in Eastern Europe collapsed (38).

Yugoslavia's government did not fall so swiftly as that of other former communist countries. Rather, Slobodan Milosevic, then president of Serbia, took the bold step of annexing the Yugoslav districts of Vojvodina and Kosovo as part of Serbia (Shuman 38). After this development, Slovenia demanded, but failed to receive, more power and its leaders effectively abandoned the joint communist party of Yugoslavia in 1990 (38-9). As each republic held elections that year and non-communist presidents came into power, communism in Yugoslavia ended.

In the republic of BiH, three political parties divided along the three main ethnic lines emerged and Bosnian Muslim Alija Izetbegovic was elected president (Schuman 39). While ethnic differences manifested themselves in the presidential election, many Bosnians lived in harmony together throughout the country (Berg 60). Living in the same neighborhoods, especially in urban areas, not only did the three main ethnic groups co-exist, but by 1990 around 40 per cent of Bosnian marriages in urban areas were ethnically mixed (Schuman 39). While

ethnic tensions existed in certain parts of the republic, they generally did not define everyday relations between the ethnic groups.

As Milosovic lobbied for a centralized Yugoslavia under Serb control, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in June 1991. Violence erupted between the Yugoslav National Army, comprised mainly of Serbs, and the armies of Croatia and Slovenia (Schuman 42). Fighting in Slovenia only lasted 13 days after Milosevic blocked military action in the country because of its small Serb population. Milosevic felt the Serb population in Croatia, approximately 15% was worth fighting for and so, with the help of the Serb paramilitary forces, continued the war in Croatia. After an internationally brokered cease-fire came into effect, a United Nations Peace Keeping Force (UNPROFOR) entered the country by February 1992 (Baumann, Gawrych, & Kretchik 22-3).

2.2 The Bosnian War

In early 1992, Bosniak, Croat, and Serb leaders met in Lisbon, Portugal to sign an agreement to prevent the dissolution of BiH. Serb leader Radovan Karadzic called for the division of the country into three self-governing regions and the Croat leader, Mate Boban, supported this solution. After initially agreeing to three separate regions within a sovereign BiH, Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic withdrew his support after the United States expressed its disapproval of the agreement (Schuman 44). The U.S. dissented from the opinion generally accepted in Europe that a three-region BiH would be an acceptable solution to avoid war (Baumann, Gawrych, & Kretchik 24).

As the war in Croatia ended, Radovan Karadzic declared the creation of a Serbian Republic, known as Republika Srpska (RS), with its capital in Pale, a town close to Bosnian

capital Sarajevo. Despite Serb opposition, Bosnian Muslims and Croats held a referendum on independence on February 28-March 1, 1992 (Baumann, Gawrych, & Kretchik 24). As Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum, 99.7% of Bosniak and Croat voters called for Bosnian independence (24). On April 5, Izetbegovic declared Bosnian independence, and the European Community and United States recognized its independence the following two days (25).

Supporting Milosevic, Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic took command of what became the Army of Republika Srpska, largely comprised of Bosnian Serbs formally of the JNA. Karadzic and Mladic's goal "uniting all Bosnian Serbs in one state," located mostly in the east and southeastern parts of BiH, but also in the northwest part of the country (Baumann, Gawrych, & Kretchik 25). The Serbian leaders' goal of creating one contiguous area of Serbs led to what they called "ethnic cleansing," or ridding the areas they wished to control of Bosniaks and Croats (Schuman 45). To do so, they often massacred or otherwise terrorized Bosnian Muslims or Croats to incite an exodus of the rest of the population, but hundreds of thousands of Bosniaks and Croats died either in their own towns and villages or in concentration camps (Baumann, Gawrych, & Kretchik 27).

Bosniaks were not simply victims in physical violence that ensued in BiH. Bosniak forces committed atrocities against Serbs, killing them, sending them to a Bosniak-created concentration camp, or otherwise forcing them from their homes (Baumann, Gawrych, & Kretchik 26). While at first fighting together against Serb aggressors, Bosniaks and Croats soon began fighting each other and Mate Boban, head of the Croatian Democratic Alliance, declared the Croat Union of Herceg-Bosna. As Croat forces gained control of western Herzegovina, Bosniaks found themselves in the precarious position between new Croat and Serb states (26).

Both Bosniaks and Croats employed milder versions of the Serbs' method of ethnic cleansing against the other.

Two events during the war are perhaps the most remembered aspects of the war. The Serbian siege of Sarajevo was an international symbol of the Bosnian War. Serb forces surrounded Sarajevo after warning Serbian civilians to leave the city. The result was a 44-month siege on the city. Bosniaks in the city experienced not only life often without electricity, water, or ways to get resources, but also frequent shellings and sniper attacks (Berg 139). After the Serbs surrendered the Sarajevo airport to the United Nations in June 1992, Bosniaks were able to receive some aid, but still faced persistent hardships and suffering during the war (134). The international media focused on certain events, such as the bombing of the Markala marketplace in February 1994, which resulted in a high number of casualties. As a result of the international coverage of this bombing and other signs of increasing Serbian aggression, the international community continued to call for a ceasefire.

The other defining moment of the war was the failure of the UN peacekeeping troops to protect Bosniaks from Serbs and the resulting genocide. Bosniaks experienced the worst massacre of the war in July 1995 in and around the town of Srebrenica, a UN designated "safe zone" (Baumann, Gawrych, & Kretchik 49). Protected by Dutch UN peacekeeping forces, 8,000 Bosniaks—mostly men and boys—met their demise at the hands of Serb forces. The ICTY ruled the killings genocide, the first of this scale in Europe since World War II. A facet especially outrageous for survivors of the Srebrenica genocide was the supposed "safety" the UN peacekeepers offered the Bosniaks. As the fifteenth anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide nears, some Bosniak bodies have yet to be found or identified. After the genocide, Serb forces

created primary, secondary, and tertiary mass graves for their victims to cover up the crimes (Partos).

A ceasefire agreement was finally reached at the end of 1995 and the war ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), discussed in the next section. This brief overview of the Bosnian war, is by no means a full history of it and full books have been dedicated to the subject. By at least providing an introductory overview of the war, I hope to illustrate that 14 years ago, violent fighting between ethnic groups and an arguably weak peace agreement heightened ethnic tensions. Although the physical fighting in the country has ceased, deep cultural and structural wounds still persist in the country.

2.3 The Dayton Peace Accords: An International Attempt at Peace

In order to understand the current political, economic, and social situation in BiH, an examination of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) is necessary. The DPA set up the framework for BiH's government and guidelines for international involvement, including an international military presence and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which eventually was granted almost absolute power in overturning actions of the country's parliaments in addition to expelling political leaders. Both of these aspects of the agreement are discussed in this section as well as the background to the DPA, its structure and measures proposed, and why it has generally failed at building a successful state.

Formally referred to as the "General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina," the DPA was preceded by many failed attempts at a successful agreement to end of the war in BiH. After the Serbs started to lose territory previously held, they became open to peace talks and in early October 1995, the United States brokered a ceasefire in BiH. By

November 21, the leaders “initialed” the DPA and later signed the DPA formally in Paris on December 14 (Hawk 66). It was apparent that all parties involved, from the warring parties to the architects of the agreement, were not completely comfortable with the outcome of the DPA. Causing unease for the regional leaders, the negotiations leading to the DPA “had been conducted over their heads and behind their backs” (Caplan 213). As for the international community members who created the DPA, they had not always followed through on earlier promises, and so the large role the international community had in drafting and in the impending implementation of the DPA was unsettling for the regional Balkan leaders and international community alike.

To more fully understand the apprehension of the parties involved in the DPA, it should be noted that many peace agreements had been drafted before the DPA was finally signed. In fact, the European Community attempted peace-making efforts in the autumn of 1991, before violence in the country broke out (Caplan 214). The efforts to broker peace in the country continued into 1992. After negotiations in February and March of 1992 among Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks,

The Resulting ‘Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina’, signed by the three parties on 21 March 1991 but then repudiated by them soon after, introduced the fundamental principle that was to be a central feature of all subsequent peace plans: the division of Bosnia into units defined in terms of ethnicity. (Caplan 215)

Even as early as March 1992, the international community and regional leaders resigned themselves to the fact that any possible peace agreement would need to include clear ethnic divisions. Unfortunately, this general idea guided the international community’s and regional community’s views on how to achieve peace and avoid further physical violence in the region. The final peace agreement presented before the DPA was the Contact Group Plan in the middle

of 1994 (216). The Contact Group was comprised of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the U.S. and was created in the hope of coordinating peacemaking efforts in BiH during the war. The plan called for a Bosnian state comprised of a Muslim-Croat federation and a Serb republic, and while rejected by regional leaders, formed the basis for the DPA (216).

What is striking about the “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina” is its similarities to the Contact Group plan of a year and a half earlier. Caplan attributes the successful signing of the DPA to three reasons. First, the Serbs lost a significant amount of territory between the time the Contact Group plan was proposed and when the DPA was agreed upon. In mid-1994, the Bosnian Serbs were still confident in their position, while it became apparent by late 1995 that they had to come to an agreement with the Bosnian Muslims and Croats (216). Secondly, the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, “who had scuppered previous deals, was excluded from the negotiations” (216-17). At the time of negotiations of the DPA, Karadzic had already been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and could not travel abroad or risk arrest. Lastly, Caplan attributes the successful signing of the DPA to the role Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic played in the negotiations (Caplan 217 and Szasz 763). In Karadzic’s absence, Milosevic took over negotiations for Bosnian Serbs and apparently held the final map from Bosnian Serb leaders until “moments before the signing” (217). Interestingly, Milosevic would later be indicted and tried in the same court that had indicted Karadzic. While not necessarily positive or encouraging reasons, Serbs’ loss of territory, Karadzic’s absence, and Milosevic’s role in negotiations finally made a peace plan possible.

Examining the structure of the DPA provides insight into why it has become ubiquitous with an unsuccessful peace agreement. According to Paul C. Szasz, “This treaty, however, has

almost no substantive content. It is mostly just a structure from which a dozen Annexes are suspended” (759). Four of the Annexes are essentially agreements between the state of BiH, the Federation of BiH, and the Republika Srpska to give NATO and other international organizations approval to carry out certain tasks in the country. For instance in the first article of the DPA, it says, “The Parties understand and agree that this Implementation Force may be composed of ground, air and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations” (Dayton Peace Accords). I discuss other international involvement the DPA proscribed later in this chapter. Also, the majority of the Annexes concern BiH’s constitution and other constitutional matters such as human rights and return of refugees (Szasz 760). Szasz notes that in addition to the formal Annexes in the DPA, there were many “arrangements” made between the “sponsors” (the international community) of the DPA that took the form not of treaties, but of “international organs” such as the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE) and the NATO Council. The regional leaders had no role in the negotiations of these governing bodies (761). The unusual structure of the DPA—of loose Annexes and arrangements of international bodies not formally acknowledged in the DPA—has caused ongoing confusion and frustration in the country and for interested parties abroad.

The actual framework for the new state of BiH was by no means ideal for any of the three ethnic groups involved in the war. As the Contact Group plan a year and a half before, the DPA saw the country divided into two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) which territorially took control of 51% of the country and the Republika Srpska (RS), comprised of the remaining 49% of the country (Hawk 66). Although the Bosnian Muslims theoretically achieved their goal of one “unified” country, there was nothing cohesive about the structure of two entities in one state (Szasz 765). The Serbs never desired the two-entity system developed,

nor did they want to exist in a unified country with the Muslims and Croats (765). Szasz notes that, “The Croatian aims have never been quite clear,” but that they either would have desired a separate Croat entity within the state of BiH or to merge with Croatia (762). Since none of the three warring ethnic parties’ desires were satisfied with the result of the territorial aspects of the DPA, it comes as no surprise that the countries drafting the DPA, especially the U.S., seemingly threatened each side and promised different stipulations, many coming in the form of international governing bodies, such as the OSCE (764).

Despite the discontent of the three ethnic groups represented, the DPA began to be implemented soon after the war ended. The most significant aspect of the DPA according to the international community was the military situation in BiH and therefore, the Annexes addressing military and security concerns were written with the most detail (Caplan 217). Arguably the most significant, or at least of the largest scale, military or security measure was that the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) would replace the UN’s 20,000 troops with 60,000 troops to implement the DPA (Hawk 66 & Caplan 217-18). The IFOR’s mission was to “monitor the cease-fire; maintain a separation of Serb, Bosnian, and Croat forces; collect heavy weapons; provide a secure environment; and ensure freedom of movement” (Hawk 66). In addition, a UN International Police Task Force was established mainly to train and oversee the local police forces around the country (Caplan 219). Whether or not completely successful in their goals both the IFOR and IPTF’s presences were felt in both entities.

To understand the constitutional aspects of the DPA, I again turn to Richard Caplan. While BiH was technically one country under the DPA, the two-entity system gave the Federation and the RS almost complete autonomy; they were able to maintain their own armed forces, and each entity was given almost exclusive governance over its respective regions. This

governance extended to “economic development, taxation, justice, education, communications, transportation, and housing” (Caplan 219). This division of governance effectively split the country into two almost completely autonomous entities. In addition to divided governance While the DPA stated, “Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections the divided governance the DPA set forth, the Constitution (Annex 4) allowed for the entities to establish “special relationships” with other countries in the region as long as those relationships did not violate the sovereignty of BiH (Annex 4, DPA). This stipulation effectively allowed the RS to align itself with Yugoslavia (later Serbia) and FBiH with Croatia (219).

The DPA also set up what has become a notoriously enormous governmental structure. As a result of the DPA, BiH was split up into not only two entities, but also into 10 cantons and one district. The result is a three-person presidency and 14 parliaments, in both of which members are determined partly on an ethnic basis (Caplan 219-20 & McMahon & Westin). As with the division of the entities down ethnic lines, ethnic identity plays a role of utmost importance in BiH’s large government. The three-person presidency must be comprised of one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb. Each parliament has its own quota for members of each ethnicity based on the ethnic make-up of its respective canton or entity (Caplan 219-20). To this day, the large government is defined by ethnic divisions and also does not account for minority populations in the country such as the Roma and Jews.

While the political parties, as mandated by the DPA, have been “working” towards Constitutional reform, various leaders of the parties dangle the threat of non-cooperation, or at worst, war, to postpone progress. This is where another interesting by-product of the DPA comes into effect. The European Special Representative holds the Office of the High

Representative (OHR) in BiH and has sweeping powers in the country. Currently held by Valentin Inzko, the position gives the OHR the power to overturn legislation that he feels does not meet guidelines set forth in the DPA. He also has the power to remove elected leaders from their posts as he sees fit, without the approval of any governing body in BiH. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) comprises 55 countries interested in helping BiH achieve guidelines of the DPA and the OHR is the position that acts on behalf of the PIC. While different people who have held the OHR vary widely to what extent they use these powers, the position itself fundamentally undermines the democratization process in BiH. While it has met some criticism within the country and in the international community, OHR has successfully dismissed politicians who have blocked the progression outlined in the DPA.

In addition to the OHR as an important international actor in BiH, several different international governments and groups descended upon BiH after the war ended. According to McMahon and Westin, “By the end of 1996, 17 different foreign governments, 18 UN agencies, 27 intergovernmental organizations, and about 200 nongovernmental organizations (NGOS)--not to mention tens of thousands of troops from across the globe--were involved in reconstruction efforts” (McMahon and Westin). In addition to the large presence of international groups, a flood of relief and reconstruction money entered the country. In fact, soon after the war ended, the international community spent the largest amount of money on “democratization assistance” in BiH than any other country (Stewart 760). However, foreign interest and investment in the small country has significantly waned since the early 2000s.

The importance of the role of the OHR in BiH is necessary for understanding the extent to which the international community is involved in BiH. The combination of the sweeping powers of an outsider in the OHR and the large and divided government within BiH has caused

progress in the country to essentially halt. Fourteen years later, the DPA has, more than anything, weakened BiH, putting non-citizens in control of BiH's destiny, which so far looks grim. The DPA did end physical violence, "but did not resolve the conflict" (Tuatbail 146). The conflict in BiH persists among the ethnic groups, but also because of the grim economic and political situation in the country.

2.4 The Current Situation in BiH and Continuing Ethnic Tensions

While the physical violence in BiH has ceased, the ethnic tensions and conflict have not faded into the background. In fact, political leaders of each three ethnic groups have heightened ethnic tensions over the past four years. These tensions stem from mutually exclusive interests of the different groups, resulting in conflict. Fourteen years after the Dayton Peace Accords were signed, the governmental structure that the DPA set up has continued to exasperate the conflict among the ethnic groups. Perhaps the divisions within the country based on differences in ethnicity (the division of the country into ethnically-based entities, and a tripartite presidency) were necessary for each of the warring parties to agree to the internationally brokered accords, but the divisions legitimized in the DPA have persisted since the end of the war.

Recently, BiH has been in the news because Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has commenced. Representing himself, Karadzic has made comments that many Bosnians and members of the international community find not only untrue, but also harmful to the progress of the country. In his opening statements on March 1, 2010, pleading not guilty to his charges—including genocide, crimes against humanity, and other war crimes— Karadzic defended Serb aggression during the war by asserting that the war was "just and holy" (Partos). In addition, he denies his

role in and occurrence of the July 1995 Srebrenica that resulted in the death of over 8,000 Muslim men and boys, calling it a “myth” even though the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has ruled it a genocide (Partos). In addition, he denies that Sarajevo was under siege or that Serb-run concentration camps existed during the war. What is so significant and damaging about his statements is that they reinforce the view that some Bosnian Serbs still hold: that the war waged against Muslim Bosnians was justified and right.

Perhaps even more alarming is that the Republika Srpska’s current prime minister, Milorad Dodik, makes similar claims to the ones Karadzic has recently made. In particular, in September 2010, he publically claimed the internationally recognized Kapija massacre on May 25, 1995 targeting Bosniaks in the city of Tuzla resulting in 70 civilian deaths was not the result of Serb aggression, but orchestrated by the Bosniaks themselves (Latal). However, Dodik’s comments come as nothing new in Serb politicians’ discourse: he and other Serb politicians deny Serb involvement in two other internationally recognized attacks near the Markale market in Sarajevo in February 1992 and August 1995 (Latal). Rather than take responsibility for their role in the Bosnian war and move towards reconciliation, Serbs exasperate ethnic tensions.

For their part, the Bosniak politicians do not help the reconciliation process or attempt to mend ethnic divisions either. Instead, they use rhetoric that perpetuates conflict between the ethnic groups, and in particular between the Serbs and Bosniaks. Haris Silajdzic, the Bosniak member of the Bosnian presidency, said shortly after Karadzic made his opening statements at the ICTY: “The ethnic divisions continued because people did not go back, were not allowed to go back, to their homes, including Srebrenica, where the genocide took place, and other places, too” (qtd. in Evans). Silajdzic regularly uses the term “ethnic cleansing” to refer to the situation in BiH, citing that the many people (namely Bosniaks) who have not relocated back to their

homes from before the war as a form of ethnic cleansing. Rather than participating in a productive and reconciliatory dialogue with Serb leaders, Silajdzic perpetuates the Bosniak anger towards the Serbs.

The rhetoric that both Serb and Bosniak politicians use is not only contradictory, but also harmful to the country's progress. Silajdzic also was quoted as saying, "There is paralysis in the Bosnian government because Serb legislators are voting as an ethnic bloc in the country's parliament and blocking progress" and "If we unblock this, we actually have a democracy in Bosnia, not ethnocracy" (qtd. in Evans). Perhaps there is some truth to what he claims, but he and other Bosniak politicians cannot elude blame for the current political stalemate in the country. The "progress" Silajdzic refers to is a contested concept in the country and the current source of political conflict within the government. The Bosniaks and Serbs have mutually exclusive goals for the progress and future of the country.

On the part of the Bosniaks, the future they envision for BiH involves the drafting of a new constitution to unify the two entities, for which the DPA calls (Prelec). Bosniak politicians believe this unity will be achieved through strengthening the central government and taking away much of the autonomy the entities currently possess. However, Serb politicians, led by Dodik, fervently oppose any measures that would unify the country and remove any power from the entity governments. Many of the proposed constitutional reforms, Marko Prelec argues, are necessary, such as making the Bosnian constitution comply with the European Convention for Human Rights or the national government's control over the integration process into the European Union (EU)(Prelec). Reforms such as these would allow for faster integration in the (EU) and the end of the Office of the High Representative, "Bosnia's international governor" (Prelec). Over the past months Serbs have rejected even these reforms.

Another recent development in Bosnian politics that affects the future of the country is the RS's establishment of the legal framework to hold a referendum in February 2010. With elections coming up in October 2010, the fear within the country as well in the international community is if the RS ballot will include an independence referendum, as Dodik has been promising since 2006 (Itano). Although the potential referendum may not directly call for independence, many Bosniaks still view it as "meaningful" and an act of "provocation" (Itano).

There is a valid notion among Bosniaks and the international community that holding a referendum in RS, either one addressing independence or the role of the international community in BiH, will heighten ethnic tensions and lead to another violent ethnic conflict. In March 2010 Paddy Ashdown, the first High Representative after the DPA were signed, stated BiH had seen substantial progress up until 2006, when politicians began to use nationalist rhetoric preceding the 2006 elections (Evans). However, he and other international observers doubt the country will descend into a violent conflict once again. The threat of a referendum on the RS ballot is heightening ethnic tensions even further, which will result in BiH moving further away from stability. Prelec asserts stability will come only when BiH's politicians take responsibility in their role in stalling the country from progressing (Prelec).

The importance of describing the ethnic tensions at the national and political level provides context for this paper. The ethnic rhetoric and constant stalemates between politicians have serious consequences for youth. Unifying efforts of the higher education system have failed, which results in thinly spread funds and human resources (Woodward). While issues such as reforming the higher education system and combating alarmingly high levels of youth unemployment (upwards of 40 per cent) plague the country, political leaders use nationalist rhetoric that contributes to the persistent ethnic conflicts and stalls productive government

measures. Jaco Cilliers, whose work I cite extensively in the chapter three of this thesis, claims that youth feel “decisions are made for us by people who do not have an idea of what we are faced with on a daily basis” (189). This thesis argues that giving youth the opportunity to speak for themselves in the peacebuilding process through addressing the problems of youth unemployment and a broken higher education system can aid in guiding BiH towards positive progress.

Chapter 3. Conflict Transformation: A Different Approach to Peacebuilding

3.1 Introduction

After examining the recent past of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the background to its current unstable situation, I now propose one theoretical framework which has the potential to successfully address the country's continuing conflicts. Despite BiH's recent turbulent past and its generally failing efforts at creating sustainable and positive peace, its youth, if given the opportunity, have the capacity to build lasting peace in the country. The relentless negative influences on young people in BiH have prevented them from being viable members of their society. In this section, I put forth a summary of conflict transformation as a basis for peacebuilding. While the two concepts are interlinked and have various definitions, for the purposes of this paper, I purport that adopting a conflict transformation lens in peacebuilding efforts will be effective in BiH, especially in regards to youth. In order to effectively build sustainable peace in a pre-, during-, or post-conflict society, an understanding of how to fundamentally transform a conflict into positive change is of utmost importance. In the case of BiH, conflict among ethnic groups has persisted as an issue that needs to be adequately addressed. After the war ended and the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) were signed, it was clear that the international community made a meager attempt at sustainable peace. Through its promotion of ethnic divisions, the DPA has had lasting negative effects on the country and its citizens. The focus on ethnic divisions has led to governmental structural failures that have affected every sector of society and every citizen—whether of Bosniak, Croat, or Serb ethnicity. I argue that building capacity of BiH's youth to build peace may be an effective way to successfully transform the ongoing conflict in BiH, but recognize many obstacles stand in the way to build youth's capacity to create sustainable peace in BiH.

Peacebuilding is a broad term that can be applied to many pre-, during-, and post-violent conflict activities that aim to restore peace. Luc Reyhler defines conflict as “the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups” (5). Peacebuilding activities are not limited to situations in which violent conflict has erupted. Rather, peacebuilding activities are employed to prevent violence from breaking out, halt violent conflict, or sustain peace after physical violence ends. The term “peacebuilding” encompasses a wide range of activities, from implementing military or economic measures, developing civil society, to national or international diplomacy. No one measure of peacebuilding is superior to another on its own, but rather, different peacebuilding activities are appropriate for various conflicts, determined by the context of the specific conflict.

Conflict transformation is one theoretical approach to peacebuilding. Conflict transformation theory views conflict as actors pursuing incompatible goals. Many times “conflict” is a term used to connote only physically violent conflict. Conflict transformation understands conflict to exist naturally, and constantly, whether or not physical violence occurs. John Paul Lederach, a founder of the field of conflict transformation, writes in *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*,

A transformational perspective is built upon two foundations: a capacity to envision conflict positively, as a natural phenomenon that creates potential for constructive growth; and a willingness to respond in ways that maximize this potential for positive change. (15)

Too often, national leaders and regular citizens view conflict as a negative force that must be quelled as swiftly and with as little discussion as possible. Lederach challenges people to view conflict as a natural and potentially positive force with the capacity to lead to constructive change. Further than simply recognizing conflict as such, Lederach urges people to act and react to conflict in a way that will lead to the best possible outcome. Lederach warns that unless

conflict is engaged as an opportunity for dialogue and change, the cycle of hurt and destruction will continue (15).

Another essential aspect of conflict transformation theory is the notion that a “particular episode” is indicative of underlying patterns and issues (Lederach 17). Rather than simply address the episode, such as an outbreak of physical violence, Lederach and proponents of conflict transformation view the episode as an opportunity to address the potentially deep-rooted cause for the episode, the epicenter. Johan Galtung, another leading conflict transformation scholar, explains conflicts have behavioral and attitudinal components that are part of the “collective subconscious” or “deep culture” of a particular nation, society, or gender (271). It is only when stakeholders in a conflict, or a particular episode of a conflict, address the underlying issues, that conflict transformation can be successfully applied to peacebuilding efforts.

Conflict transformation should not be confused with conflict resolution. Conflict resolution asks, “How do we end something that is not desired?” (Lederach 29). Many peacebuilding efforts are implemented with the goal of ending something not desired, such as a violent conflict. While conflict transformation asks the same question, it goes further by also asking, “How do we...build something we do desire?” (30). While conflict resolution sees peace as a static condition, conflict transformation views peace as a dynamic process in which continually building something(s) desired is necessary.

The goal of conflict transformation is to constructively change a conflict so that it results in what is desired. In the case of BiH, what is desired is sustainable peace. Conflict transformation theorists do not view peace merely as the absence of physical violence, but the presence of creative solutions to the conflict. Lederach proposes achieving lasting peace through “adaptive responses to the immediate and future repetition of conflict episode” and addressing

“the deeper and longer-term relational and systemic patterns that produce violent, destructive expressions of conflict” (46-7). In this view, the transformation of a conflict is not—and should not be—a quick, surface-level process. Transformation of conflicts through addressing both the conflict episode and the underlying attitudes is a process that examines all aspects of a society. Galtung stresses that the absence of physical violence is just one concern of conflict transformation and lasting peace will only exist when structural and cultural violence are eradicated as well (270). Cultural violence, or the negative and unproductive underlying attitudes, perpetuates structural violence such as “massive suffering caused by economic and political structures” (270). Through a conflict transformation lens, only when a society can overcome physical, structural, and cultural violence will it experience positive peace.

In a conflict transformation framework, peacebuilding efforts should, to a certain extent, be coordinated to achieve positive and sustainable peace (Lederach 28). Multiple peacebuilding efforts not following a conflict transformation model may result in a lack of a clear vision for the future of the community in which the conflict occurs. Without a clear vision, separate peacebuilding activities may achieve short-term goals, but fall short of addressing conflict as an opportunity for constructive change. In order to foster creative change from conflict, a level of cooperation between those organizations, governments, and individuals initiating peacebuilding activities must exist. Lederach argues that despite the best of intentions, peacebuilding efforts have the risk of proving ineffectual or even harmful if a clear, overarching goal is not in place (45).

Another crucial aspect to the theory of conflict transformation is the notion that cultures are inherently different and not only should the content of the conflict be taken into account, so should the deeper context (Lederach 25). Peacebuilding methods cannot be applied in the same

way across cultures or conflicts. A transformative view, or any successful peacebuilding theory, must take into account the culture in which the conflict occurs. A successful peacebuilding measure may work to address one conflict, but not another. Understanding the social and cultural nuances of a community, nation, or region is crucial to successfully implementing peacebuilding measures. Conflict transformation's basis in peacebuilding hinges on the deep understanding of a culture in order to build peace. Understanding the positions and attitudes of the different stakeholders in a conflict when proposing peacebuilding methods is essential to transformative peace building.

3.2 The Dayton Peace Accords: Transforming or Perpetuating the Conflict?

The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) was a peacebuilding effort, but not one in line with the views of conflict transformation. Rather, it addressed the physical violence of the war and not the ethnic tensions as the underlying cause of the war. In fact, its many Annexes that divided the new country along ethnic lines (i.e. the creation of ethnic entities, the mandate for a three-person presidency) perpetuated and continue to perpetuate ethnic divisions. Peacebuilding efforts and institutions such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Office of the High Representative, and NATO's IFOR (subsequently replaced by the SFOR and later the EUFOR), all serve as different "tools" for peace. However, they all support, at best, the loose and negative structure for peace.

Peacebuilding efforts (either conducted by the architects of the DPA or by nongovernmental organizations) in the last 14 years have not brought sustainable or positive peace to the country. In fact, the country's ethnic groups are still in conflict with one another, as tensions still run high, especially among government officials. As discussed in the next chapter,

“Higher Education in BiH: Broken and Disserving Youth,” political parties—based on ethnicities—have been, at the very least, pursuing “incompatible goals.” As government officials walk out of parliament sessions and the RS holds a referendum for succession from BiH, the possibility of violent conflict breaking out once again is a reality (Prelec). There is an urgent need for peacebuilding efforts to address the deep-seeded ethnic tensions in the country. Specifically, if efforts coordinate and address sources of structural violence, or violence “built into the social structure,” violent conflict is not inevitable (Reychler 5).

The DPA, which effectively ended the violent conflict in BiH, was a major and ambitious peacebuilding effort. As an exercise to illustrate how *not* to “practice” conflict transformation, I examine the DPA as an inadequate peacebuilding method. The DPA was successful as a tool of limited peacebuilding, aimed at stopping and preventing physical violence. However, almost 14 years after its signing, it has failed to create sustainable peace as envisioned by conflict transformation scholars—the absence of not only physical violence, but also the absence of cultural and structural violence.

The application of a conflict transformational view of peacebuilding “provide[s] opportunity to learn about patterns and to address relationship structures while providing concrete solutions to presenting issues” (Lederach 12-13). Conflict transformation views conflict (even if it has caused destruction) as necessary and as a potentially positive force for change. It also suggests this process of transforming conflict from a negative force into a positive one should take into account not only the immediate episode of conflict, but also the underlying causes for conflict, what Lederach calls the “episode.” In this view, the architects of the DPA by no means negotiated the agreement in a transformational manner. Although the DPA resulted in the absence of physical violence, it perpetuated and created long-term problems,

especially in regards to ethnic divisions. Rather than taking the war in BiH as an opportunity to examine the “patterns” and “address relationship structures” among ethnic groups, it simply ensured the ceasefire would not be broken.

According to Lederach, “Rather than seeing peace as a static ‘end-state,’ conflict transformation views peace as a continuously evolving and developing quality of relationships” (20). A dynamic, lasting peace does not exist in post-DPA BiH. The Annexes put forth in the DPA left little room for growth or dialogue. While it created implementation of organizations, the DPA viewed peace as a ceasefire and the creation of a “democratic” government. In addition to a dynamic view of peace, conflict transformation views peace, not only as the absence of physical violence, but also the absence of structural and cultural violence (Galtung 270). The DPA’s structure for the government in BiH also sowed the seeds for structural violence; its call for a large government divided among the two entities led to the impossibility of an effective central government, resulting in corruption and the inability to pass measures to unify the country. The DPA also reinforced cultural violence within BiH by mandating the division of ethnic groups within the government. Whereas the architects of the DPA made provisions such as a three-person presidency in order to ensure each group’s voice is heard, this structure has only made the cultural and structural violence within the country more acute; according to this provision, it is culturally acceptable to divide groups of people along ethnic lines. Unfortunately, the DPA created an “end-state” in its version of peace, and this state perpetuates pervasive structural and cultural violence.

Certainly, where the DPA fails most acutely in terms of conflict transformational peacebuilding is in its narrow definition of peace. However, the DPA (and negotiations made by its architects) did set up several provisions and organizations to ensure its Annexes were upheld

and while some people may praise the DPA for its proactive response, this response has not been effective in the long term. According to Lederach, one problem with attempting to solve only the immediate problem is, “We may end up moving with a great sense of urgency but without a clear understanding of what our responses add up to. We may solve lots of immediate problems without necessarily creating any significant constructive social change” (28). The DPA and its subsequent implementation measures and organizations lacked the vision needed to create significant constructive social change. While the IFOR successfully pushed back troops of the different warring parties, over 14 years later, the same ethnic tensions remain and are perhaps even heightened. Rather than addressing deeper ethnic conflicts to ensure, at the very least, that another war would not break out, the DPA and the ways it has been implemented may have done much more harm than was intended.

Through examining the DPA as a form of peacebuilding and its failure to conform to a conflict transformation framework, I have laid out some of the basic tenants of conflict transformation. First, conflict transformation gains its name from the notion that conflict is a transformative force that does not have to be negative, but has the potential for positive change. Conflict transformation also operates under the theory that a conflict may be, and often is, indicative of a deeper problem; the response to the conflict can, and should, also observe and address the underlying patterns and relationship structures. Another important aspect to conflict transformation is its view of peace as not simply the absence of physical violence, but the absence of structural and cultural violence as well as the presence of measures or institutions to promote positive change. Lastly, for the purposes of this paper, another key feature of conflict transformation is a clear vision of the structural, cultural, and physical peace desired as a result of the constructive forces of conflict.

3.3 Youth's Transformative Peacebuilding Potential in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In this thesis, I argue that youth in BiH have the potential to be agents of positive and transformative social change. Several authors also examine the potential for youth to act as catalysts for positive, peaceful change in the work *Troublemakers or Peacemakers: Youth and Post-Accord Peace Building*, edited by Siobhan McEvoy-Levy. The authors of the various chapters discuss youth's complex roles in and after violent conflict. The theme that emerges throughout the volume is that youth are an important segment of the population that have the potential of positive transformative effects on conflict and societal attitudes.

Galtung argues youth often approach conflict in a unique way: "A very strong point for youth would be creativity coming from their less closed, more open mind" (274). Galtung's hope for youth's creativity is echoed in the rest of the *Troublemakers or Peacemakers* volume. He and others pose that because youth have less experience and less knowledge, they may be more idealistic than their realistic-oriented (and possibly pessimistic) adult counterparts (262). However, in BiH, youth are excluded from peacebuilding processes. Galtung argues, "A second strong point for youth would be positive, not only negative, peace. This would spill over into peace architecture, building structures and cultures of peace" (274). If peacebuilding efforts began to operate within a conflict transformation framework, according to Galtung, youth may be an invaluable source of building positive and lasting peace.

Galtung argues that youth occupy a unique position within society to be catalysts of peaceful societal change. He states, "But youth are, generally speaking, less inclined to see violence as normal and natural. The longer the remaining life span—life expectancy—the more vested one's interest is in creative and nonviolent ways of handling conflict at all levels." (265). His assertion particularly echoes the sentiments of conflict transformation. If youth inherently

have the capacity to nonviolently transform conflict, focusing on the structural violence plaguing youth in BiH becomes of utmost importance. According to this argument, if the obstacles blocking youth from becoming active members in society and active in peacebuilding efforts are alleviated, then BiH has a better chance of avoiding future violent conflict and addressing the root causes of the ongoing political and social conflicts.

As the situation stands today, youth in BiH are not typically included in peacebuilding efforts and they are certainly not represented within political parties. In fact, in many post-conflict countries, “Youth are invariably marginalized from political and economic decision making” (McEvoy-Levy 283). In BiH, not only are youth marginalized, they are frustrated with politicians. First name Pickering quotes a college student in Mostar working with a multiethnic NGO: “Youth need opportunities. Youth are fed up with politics. Politicians only make promises and never implement them” (155). With little active role in politics or the government, they are forced to take on a passive role in the rhetoric of the politicians, as the college student from Mostar recognizes. McEvoy-Levy argues, “Youth are more powerful as active conflict transformers” (287). In BiH, youth are not given the opportunity to be active conflict transformers.

In two cases of structural violence—a fractured higher education system and high levels of youth unemployment—the common result is that youth are inhibited from becoming productive members of society or conflict transformers. Both examples of structural violence are either a direct or indirect result of the DPA. The fractured higher education system mirrors the complex structure of the national, entity, and cantonal governments and high levels of youth unemployment are caused, in part, by the lack of a social safety net or government programs for the training of youth.

Each of these instances of structural violence is also indicative of the deeper conflicts within Bosnian society, namely the ethnic divisions in the country. Besides the potential capacity youth hold to look at conflict with an open mind, creatively, and as an opportunity for positive peace, Pickering's findings in the country indicate youth are more open to erasing ethnic divisions than adults in the country. For instance, through her survey of Bosniaks in the country Pickering found that, "The probability that an individual between 18 and 24 years old would express intolerance [of living next to someone of a different ethnic background] was 3 percent, while the probability that an individual 65 years old or older would express intolerance was 20 percent" (145). Youth's tolerance of other ethnic groups may mean they are more likely to address the underlying conflict of ethnic tensions in the country if given the opportunity to participate in peacebuilding efforts. Pickering's findings and Galtung's theories on youth's potentially positive and effective roles in peacebuilding mean that youth in BiH will likely have a positive effect on conflict transformational peacebuilding efforts if given the opportunity.

In Chapters 4 and 5 I discuss BiH's broken higher education system and its high rates of youth unemployment as two hindrances to youth's participation in peacebuilding efforts within the country. Both issues gravely affect youth in the country, leaving them without quality higher education and widely unemployed. Given their potential to have conflict transformative effects on peacebuilding efforts, the broken higher education system and the high youth unemployment in the country must be addressed if youth are to become active participants in peacebuilding.

Chapter 4. Higher Education in BiH: Broken and Disserving Youth

4.1 Introduction

As Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) continues to recover from the widespread devastation the war inflicted on the country, its youth are in a dismal position, unable to significantly shape or participate in the ongoing peacebuilding efforts. One way to improve youth's chances of becoming valuable members of Bosnian society and realizing their full potential is by addressing the ineffectual and broken higher education system in the country. With 46 countries signing the European Commission's higher education initiative, the Bologna Process, European countries recognize competitive higher education systems are essential to a country's growth. BiH is a signatory to the Bologna Process and has therefore made a commitment to reforming its higher education. Such a commitment directly benefits the well being of its youth. While the higher education system in the country has begun to reform, it still fails to meet the standards of the Bologna Process and therefore keeps its youth at a disadvantage, because they do not have access to the same quality higher education as youth in other European countries.

In this chapter, after a brief recent history of higher education and its current national structure, I discuss the reforms that the Bologna Process proscribes for higher education systems across Europe. Now an internationally recognized necessity, higher education reform is one avenue for progress in BiH. After providing a summary of the Bologna Process, I describe how BiH's higher education system falls short of the necessary reforms and the reasons for those short falls. I lastly discuss why higher education reform is a recognized priority of particular urgency in BiH. As Wayne Nelles writes, "Until as recently as 2002 in Bosnia and Herzegovina education was not viewed as essential for conflict prevention, security or peacebuilding" (230). Education builds the capacity of youth to participate in peacebuilding. Their potential

transformative capacity in the peacebuilding process must be tapped and encouraged and reformation of the higher education will provide such encouragement and capacity building.

While the situation in BiH and the European Union's policies currently cause difficulties for BiH citizens to obtain visas for travel to a foreign country, throngs of BiH citizens fled the country as refugees. Between 1996 and 2001, the initial years after the Bosnian War, 92,000 young adults left and 62% of those remaining "said that they too would leave if they had an opportunity to do so" (Kasumagic 377). The higher education system in BiH attempts to meet the need of the remaining young adults who wish to attend a four-year university. In turn, the higher education system—or lack thereof—in BiH poses many problems for the country as a whole and it is especially problematic for the youth in the country. Larisa Kasumagic's assertion that educated youth are the "only chance to escape from gradually sliding down the scale of human development" illustrate just how serious the problem of a broken higher education system is (377).

The country has gone through drastic "political-economic" changes in the last decade after World War II when the country—as part of the larger Yugoslavia—came under socialist regime, in the late 1980s when the socialist regime fell, and as a result of the war in the country (Tiplic & Welle-Strand 17). As a result, like many other aspects of BiH's society, the education system has gone through extensive changes and is still not functioning in an acceptable way. Before the war, education in BiH was based in "transmission" learning and teachers expected students to absorb information via lecture and graded them on successfully relating that information; the method in BiH was "rigid, traditional, and conservative" (Kasumagic 380). During the war, many different social systems failed including the education system in the country. Once the education system collapsed and the war went on, education materials were considered a luxury

next to the bare necessities families in BiH struggled to procure. Also, many students and teachers were killed during the war, displaced, or otherwise unable to attend school during the war (380). After the war and the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), the higher education system was restructured along with the rest of the socio-political aspects of the country.

Currently, the higher education system in BiH is extremely fragmented, complex and faces many problems. The complicated structure of the higher education system is one of the most fundamental issues with the system. With the division of the country into two entities (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska), 10 cantons (states), and a district, each has its own educational system without one unifying system at the federal level. Each of the five cantons with universities has “passed its own higher-education law and has its own education minister” along with the RS and the district of Brcko (Woodward). Therefore, each local government has its own laws, regulations, and political agendas for institutions of higher education. In a country where ethnic tensions run high, this fragmentation of education is especially dangerous.

4.2 The Bologna Process: A Model for Higher Education

The Bologna Process addresses many of the issues hindering BiH’s higher education system. The Bologna Process “is named after the Bologna Declaration, which was signed in the Italian city of Bologna on 19 June 1999 by ministers in charge of higher education from 29 European countries” (Bologna Process Website). Since then, an additional 17 countries, including BiH, have signed the Declaration and are therefore committed to implementing the

Bologna Process. The Bologna Process aims to foster a European Higher Education Area (EHEA). According to an informational leaflet produced by the Bologna Process website,

The overarching aim of the Bologna Process is to create a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) that promotes mobility; attracts students and staff from Europe as well as from other parts of the world; and is internationally competitive. It aims to do this by facilitating greater comparability and compatibility between the diverse higher education systems and institutions across Europe and by enhancing their quality. (3)

Essentially, the Bologna Process aims to unify higher education systems across countries to meet international standards. Each country has initiated or completed different aspects of the Bologna Process at its own rate. While concerns about the (considered by some) slow speed of implementing the reforms, after a meeting in Bergen in May 2005, “it was acknowledged that ‘Bologna’ overall has demonstrated remarkable success” (Keeling 207-08).

In signing the Bologna Process, BiH committed to reforming its higher education system. As I illustrate in this chapter, BiH’s higher education system lacks the quality, structure, and unity to meet the requirements of the Bologna Process, and as a result fails its youth. Since signing the Bologna Process in 2005, the BiH national government has failed to pass critical legislation to reform the higher education system (Sabanac 2). Multiple law drafts have been rejected, because governing bodies and committees, “could not reach consensus on that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina should have competency in the area of accreditation and licensing of higher education institutions” (Sabanac 2). Such unproductive attempts of reformation on the national level has led the RS and the cantons of the Federation of BiH to pass their own legislation to reach the goals laid forth in the Bologna Process. While this initiative shown on the part of entity and cantonal governments is fortunate, the higher education system continues to be segmented with no national legislation in place to unify it.

However, as of 2007, when BiH's latest "National Report on Higher Education" became available, the country's higher education system has made significant progress in meeting the requirements of the Bologna Process. For instance, as early as the 2003-2004 school year, some universities implemented the first two cycles (Bachelor's and Master's) of the three-cycle structure (Sabanac 1). In addition, universities previously comprised of loosely associated faculties have or are in the process of being legally integrated (5). These measures, while only a start, demonstrate the potential for change in the higher education system in BiH.

As the Bologna Process calls for a European Higher Education Area, BiH's system experiences inhibited mobility of professors and students to teach, study, or research out of country (Sabanac 24). Since one objective of the Bologna Process is to promote mobility within the EHEA, BiH's students' and teachers' immobility hurts the progress of the higher education system. The two main obstacles blocking Bosnians movement within the EHEA are a lack of necessary funds and the immense difficulty Bosnians face obtaining visas for travel in many EHEA countries (24). The strict visa regulations Bosnians face have caused a halt in the mobility of all citizens. In the spirit of academic sharing and learning, it is in the interest of the signatories of the Bologna Process to lift the visa restrictions prohibiting Bosnians from teaching and studying outside of their country. Visa restrictions are a major roadblock to BiH's integration within the European Community.

BiH is just starting to make the reformations needed to meet the Bologna Process standards, but with every unifying law rejected or country wide educational cooperation halted, BiH's youth are put at a disadvantage compared to youth in other European countries. Until the national government puts legislation in place to ensure BiH meets the standards of the Bologna Process, it blatantly ignores the future of its youth, the future of the country.

4.3 The Current System: Fragmented, Ineffective, and Hurting Youth

In an international climate of recognition of the importance of higher education reformation, the Bosnian system is strikingly broken. In this section, I describe the current state of the higher education system and why it persists. As with many aspects of Bosnian society, the Dayton Peace Accords ensured a complicated and fragmented structure for the higher education system. The DPA failed to use higher education as an opportunity to unite the country and as a platform for transformative peacebuilding. In this section, I discuss the fragmentation of the higher education system as a result of the DPA and politicians' continuing resistance to unify the system. I then lay out the resulting problems from this fragmentation including keeping ethnic groups separate, which results in underfunding for the universities, and alienating Bosnians who left the country and wish to return.

Like many other aspects of socio-political life, the country's complex and ethnically divided government negatively influences the higher education system. As laid out by the DPA, the three major ethnic groups have a certain amount of power in the country and entity governments. According to, Lamija Tanovic, a professor at University of Sarajevo and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party in BiH, "Under the current constitutional arrangement, any nationalist group can stop anything in this country... On many higher-education issues, there has been no progress at all because of these funny games they play in Parliament" (qtd. in Woodward). Many other educators and students echo Tanovic's sentiment; with such nationalist agendas from politicians, reforms to the higher education system have failed. In 2004, Bosnian politicians did not pass the legislation to modernize the higher education system required by the World Bank to receive a \$12 million loan (Woodward). Instead of acting in the best interest of its youth, Bosnian politicians instead refused to budge from their ultra-nationalist positions.

In an even more overt way to stall progress in the education system, post-DPA aid mandated to go towards the transformation of the higher education system went elsewhere (Cilliers 183). In that case, the leaders of the country had the means to accelerate reform, but ignored the needs of the youth of the country. In addition to mismanaging funds, politicians also block measures that would unite the country and ultimately centralize the higher education system. The Bosnian Serb leaders generally try to avoid passing legislation that would give any more power to the national government and away from the entity government. In particular, they have resisted creating a national accreditation agency for Bosnia's universities (Woodward). This perpetuation of fragmentation of the higher education system, as already examined, causes logistical, financial, and functional problems for the country's higher education system.

Fourteen years after the end of the war and the signing of the DPA, funding has emerged as a major problem for universities in BiH. In the years following the DPA, funds from countries and organizations did enter the country for reconstruction, but those funds were either not geared towards education reconstruction or the funders had a very "narrow vision" for the funds (Cilliers 188-9). Funding for universities from within the country have not been successful in transforming the higher education system either. Even though BiH has eight public universities (and other private institutions emerging), the country's government only provides a fraction of the funds necessary to run the universities. In fact, the national government does not provide funding, but rather the cantonal and entity governments provide funding for their own universities (Tiplic & Welle-Strand 21). There is no national laws regulating how much funding cantons and entities provide their universities, so disparities among universities persist.

Under funding also stems from the ethnically divided higher education system. In both Sarajevo and Mostar, two universities serve different ethnic groups (Cilliers 185). For instance,

only a small group of Bosniaks and Croat students study at the University of East Sarajevo located in Pale (the Bosnian Serbs' "wartime capital") and Serbs are under represented at the University of Sarajevo, which mainly serves Bosniaks and Croats (Woodward). As a result of division of universities among ethnic lines, the cantons must split funds between the different universities. According to an interviewee asked about the divided system, the multiple universities are "draining the resources of the country and taking away funds that should be applied to other educational programs" (Cilliers 186). As this interviewee (and other interviewees in the study) points out, rather than expanding programs in a single university for all students, those funds are not available for such progress in education.

Inadequate funding has led faculties to finance themselves. For example, English departments hold language classes for the public and engineering and economics departments earn money from consulting projects (Woodward). As a result, the professors are not able to offer quality time outside of class to their students, because they are busy raising funds for individual faculties. Unifying the education system will hopefully lead to more secure salaries for educators as standards are raised in all areas of higher education. Until then, teachers unable to provide support to their students outside of the classroom will also not be able to encourage dialogue across ethnic lines. While some teachers find the time to travel between universities, such as the ethnically divided University of Sarajevo and University of East Sarajevo, many are not able to collaborate in such a way (Kasumagic 380-1).

Aside from funding, another serious cause for concern that has persisted in the years since the war is the issue of brain drain in the country. Not only did the war physically destroy much of the country, it also destroyed the basis of the higher education system. The brain drain, or the emigration of a large portion of the educated community, has severely affected higher

education in BiH. After the war, a “majority of students and academic staff” left the war-ruined country (Tiplic & Welle-Strand 19-20). With high numbers of unemployment, not only did young Bosnians leave the country, many found and are finding it hard to return. Often when they try to return to the country and work at a university, it will not employ them.

Two reasons account for this interesting and all too common occurrence of foreign educated Bosnians facing adversity in finding employment at universities. First, public universities in BiH do not recognize university diplomas from other countries (Woodward). Because of the fragmented structure of higher education in the country, no common standards among universities (or faculties within a university) exist. According to the one time director of education in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Bosnia, Claude Kieffer, the three commonalities among universities reviewing foreign diplomas are the slowness of the process, the high costs to review a diploma, and the overwhelming likelihood that a diploma will be rejected (Woodward). While signing the Bologna Process indicates that this practice should change, so far foreign diplomas go largely unrecognized in BiH.

Not only does BiH lack the laws governing recognition of foreign diplomas, the universities generally do not seem interested in enticing those with foreign diplomas back to the country. According to Kieffer, “People don't want to hire individuals who have better qualifications than they themselves do, because they fear the competition” (qtd. in Woodward). Not only has the government failed to accommodate their ex-patriots who wish to return to the country and assist in rebuilding it, the some educators themselves block progress. Without the willingness to welcome educated Bosnians back to the country, it is not likely that the higher education system—and as a result the county's economic and social sector—will progress.

4.4 Failure of Post-Accord Peacebuilding to Utilize Higher Education

In his interviews with local peacebuilders and educators, Jaco Cillier found that the troubling situation of the higher education system in BiH stems from the DPA and post-accord peacebuilding efforts that failed to adequately address rebuilding the education system. The first mistake that the DPA's drafters made was not involving local educators in designing post-war reconstruction efforts. International actors who designed reconstruction efforts for the education system did not consult local educators (Cilliers 185). Local educators' and students' lack of involvement in the design and implementation of post-war education reconstruction efforts led to an apathetic and passive attitude towards the efforts.

Kasumagic poses the question, can you criticize these young people "for their passivity and lack of initiative?" (381). She argues that the regional and international community cannot criticize young people, because they were never involved in efforts to reconstruct their education system. The current state and structure of the higher education system does not offer an opportunity for young people to develop relationships and dialogue across ethnic lines nor does it even offer a viable and cohesive structure within to learn. The issue here is that higher education institutions offer a way for youth to contribute to peacebuilding efforts: "Education institutions are powerful mechanisms that, on the one hand, can often hinder long-term peace-building efforts or, on the other hand, can constructively influence young people to work toward a peaceful future and coexistence" (Cilliers 174). The education institutions in BiH hinder rather than promote peacebuilding among youth.

In light of the fact that higher education institutions have the ability to promote peacebuilding among youth, addressing the broken higher education system can have important effects. As this thesis argues, youth can have an integral role in peacebuilding if given the

opportunity. Not only will mending the broken education system give youth the opportunity to learn, grow, and develop a vision for their future, it will offer them a vehicle through which to contribute to the peacebuilding process in their country. Reforming the education system in BiH has the potential to lead to major advancement in peacebuilding efforts by tapping into the potential of the country's youth.

As the education system stands, it hinders peacebuilding efforts. This unfortunate hindrance is not an accident or a coincidence: "Leaders often use education systems to ensure that divisions and negative stereotypes are reinforced" (Cilliers 173). Political leaders in BiH—"representing" their ethnic groups—have prevented reform to take place within the education system. This poses a major roadblock to youth involvement in peacebuilding, and as discussed previously in this thesis ("Conflict Transformation: a Different Approach to Peacebuilding"), youth can have a potentially significant positive influence on peacebuilding efforts. By preventing interethnic dialogue within higher education institutions, politicians do not give youth the opportunity to transform the deep ethnic conflicts within the country.

From the very beginning of reconstruction efforts, educators and students were not given a voice in the peacebuilding process. As their voices are further silenced, transformative peacebuilding efforts are seriously hindered. Education institutions offer a proven and concrete forum for peacebuilding. They are also institutions heavily populated by youth. Just as the broken higher education system does not foster an environment conducive to peacebuilding, neither does the high youth unemployment rates in the country. In Chapter 5 I discuss the links between a broken higher education system and youth unemployment and also further illustrate how both are hindering youth from acting as peacebuilders in BiH.

Chapter 5. Youth Unemployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Chronic Problem

Relatively high rates of youth unemployment are not unique to developing and transitioning economies. Even in the most advanced economies, youth typically experience higher rates of unemployment than their adult counterparts. Youth unemployment has been thoroughly studied in advanced economies, which recognize high levels of youth unemployment as a threat to the future of their country's growth. However, developing and transition economies, such as BiH, are not understood or studied as thoroughly as advanced economies and therefore less is known about the reasons and cures for high unemployment, especially in youth. Because this thesis asserts that Bosnian youth are the future and key to successful, transformative peacebuilding efforts, the extremely high rate of youth unemployment in the country needs to be examined, understood, and eradicated. It is also important to view youth unemployment in conjunction with the importance for higher education reformation. Placing these two issues as priorities in BiH will enable Bosnian youth to lead the country in peacebuilding and developing their country into a prosperous and peaceful nation.

In the first section of this chapter, I discuss youth employment in BiH in relation to other transition economies, the reasons for high levels of youth unemployment in BiH, and highlight the unfortunate lack of gender and ethnic specific research in relation to youth unemployment. Next, I extensively discuss BiH's "shadow economy." Also, referred to the country's "grey market," the shadow economy describes the "illegal" activities in which Bosnians who are otherwise unemployed take part. In this section, I focus on how the shadow economy, which accounts for a significant portion of BiH's economy, affects youth and essentially forces them to engage in illegal activity. Lastly, I consider how, if youth unemployment is addressed, youth's capacity to contribute to the peacebuilding process in the country will increase significantly.

5.1 Reasons for Youth Unemployment, Only Beginning to be Understood

For youth in general all over the world, unemployment rates are two to three times higher than the unemployment rates for adults. Also, in advanced economies, under-educated youth usually account most of the unemployed youth (Fares & Tionson 2). In transition economies such as BiH, the situation of youth unemployment is even further complicated by many factors discussed in this section. In 2007, the World Bank produced a background paper to the *2007 World Development Report* entitled “Youth Unemployment, Labor Market Transitions, and Scarring: Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2001-2004.” It uses data from the Living in BiH/Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) conducted from 2001 to 2004 including over 4,800 working age respondents (2). Other sources cited in this chapter also use the LSMS to find rates and causes of youth unemployment (Pugh “Transformation” & Gurbuzer & Nihan Koseleci). While the survey and its analysis certainly has its limitations (most notably, a relatively small respondent size), it also offers a unique view into the complexities of a transition economy, especially with respect to working age youth, referred to in the World Bank paper as 15 to 24 year olds. While this range is off from my definition of youth (18 to 29 year olds), it serves the purpose of illustrating the severe hardships Bosnian youth face when attempting to leave unemployment. Unfortunately, the LSMS and the articles that use data from the LSMS do not fully take into account the shadow economy in BiH that I later examine as another contributing factor to complicated youth unemployment rates. Despite the.. the LSMS has had a significant effect on the understanding of the Bosnian economy and labor market.

The characteristics of youth unemployment in BiH are consistent with other transition economies in Europe and especially consistent with other Southeast European countries. For

instance, in the transition economies of Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, and Slovakia, youth unemployment is greater than 35% (Fares & Tiongson 3). To give readers an understanding of the severity of youth unemployment in transition economies in Europe, the World Bank background paper offers the following ratios: in 2002, the ratio of youth to adult unemployment in European Union (EU) countries was just under two to one; the ratio is 2.2 to one in EU accession countries; and the ratio is generally higher in Southeast European countries, including BiH (3-4). Fares and Tiongson also stress how severe youth unemployment is in Southeast Europe. Even after a decade of beginning the transition to a capitalist, free market economy, countries in Southeast Europe had (and have) twice the youth unemployment rate as EU countries and these transition economies have alarmingly large and increasing pools of unemployed young people (4). BiH's economy, from where much of the data on youth unemployment was collected in the region, has clearly not been able to handle the serious problem of high youth unemployment rates.

One apparent problem with youth unemployment that emerged from the LSMS was the relatively long unemployment spells for Bosnian youth. In fact, the long unemployment spells of Bosnian youth is one of the major problems facing the economy and youth of the country as well as the country's future (Gurbuzer & Nihan Koseleci 1). The reasons for long periods of unemployment vary from region to region and vary depending on several other factors such as displacement as a result of the war. With 70% of Bosnian youth unemployed for more than a year in 2004, long spells of youth unemployment is quite clearly and undeniably a chronic, widespread problem in the country (Gurbuzer & Nihan Koseleci 2).

Several factors contribute to the high probability that Bosnian youth experience long periods of unemployment compared to their adult counterparts. First, young men displaced from

their towns of origin are more likely to suffer from long unemployment spells more so than young men who were not displaced as a result of the Bosnian War (Gurbuzer & Nihan Koseleci 19). In their paper, “What hides behind extended periods of youth unemployment? Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Leman Yonca Gurbuzer and Ozge Nihan Koseleci cite several reasons for this phenomenon of displaced young men experiencing longer spells of unemployment compared to those young men who were never displaced from their hometowns, cities, or villages. Reasons include: displaced people (in general) leave villages unwillingly and often without the ability to prepare materially or psychologically (19); they are often cut off from their home village once displaced, losing a source of support (19); displaced people generally move from their home villages as a family rather than the chain-migration that typically occurs when families leave their homes, causing difficulty in establishing social networks, finances, etc. (19); and displaced people do not necessarily have the skills needed to find employment in a new environment (19-20). Displacement has a particularly harsh effect on young men compared to adults already in the labor market, because without higher education or vocational training, they are often totally unprepared for a new environment while their parents may have established skills. Women, for reasons I will discuss later, do not seem to be affected by migration in relation to finding employment (20).

As one might expect, level of education attainment directly impacts working age individuals’ ability to leave unemployment more rapidly and stay out of unemployment. The link between education attainment and employment is particularly important for young people in BiH. Referring to the LSMS, Fares and Tiongson assert, “The results also suggest that education facilitates transitions into employment, reduce the likelihood of becoming unemployed, and lower the exit out of the labor force” (11). These three reasons pose strong evidence of the

importance of secondary and higher education in employment in BiH. Gurbuzer and Nihan Koseleci conclude from the same LSMS survey that education is essential for both young men and women (13). However, Fares and Tiongson, as well as other scholars, have conflicting views on the importance of education for young women. This thesis later discusses the specific roles (or lack-there-of) and challenges of young women in BiH's economy.

Gurbuzer and Nihan Koseleci also find more specific links of the higher education system in BiH to the transition to employment for Bosnian youth. According to them, the education system in BiH “does not provide opportunities to combine initial education and work” (18). As a result, while having a higher education degree is associated with leaving unemployment more rapidly than without a degree, the education system in BiH fails its young people by not offering a smooth transition between higher education and employment. Regardless, both Fares and Tiongson and Gurbuzer and Nihan Koseleci come to the conclusion that “educational attainment is generally associated with more favorable labor market outcomes” (Fares & Tiongson 17).

As in many societies—including developed, transitioning, and developing societies—women traditionally inhabit a separate space from men in BiH. While this thesis's aim is not to delve into the details of the reasons for the separate and often-unequal roles women fill in Bosnian society and culture, it is a significant issue that affects Bosnian youth in particular. Numbers of women in the workforce and employment are significantly lower than that of men (Fares & Tiongson 10). Traditional gender roles in BiH—as a result of patriarchy in religion and society—have kept women from entering and staying in the work force as frequently and at the same rates as men.

This high rate of unemployment for women (over 40% between 2001 and 2004) is particularly disconcerting for the peacebuilding process in BiH. Continuing with Galtung's theory that youth often have the ideals necessary for effective peacebuilding, banishment of a significant amount of the youth population to the home, or private sphere, and out of the public sphere cannot help the post-conflict transformative peace process. Even more disheartening is the fact that despite skills or education level, women always have higher rates of unemployment than men (Fares & Tiongson 10). Despite levels of education attainment, women are kept out of the public sphere and therefore out of the peacebuilding process. Galtung theorizes that young women can have a particularly transformative effect in conflict (275). Through these unfortunate realities, BiH's economy and peacebuilding process lacks important educated human resources.

5.2 Shades of Gray in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Shadow Economy

With the recent "economic crisis" shaking the financial systems of the world, putting transition and developing economies into focus may not be the priority of many western financial specialists. While advanced economies struggle to regain the strength they previously had, transition and developing economies are still struggling with even bigger implications and bigger losses (either from the global financial crisis, their long-term struggling economies, or both). Such is the case in BiH. While the youth in western countries struggle to find employment and find themselves with unemployment rates above 10%, the youth in BiH have—and continue—to face astronomical unemployment rates upwards of at least 50%. This high number is not only a result of the global economic crisis, but primarily of the devastating war that destroyed many aspects of Bosnian culture and life, including its economy.

I saw the struggles young people in BiH face finding employment firsthand during the summer of 2009. Most of my friends aged 18 to 30 were unemployed, saw periodic employment, or were unstably employed in BiH's shadow economy. Even those who were employed—whether in the legitimate or shadow economy—were often underpaid and easily disposable. My friend, Anto, works eight-hour days at an Internet café for 10 Bosnian convertible marks, or about seven U.S. dollars, per day. His low pay is offset by the fact that as a 27-year-old, he lives with his parents. His 25-year-old brother also lived at home, but was completely unemployed. He had previously worked in the shadow economy as a repairman (an all encompassing term for odd-jobs his employer gave him). Unfortunately, their situations are not unique in BiH.

Unemployment is traditionally viewed as unemployment in the legal labor market. BiH's economy, however, is fueled not only by legally recognized businesses and organizations, but also by a very significant black and "gray" market. The CIA World Fact Book places BiH's unemployment rate in 2009 at 40%. However, it also notes if the gray sector of the economy (also known as the "shadow economy") was included in calculating the unemployment rate, it may be 25-30 per cent (CIA World Fact Book). Whether or not the unemployment rate includes the gray market, it is much higher than in established economies. Still, youth unemployment rates across labor markets, both established and transitioning, are typically two to three times higher than the national unemployment rates (Fares & Tiongson 2). Youth unemployment is also complicated by many factors such as household income, rural versus urban areas, and gender of youth. For example, young women are much more likely to be unemployed or stay out of the formal work force in BiH (3).

As with many, if not all, sectors of governance and life in BiH, the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) set BiH's economy up for, essentially, failure. According to Michael Pugh, "Dayton's complex constitutional arrangements fragmented the market and its economic governance" (448). As with BiH's education system—particularly its higher education system—the DPA set up a complicated structure under which BiH's economy functions. It was left fragmented and the lack of cohesion, among other reasons, has continued to negatively affect the growth of the economy. Ten years after the DPA and also as of 2010, "GDP per capita in BiH was only 50 per cent of its pre-war level" (453). While the effects of the DPA on BiH's economy have been detrimental to all Bosnians—of all ethnicities—Bosnian youth have suffered considerably more than adult counterparts.

Youth in all countries and cultures are an indispensable group because they represent the future of their respective countries and cultures and therefore the struggling Bosnian economy should be viewed not only in terms of the economy at large, but how it affects the country's youth. In order for Bosnian youth to take part in the peacebuilding process in BiH, they must be both educated and employable: two characteristics they currently lack. The dynamics of BiH's economy with a large gray and black market complicate matters even more. However, not enough research has been conducted on the link between youth capacity and employment in the gray and black markets.

During the Balkan wars of the 1990s, the region's countries developed a large wartime economy. This wartime economy has carried over into BiH's supposedly peacetime economy in the form of the informal, or shadow, economy. Unlike the usual connotations of a "black market," all aspects of BiH's shadow economy are not as morally decrepit as activities like human and drug trafficking and other gang and mafia activity. Michael Pugh notes:

Policies that add to social stress and reliance on crime are legitimized, while economic survival through shadow economic activity is criminalized. Indeed southeast Europe's political economies seem to have been archived as 'criminal', and regional traffickers and corrupt political leaders have been held responsible by peacebuilding agencies for resistance to economic modernization and integration with the world economy. (Pugh "Transformation" 456)

Pugh refers to the original framework of the DPA and the continuing economic model the international community has imposed on BiH's post-conflict economy as a source of the continued strength of the shadow economy. As with many aspects of BiH's post-conflict government and culture, the shadow economy represents a complicated and moral challenge for local, national, and international governments. Because policies have essentially forced Bosnians to enter the shadow economy, it cannot be discounted as immoral, unnecessary, and the fault of participants in the shadow economy.

The shadow economy in BiH does not account for a small fraction of the country's economy. Rather, estimates put the shadow economy accounting for 50-60% of the countries GDP per capita (Nitzschke & Studdard 229). Because the shadow economy in BiH is so prevalent, it needs to be viewed as a driving force in BiH's economic development. Similar to other aspects of Bosnian life, the shadow economy persists because of the government's incapacity to adequately serve all citizens of its country. Informal and shadow economies in transition and developing economies are often difficult to eradicate because they fill a void the government has left unfilled: economic opportunity and social benefits (Nitzschke & Studdard 230). In BiH, this void filled by the shadow economy is recognized by the CIA World Fact Book, which reported the unemployment rate in 2009 was 40%, but noted that if the grey (shadow) economy was accounted for, the rate could drop to 25-30%. Pugh believes that in 2003, the shadow economy in BiH may have reduced the unemployment rate from 43%, the number that did not take into account the shadow economy, to as low as 16 to 20% (Pugh

“Transformation” 456). Unfortunately many factors, including lack of data, leave these rates as estimates only. Whether or not the shadow economy brings the unemployment rate of BiH below 20%, it clearly accounts for a large portion of the economy and many individuals are active in the shadow economy in addition to (or instead of) the legitimate economy.

BiH’s shadow economy, like shadow economies of other transitioning countries, is composed of three different aspects: “organized mafia rackets and trafficking,” “corruption, fraud and nepotism in business and public life,” and “the coping or survival shadow economies (including black markets in employment and trade) of the population at large” (Pugh “Transformation” 457). While individuals both nationally and internationally with a vested interest in the economic recovery of BiH will agree that the first two aspects of the shadow economy must be eradicated, the third coping or survival shadow economy offers a morally ambiguous challenge to economic development (and development at large) in the country. Many people who engage in shadow economic activities are forced to do so because of the chronic unemployment in the country. Also, the shadow economy in BiH is not a necessarily “bad” force in the country. According to one scholar who has studied the effects of the shadow economy in the Republika Srpska, “[It] increases productivity and employment, improves the variety of goods and services, and reduces social inequalities. Shadow activities increase the Republika Srpska’s income by more than 50 percent and enhance personal consumption, living standards, and overall demand” (Rajko Tomas qtd. in Pugh “Shadow Economies” 57). Since the shadow economy in the RS, and in the country at large, fills voids the government and “legal” economy have not been able to fill, it cannot be disregarded as simply criminal, immoral, and wrong.

The shadow economy in BiH is still essentially and technically illegal. Because the shadow economy is so extensive in BiH, its government loses significant amounts of money in tax revenue each year and therefore does not have the financial or human resources to expand the legitimate economy. The shadow economy in BiH also hinders accountability and transparency within the country, its government, and its economy and is thus a “threat” to democracy (Pugh “Transformation” 456). In combination, due to the revenue the government loses to the shadow economy and the transparency it takes away, the country continues to be dependent on foreign aid (Nitzschke & Studdard 230). Given these problems and dependencies that come with the extensive shadow economy in BiH, it must be handled in an adequate way when forming new policy so that the government can create alternatives to participation in the shadow economy (234).

The shadow economy complicates matters like unemployment rates and also how the labor market operates. Its implications on young people have complicated effects as well. Earlier in this section I discussed how youth are in a particularly vulnerable position in labor markets in all different types of economies, but especially in developing and transitioning economies. Participation in a shadow economy does not offer the same benefits as participation in legitimate economies. It is also difficult to estimate just how many youth are unemployed in the legitimate economy, but otherwise employed in the shadow economy. Because it composes such a large part of the Bosnian economy, the shadow economy must be taken into account as new studies are conducted. In combination with focusing on youth’s position in the economy, focusing on the shadow economy will help economists, scholars, and the BiH government formulate legislation and measures to move the economy forward.

5.3 Negative Implications of Youth Unemployment and Peacebuilding

As in all societies, unemployment leads to many negative consequences and because of the high rates of youth unemployment in BiH, the negative consequences of unemployment begin early in life for youth. In a regional context, “Longer-term consequences of unemployment and inactivity may have an impact not only on individuals’ future outcomes in the labor market but also on the longer-term stability of the region” (Fares & Tionson 6). This statement is indicative not only of the economic stability of the region, but also the political and social stability of the region as a whole. Because unemployment, especially youth unemployment, is extremely widespread in BiH, it becomes a collective problem. Youth unemployment is a systemic failure as a result of the DPA and continuing ethnic tensions perpetuated by BiH’s political leaders. As noted in the introduction of this paper, the inability for the Bosnian government to pass measures required by the World Bank to receive a loan to, among other activities, stimulate the economy is a result of DPA’s reinforcement of continuing ethnic divisions within the government.

The ramifications of the inability of displaced young men to find employment on the peacebuilding process in BiH are significant. Johan Galtung purports, “To be young is to have less past and more future, less trauma suffered and inflicted and more hope” (262). Galtung argues these are reasons why youth in post-conflict societies are often more able to lead peacebuilding efforts. Displacement contributes to stress and often-negative experiences of individuals, and young people in particular. As noted above, Gurbuzer and Koseleci discuss the many reasons why displaced youth find it difficult to exit unemployment spells and as a result displaced and unemployed youth may have less hope and more trauma—according to Galtung, two components that may have an adverse effect on individuals’ capacities for peacebuilding.

The purpose of this thesis is not to propose how to eradicate youth unemployment, but rather to illustrate why eradicating youth unemployment is important. Because “extended duration of unemployment may also be associated with social problems such as crime, violence, and drug abuse among others,” it is an issue worth addressing (Gurbuzer & Nihan Koseleci 1). The negative social problems long periods of unemployment pose are especially dangerous for youth. As noted above, Galtung theorizes youth’s generally less traumatic experiences leads them to be more idealistic rather than pessimistic. If a large proportion of youth are unemployed and it results in youth involvement in crime, violence, and drug abuse, youth’s traumatic experiences are more frequent and serious. Galtung believes “Violence has to be learned. Young people watch how adults handle conflicts, assuming that what they see is normal and natural” (Galtung 268). The earlier youth are put in a position of violence, the earlier they assume it is “normal and natural.” Because unemployment has the potential to lead to violence, large numbers of youth are at risk of normalizing violence. Also, Galtung suggests traumatic experiences (such as crime and drug use) negatively affect individuals’ capacity to view conflict as a vehicle for positive change.

Youth’s potential to contribute to a conflict transformative model of peacebuilding relies on their unique capacity to hope for a peaceful and prosperous country. Increasingly, young people in the country “believe that the social issues at hand defy solution” (Kasumagic 379). Quite frankly, they have no reason to believe BiH’s government is adequately addressing the immense social issue of widespread youth unemployment, which does not statistically improve as youth transition into adulthood. The high levels of youth unemployment, especially in the formal economy, keep their voice in the public sphere essentially silent. As in other post-accord

countries, while youth's potential in transformative peacebuilding is high, it is often untapped, leading to apathy and low self-confidence (McEvoy-Levy 289).

In her observations of youth in peace accord countries, Sibohan McEvoy-Levy notes: "In each case security is not viewed simply as freedom from physical violence/militarization but is also intertwined with economic survival and opportunity and with perceptions of positive self-worth" (286). This observation presents the complicated view youth hold regarding their security. It also reveals that without addressing youth unemployment, youth will not feel secure. Having already experienced the trauma of a war as children, chronic youth unemployment compounds this trauma, leaving youth unable to fully participate in peacebuilding processes.

While this thesis argues that youth can play an indispensable part in Lederach's theory of conflict transformational peacebuilding, youth cannot be expected to build peace in the country if they are battling personal unemployment and poverty. In order to involve youth in the peacebuilding process, BiH's government needs to place youth in a position of personal financial and physical security. As long as youth face the violence associated with unemployment and the constant struggle to find secure employment in the shadow or formal economy, they will not have the capacity to join the peacebuilding process in the country.

In terms of peacebuilding, widespread participation in the shadow economy could have negative effects on youth in the country. The youth in Bosnia are not exposed to situations in which to be hopeful. Rather they are either unemployed all together, employed in the shadow economy, or (if they are very lucky) employed in the legitimate economy. Because youth in BiH are faced with the difficult task of finding employment either in the legitimate or shadow economy and, if involved in the latter, taking part in essentially criminal activity, they are being shaped by what has the potential to be a very negative experience. As Bosnian youth participate

in the shadow economy (whether out of desperation or by choice), they add to their collective traumatic experience that has continued since the signing of the DPA.

Conclusion

A broken education system and high levels of youth unemployment are two of the most challenging issues youth in BiH face. They are not indicative of youth's motivation or capabilities, but rather of systemic problems rooted in the Bosnian government and society since before the war. Although these are problems that other groups—whether defined by ethnic, age, or socioeconomic status—also continue to face, addressing youth unemployment and an inadequate higher education system are two ways to build youth's capacity to help move the country forward. Their potential to transform the ongoing ethnic tensions in the country needs to be tapped. Giving youth better economic and educational opportunities will lead to higher self-worth and transform them into a productive segment of the population.

While high ethnic tensions have not always defined the country, the DPA ensured ethnic divisions would be a lasting characteristic of Bosnian government. The DPA set the precedent for many subsequent peacebuilding efforts: international intervention that does not take fully into account the underlying deep conflicts within society. Addressing youth unemployment and reforming the higher education system are not necessarily peacebuilding efforts in themselves, but will enable youth to participate in peacebuilding activities in the future. Because both issues are rooted in systemic failure, youth cannot be expected to lift themselves out of their current situation. Their inability to address these issues should not be confused with total apathy or a lack of motivation.

While the DPA did not view youth as a powerful peacebuilding force, scholars such as Siobhan McEvoy-Levy and Johan Galtung beg to differ. They argue that youth, by virtue of their capacity for idealism and looking towards the future, are in a special position to address

conflict. McEvoy points out that despite this position, they are often forced to take a passive role in political and peacebuilding processes. Indeed, Bosnian youth are not able to participate in processes that determine their own future and are left, to a certain extent, helpless in shaping the future of their country.

Rather than viewing youth as passive participants in Bosnian society, McEvoy suggests their capacity to be “active transformers” needs to be fostered (287). Lederach and Galtung’s theories of conflict transformation are not currently applied to peacebuilding efforts in BiH. Perhaps peacebuilding efforts in the country thus far have relied too heavily upon the government for a conflict transformational approach to peacebuilding to be successful. Unlike their political leaders, youth have a greater capacity to view conflict as a force for positive change. As “active transformers,” they can shape their country’s future from that of perpetually ethnically divided to a society where not only do ethnic groups live in physical peace with one another, they work together to build positive peace in the cultural and structural aspects of the country.

Empowering youth through education and economic security are two ways to place youth in a position to be active transformers. Without addressing these two issues, youth cannot be expected to collectively use their power as transformers to build peace. By giving youth the capacity to build their own successful futures through education and employment, they can focus on transforming the conflicts still facing their country 14 years after their leaders signed the DPA. While the DPA addressed some of the presenting episodes of the conflict in BiH, it has failed to transform the conflicts, specifically the ethnic tensions in the country, into positive peace and constructive change. Utilizing youth’s capacity to transform conflict has the potential to move peacebuilding activities from unsuccessful efforts to flourishing social change.

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