Nationalism, Violence and Cosmopolitanism

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes nationalism's intricate relationship with violence and a worldview – cosmopolitanism – that can be used to create a more peaceful world order. Using theories of nationalism, the thesis investigates nationalism's origins and seeks to explain why the nation is an important taken-for-granted framework. The following section suggests that nationalism is not inherently violent but under certain socio-economic and political conditions, often found in weak states, violent nationalism will arise. This thesis also considers the implications of migration on nationalist structural violence in developed countries. It suggests that there is a lack of conceptualization of structural violence when addressing nationalist violence in the current literature. Using Galtung's conceptualization of violence broadens the cases of violence and includes violent nationalism in places such as developed Europe. Thus, the thesis presents a cosmopolitan framework to address some of the issues of nationalist violence at the individual level. Using the idea that respect and acknowledgement of identities are at the core of cosmopolitanism, the final parts suggest that a cosmopolitan nationalism would help to create a less violent world order.

"The age of nations is past. The task before us, if we would not perish, is to build the earth."

- Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J.

To many, Father Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's contention that the idea of the nation is outdated or unnecessary might appear absurd. One need only look back at the most recent FIFA World Cup tournament in South Africa and ask an Englishman (or woman) if the English nation exists or not. Surely, while chanting songs of former English (often imaginary) exploits on the field, the answer would be a resounding "Yes!" This anecdote could be replicated throughout a large number of so-called nations at the World Cup or even across the world (with varying degrees of success of course.) That is to say, at least at the individual level, nationalism remains and will remain a relevant fixture of political and social life for as long as people *feel* that they belong to a nation. While this feeling of belonging, in and of itself, is not dangerous, nationalism's historical record over the past century can certainly be alarming.

Nationalism has marked several of the bloody conflicts of the twentieth century. As the twenty first century begins to unfold, the specter of nationalist-inspired violence continues to loom throughout the world. Wherever this violence occurs – within states, across states, in Africa, in Europe, or North America – the toll on human life and infrastructure is often unimaginably high. Worse yet, the scars such violence leaves often exacerbate tensions and undermine prospects for post-violence reconciliation between conflicting nations or groups. This, perhaps, is the essence of Teilhard de Chardin's often quoted line. It is not so much that nations are irrelevant; rather, nationalism poses challenges that can, perhaps stated too alarmingly, destroy us. Certainly, addressing the challenges that face humanity this century – water shortages, food insecurity, global climate change – will necessitate concerted efforts by all governments and people. The aspects of nationalism that perpetuate violence need to be carefully

analyzed and separated so that, as Teilhard de Chardin declared, we do not parish but rather build the Earth.

For this task, I will put forward a theory for the transcendence of violent nationalism by, first, exploring the roots of nationalism and nations. It will then be necessary to examine some distinct factors – both at the group and individual level – that move people to commit acts of nationalist violence. I will then offer a brief political and moral conception of cosmopolitanism as a way to divorce violence from nationalism so as to create a moderate nationalism based on respect and dignity for other groups.

Nations and Nationalism

To attempt to develop a theory for the transcendence of violent nationalism, one needs a conceptualization of nations and of nationalism. Both are, first of all, ideas. As ideas, or concepts, scholars will attempt to define the boundaries of the meaning of the terms. Yet, by this virtue, there will never be a consensus on a clear definition of the terms. People will highlight or deemphasize distinct aspects of the concepts of nations and nationalism, as they believe important or not. It is essential to understand this, for time and people transform ideas and enhance understanding of concepts over time. The ideas of nations and nationalism, nonetheless, have real implications for the world. Whether or not nations, for instance, are fabricated by industrialization, as Ernest Gellner has famously argued, is crucial to understanding why nationalism has motivated people to commit atrocities in the modern area because to address a problem one needs to know its roots.[1] Thus, it is essential for scholars to gain different insights into how nations and nationalism have developed and what they are, even if the ideas themselves will remain indefinable.

[1] Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Before the 20th century, the primordialist school of thought dominated the discussion of nations and nationalism in Western thought. The primordialists contend that nations, and, thus, nationalism, both predate the modern era and are a facet of human society. Within the primordialist camp, there are those scholars that point to biology as the source of the nation. They argue that nations can be traced to the "underlying genetic reproductive drives of individuals."[2] Perhaps more influentially, there are those primordialist scholars who see a cultural connections made by language, common history, and traditions as the markers for primordial nations. Thus, it would be natural that the French people, for instance, having a shared history, culture and language – essentially being a nation – to be a nation and have a country in France.

The late twentieth century saw the rise of the modernist school of thought. While scholars disagreed on the peculiarities of nations and nationalism, the underlying argument proposed emphasized the modern nature of nationalism. Political scientists like Benedict Anderson called the nation an "imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[3] More, provocatively, Gellner argues that "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist."[4] Thus, while there are important distinctions between modernists, they share the belief that nations and nationalism are both modern and socially constructed.

Modernists agree that nations and nationalisms are a product of our age. They, nonetheless, disagree on the essential factors that precede the creation of nations. These can include those modernists in the socioeconomic camp who argue that economic factors like those

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[2] Anthony Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001) 52
[3] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso Press, 2006) 6.
[4] Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964) 169.

created by capitalism and industrialization allowed for the fabrication of the nation. Likewise in the socio-political camp, several theorists emphasize the role of the state and of print-capitalism in the creation of distinct nationalisms.

In the next major camp involved in the discussion of nations are the perennialists. The perennialists see nationalism as a relatively new phenomenon, yet they regard nations as having deeper roots in history. As Anthony Smith writes of the pereninialists, they "subscribe to the idea that, even if nationalist ideology was recent, nations [have] always existed in every period of history, and that many nations existed from time immemorial."[5] Nations have roots that can be traced back, often times, to antiquity. The English, French and even the Spanish exemplify these more ancient nations, in the perennialists' view. Some of these scholars focus on the continuity of nations while others, who believe that nations come and go, see nation framework in general as perennial.

A final paradigm from which to analyze nationalism comes from the ethno-symbolist camp. Anthony Smith writes, "historical ethno-symbolism focuses particularly on the subjective elements in the persistence of *ethnies*, the formation of nations and the impact of nationalism."[6] Thus, ethno-symbolists attempt to reconcile the perennialist idea of nationalisms through time by identifying ethnic communities as the frameworks from which nations arose. Smith, a prominent ethno-symbolist scholar, explains that ethno-symbolists "propose historical/or sociological explanations which address the reason for the continuing emotional attachments of so many people to their ethnic communities and nations."[7] In this regard, ethno-symbolism offers an innovative perspective from which to analyze the deep-seeded drivers that push people to violence.

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[5] Smith 49.
[6] Ibid. 57.
[7] Ibid. 59.

What is it anyways?

Fatherland! Fatherland! Your children swear to you / to breathe their last for your sake, if the bugle with its bellicose accent / persuades them to battle with courage.

- Mexican National Anthem, Stanza X

Not many rituals demonstrate the power that nationalism has on the psychology of people as does the singing of the national anthem. Whether it is at baseball games or during primary school, it is unquestionable that nearly all Americans have at one point, holding their hands near their heart, sang the "Star Spangled Banner." The collective force driven by thousands singing in concert brings many to tears. Yet, this act does much more then simply triggers emotion in people. It reminds a community of strangers, diverse in character and thought that they belong with each other in a grander scheme – the community of the nation. When the baseball stadium or the soccer field rings from the passionate chorus of the spectators - the professor, the man who works concessions, the investment banker in the suite, the construction worker with the worst seats in the stadium – rich and poor all belong to the same family in that moment. The boundaries of class are forsaken for the solidarity of the nation. This ritual, as trivial as it may appear, serves as one of many that reinforces the imagined community and strengthens its invisible ties.

But for all of the positive imagery of people singing the country's song at a baseball game, national anthems remind us how closely linked nationalism can be to both violence and the imagined community. The 10th stanza of the Mexican national anthem serves as a case in point, highlighting the association of violence and sacrifice with the nation. Francisco Gonzalez Bocanegra, the author and poet, makes clear that the bond between the people and the nation itself resembles that of a family. This bond is so strong that the nation's 'children' (not just its'

people or citizens) are willing to sacrifice themselves for the 'fatherland' (not just the country or state). Indeed, some scholars argue that only through these familial ties can a daughter or a son of the 'fatherland' be persuaded to not only fight but also die for the nation. Michael Mann, for example, writes that:

"Nationalism also everywhere generated a fictional family: the nation is supposed, erroneously, to be a community of descent; it is also our symbolic mother or father. I believe the moral fervor of nationalism derived from its ability to link family, local community and extensive national terrain." [8]

This strong bond places many of the last century's communist struggles, which identified themselves along nationalist lines, in context. Yet, some might question the significance of merely singing the national anthem. As a child in Mexico, I have strong memories of singing the national anthem before class while in primary school. Before classes started, all of the students – dressed in somber gray uniforms – lined up in the school's courtyard, and in the shadow of another powerful national symbol – the Mexican flag – reciting the anthem in unison. This scene is compounded by the knowledge that other Mexican students across the country simultaneously saluted and sang before the national flag prior to entering the classroom, in both private and public schools. This is not common to just Mexico or developing nations, but also in the developed world. In the United States, students stand daily to pledge allegiance to the United States in front of American flags at their schools.

National anthems place nationalism in a given temporal context – usually after the formation of government institutions (governments make songs or poems official national

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[8] Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 227.

anthems). Yet, a better understanding of what drives people to feel nationalism necessitates an examination of why the 'nation' exists in the first place.

My brief overview of the schools of thought on nationalism offered earlier provides a starting point. However, none of the four major viewpoints singlehandedly addresses the question of what nations and nationalism are fully. Nonetheless, I will propose a working definition of nations and nationalism that necessarily omits points emphasized by others. I do this because it is central to the discussion of nationalist inspired violence to propose a conceptual framework regarding the origins of nationalism from which the discussion of the transcendence of violence can evolve. Due to the nature of my assertion, it will undoubtedly fall short of encompassing all cases of nationalism.

The broad modernist argument serves as the foundation for my definition of nations and nationalism. Nations, although perhaps not in all cases, began to appear in the modern era. The rise of the nation was a marker of several political and economic transformations that crystallized in the 18th 19th and 20th centuries but with deeper roots in history. Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* offers a key argument as to why nations and nationalism arose. His four-part definition of the nation emphasizes important facets of what the nation is. As he correctly argues a community in which the members do no fully know each other is inherently imagined – it is only through imaginary processes, such as signing the national anthem, that people who do not know each other see themselves as belonging to the same national body. Anderson also notes that a nation is both limited and sovereign. These two points stress the fact that the nation exists only in the plural for if a nation is unlimited in size so as to encompass all people there would not be a way to differentiate a nation in the first place. In other words, there would be no observed nationalisms or nations but merely one. Most importantly, it is a community where there exists

"horizontal comradeship," meaning that although social or economic inequality may be prevalent those in the nation are to some degree interested in the welfare each other even where no tangible relationships exist between some or most members.

It is the comradeship that exists in the community, which is especially pertinent to the discussion of nationalist violence. Anderson notes this importance; "ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings."[9] But as he investigates the sort of community that nations come to be, Anderson sees two similar non-national communities that were dominant facets of the cultural systems that existed over centuries – the religious community and the dynastic.

It is, then, of no surprise that nationalism is often thought of in religious terms – fanaticism, unquestioned love, near-religious devotion – for both captured the imagination of people, especially through literacy. In this religious system, Christendom, the Islamic Ummah, the Buddhist world among others all "conceived of themselves as cosmically central, through the medium of a sacred language linked to a superterrestrial order of power."[10] Language served as an effective link between strangers, who, perhaps halted by distinct vernaculars, could imagine their community through the sacred language of Latin, classical Arabic or Chinese. Undoubtedly, given mass illiteracy, this sacred language, at least partially, served to shape the community. In this context, the small literate strata played a fundamental role in developing the religious systems. "The literati," writes Anderson, "were adept, strategic strata in a cosmological hierarchy of which the apex was divide…[they] mediated between earth and heaven."[11] Similarly, nationalism was harnessed to make people conceive of themselves as a community through the

[9] Anderson 7.
[10] Ibid. 12.
[11] Ibid. 15-16.

medium of a shared language linked, however, to a shared mystic/quasi-historic past. From this, nationalism garners its strength. While this religious community, stretching over European and Asian states, served as a central facet of the cultural system in place prior to rise of nationalism in Europe, it eventually eroded, coinciding in part with the rise of nationalism and the downfall of the sacral languages.

In contrast to Anderson, Ernest Gellner presents an argument that emphasizes economic factors in the rise of nationalism and nations. Gellner argues that the transformation of the economic realities brought about by industrialization played an important factor in the destruction of the village and town as the centers of social life. While this agrarian society strengthened central village ties, industrial society destroyed these bonds and affirmed near-vertical ties that strengthened would-be nations. Thus, "Nepalese hill peasants [for example] often have links with a variety of religious rituals, and think in terms of caste, clan, or village (but not of nation) according to circumstance."[12] This change from pre-agrarian and agrarian society to industrial society had important implications for the social order. "The old stability of the social role structure is simply incompatible with growth and innovation" of industrial society, argues Gellner.[13] Therefore, the creation of large industrial cities and the dissemination of the factory as the work place allowed for a new conceptualization of belonging that differed deeply from the one found in pre-industrial societies.

In this new industrial society, life differed to the extent that, whereas pre-industrial society had been stable, industrial society was infinitely more mobile. Industrialization and the changing mode of production made it so that "a society has emerged…which requires both a mobile division of labour, and sustained, frequent and precise communication between strangers

[12] Gellner 13.
[13] Ibid. 24.

involving a sharing of explicit meaning, transmitted in a standard idiom and in writing when required."[14] By literally reshaping the landscape and spurring the growth of industrial cities, industrialization created the factors – a common language and social instability – that allowed for the creation of a sense of nationhood, to fill the void left by the process of mass urbanization. The age of nationalism, thus, writes Gellner, was "a period of turbulent readjustment, in which either political boundaries, or cultural ones, or both, were being modified, so as to satisfy the new nationalist imperative."[15] In short, Gellner proposes that:

"Early industrialism means population explosion, rapid urbanization, labour migration, and also the economic and political penetration of previously more or less inward-turned communities, by a global economy and a centralizing polity. It means that at least relatively stable and insulated Babel system of traditional agrarian communities, each inward-turned, kept separate by geography sideways, and by an enormous social distance upwards, is replaced by quite a new kind of Babel, with new cultural boundaries that are not stable but in constant and dramatic movement, and which are seldom hallowed by any kind of custom."[16]

Yet, even if the conditions necessary for the rise of nationalism were created during industrialization, why did nationalism become so dominant?

Gellner argues that, rather than seeing nationalism as a homogenizing force, "It is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative (industrialization) eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism."[17] Mass urbanization caused by industrialization becomes a driving force of cultural and linguistic homogenization – the backbone of nationalism. "The alienated victims of early industrialism," writes Gellner, "are

[14] Ibid. 34.
[15] Ibid. 40.
[16] Ibid. 42.
[17] Ibid. 39.

unlikely to be tempted by cultural pools that are very small – a language spoken by a couple of villages offers few prospects – or very diffused or lacking in any literary traditions or personnel capable of carrying skills, and so on."[18] Thus, for Gellner, industrialization pushed people to linguistically and culturally homogenize, creating nationalism and in turn laying the foundation for the nation.

Both Gellner and Anderson discuss some of the motivating factors that are central to nationalism. In both arguments, one finds the transformation of a traditional society in which the village or religion had been central components to the lives of people. Yet, through the processes of secularization and industrialization, these barriers to nationalism began to crumble. Moreover, both stress that the diffusion of nationalist sentiment was only made possible by modern notions of mass media and popular education. This is to say that the rise of nationalism was a process of interconnected factors. Out of these new conditions arose modern nationalism and nations. Nonetheless, the picture is not fully explained by these arguments as other factors help to clarify how nationalism arose. Two missing components help to explicate more fully the often-violent tendencies found in the creation of several nationalisms: common traditions and culture and the role of the state.

The state plays a key factor in the ascent of nationalism and its mass societal diffusion. Gellner and Anderson, while acknowledging the role of the state, emphasize its roots in other factors. Nonetheless, it is important to examine the quintessential and direct role of the state in the fomentation of nationalism and the creation of the idea of a nation. Political scientist Charles Tilly argues that, to paraphrase his argument, 'wars make states and states make war'.[19] This simple argument can help to give insight into the rise of common languages and the nation

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[18] Ibid. 46.
[19] Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992.* (Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992)

through the creation of bureaucracies in the process of state formation. The bureaucracy created in the wake of the rise of the modern state necessitates a common administrative language that promotes the homogenization of the people in a territory. Through the formalization of European states, governments became important stakeholders in the further homogenization of the people within their territory. Put more bluntly, it is to the state's advantage to foment nationalism and the idea of nations! While several theorists question how or why this occurred, the historical cases of Britain, France and Spain serve to illustrate this point. Moreover, the public education system in many countries serves as a case in point of the direct role that the state has in producing the type of citizens and nationals it so desires. Several of the nations that are now taken for as given, such as the English or French, were at least partially, consolidated by the central powers in a bid to assure their power. The state has a stake in ensuring that the people of their territory feel a certain emotional attachment to their country if only to be more efficient at war making but also to gain legitimacy.

Anthony Smith's entho-symbolist interpretation presents an important distinction in the literature on nationalism that addresses many concerns from the primordialist camp through his differentiation of the ethnie and a nation. An ethnic community, according to Smith, is "a human community connected to a homeland possessing common myths of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity at least among the elites."[20] A nation, in contrast, is a "named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members."[21] A critical point lies in that ethnicities often form the basis for the creation of nations. Thus, nations indeed may have historic and even cultural ties that

[20] Smith 13.
[21] Ibid. 13.

bring some type of commonality to nationalist project. Nonetheless, to modern readers ethnies may translate to something that would resemble a modern nation.

Thus, it is essential to note that while the word 'nation' has been used for hundreds of years, its meaning is certainly very different than in the 19th and 20th centuries. Thus, it is nearly impossible to know what an Englishmen could have meant by evoking the English nation in literary works. At the very least, we can imagine that a small literate elite could conceptualize that some sense of similarity existed within some of the people living there. Clearly, there are often times linguistic and cultural roots can be attributed to modern nations, though they may not be massively or entirely reproduced within a group in the medieval ages, for instance.

Having given a brief overview of nations and nationalism, I will aim to present a brief working definition of nationalism that will serve as a framework for the rest of the essay. I will not, however, attempt to define the different characteristics of a nation. For the purposes of this paper, I believe it suffices to say that the nation is neither biological nor primordial; it is a socially constructed imagined community that often has cultural and linguistic ties. It is not critical to examine these characteristics because through the earlier overview, it has become clear that the driver of nationalist violence is often not directly related to the nation but more so to the feeling of nationalism.

If nationalism, at the individual level, is the degree to which an individual identifies with the feeling of belonging to a particular nation, then nationalism should not be thought of as a category to either belong to or not. This is a false dichotomy, for any person, even within the span of a few days can feel differently toward their nation. In one instance, one may feel great attachment to the nation, but perhaps after some distressing news about the actions of some nationals during war, one may feel a different degree of belonging. In our increasingly

globalized world one may be born in one nation only to live within, and perhaps be accepted, in another. This is telling of the flexible nature of nationalism's character. Nationalism, as a feeling, should be seen through the framework of a spectrum because a spectrum allows for the flexibility inherent in changing feelings.

At a certain point, nationalism could simply be the acknowledgement that one belongs to a certain group because of linguistic, cultural, historical or traditional ties. This is a mild form of nationalism. These feelings could lead to a more moderate form of nationalism that pushes the individual towards love of the nation or the belief that its political fulfillment lies in the form of an independent state or political autonomy. But there are other more dangerous, extreme forms of nationalism could lead to the belief that violence is a morally correct tactic to achieve this political goal or that one's nation is superior to all others to the extent that it deserves to violently assert this perceived superiority within or outside of state apparatus.[22]

The following is the basic argument that I have presented: the old order, the village, the cultural systems that developed prior to the 17th century filled a void in people that was displaced by both rapid industrialization, which led to mass urbanization, and the secularization of society, arising in part from Europe's experience with the Enlightenment. Out of the old order, fertile ground lay in which the seed of nationalism could spread. It is on the pillar of this instability that a new way to conceive a person's identity arose. Throughout this process, the state played a quintessential role in fostering nationalist feelings and thus creating an imagined community. Again, this is not an attempt at discrediting historical national communities, but the recent nationalist phenomenon is more congruent, popular, horizontal vision of a community than the

[22] Robert Audi has made this categorical distinction in his essay *Nationalism, Patriotism, and Cosmopolitanism in an Age of Globalization* (2009). He categorizes nationalism as extreme, moderate or minimal, giving each categorization distinct attributes relating to perceived national interests and helping others.

vertical, elitist communities envisioned earlier. But is the existence of nationalism enough to make a person kill for the nation? Or perhaps die for the nation? How does murder become legitimate? In the next section, I will explore what nationalist violence is and elements drive people to commit these acts of violence.

Nationalist Violence

Of nationalist violence, Gellner writes:

"Because rulers do not surrender territory gladly (and every change of a political boundary must make someone a loser), because changing one's culture is very frequently a most painful experience, and moreover, because there were rival cultures struggling to capture the souls of men, just as there were rival centres of political authority striving to suborn men and capture territory: given all this, it immediately follows from our model that this period of transition was bound to be violent and conflict ridden. Actual historical facts fully confirm these expectations."[23]

As Gellner recounts, the emergence of nations and nation-states proved and continues to prove to be incredibly violent. Even after many nations had consolidated themselves, they appeared to be intrinsically violent as imperialism swept the world. Yet, as the 18th and 19th centuries unfolded and came to a close, the 20th century brought about several changes in the way nationalist violence played out. In many colonized countries, nationalism led the way as nationalist movements often fought long wars for independence and autonomy. President Woodrow Wilson exemplifies this sentiment through his 14 Points and the League of Nations charter that called for the respect of the right of self-determination. As the Soviet Union dismantled a new wave of independence movements has continued to assert self-rule in the

[23] Gellner 40.

former countries of the Soviet bloc. While news media outlets have reported heavily on these events, some scholars, instead of focusing on the power of nationalism, argue for its weakness.

Conventional wisdom affirms that nationalism and violence are intrinsically linked. Indeed, a large proportion of the scholarly work on nationalism has focused on the phenomena of nationalist violence. How could it not? The twentieth century was not the age of the ideological struggle between communism and capitalism. Rather, it was nationalism that served as the driver for several of the atrocities committed in the past century. Violent struggles in African countries, places like Vietnam and in the Balkans, amongst others, highlight the power that nationalist ideologies have had throughout the century. Many scholars point to an imagined prevalence of nationalist violence. The scholarly research clearly shows a bias in highlighting cases where nationalism turned crises violent rather than were peacefully resolved or did not occur at all. But if the bias exists and nationalist violence overstated, is nationalism really a problem when it comes to violence?

One quantitative analysis of direct nationalist violence suggests that the strong link between violence and nationalism may be overstated. Political scientist David Laitin in *Nations, States, and Violence* puts to the test conventional wisdom by analyzing cases of violence over the century attributed to ethnic fractionalization or nationalism. Through his research, Laitin, for example, found that from 1960 through 1979, there were only twenty incidents of violence from a potential 38,383 cases in Africa.[24] The data generally seems supports the contention that, instead of constantly fighting over issues of nationality, "people belonging to different ethnic

[24] "The potential cases per country and year were a conservative estimate of the number of ethnic neighbors in regular interaction in each African country." In David D. Laitin, *Nations, States, and Violence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 10.

[national] groups cooperate nearly all the time"[25] Indeed it appears that nationalism plays a lesser role in driving violence than previously thought.

A thought experiment could help to more clearly visualize Laitin's thesis. The world has a myriad of spoken languages. According to the Linguistic Society of America, over 6,000 languages are spoken in the world, albeit most only by a few thousand. A more reasonable number, if one counts languages that are more widely spoken (over a few thousand speakers), could be arbitrarily set to the number 800.[26] Given the integral role language plays in the formation of a national character as well as the lack of more suitable proxies for nationalism, language can serve the role of nationalism. There are 193 internationally recognized countries in the world with 10 more disputed but essentially established states. Given the vast amount of languages in the world, there is a clear disparity in the number of realized nationalisms and unrealized (600 if there are 800 nations). Yet nationalist violence does not dominate the political landscapes as would be expected in a highly fractionalized world. It is almost logically clear that nationalist violence is overstated when compared to actual cases of nationalist violence. Partially, this bias is caused by a certain romanticism attached to nationalism, the struggles of national heroes and the ensuing violence. While this may appear as a stumbling block to my contention, that nationalism, under certain conditions, can drive people to violence, there are, however, essentially two clarifying points to be made.

Firstly, Laitin vastly underestimates cases of nationalist violence by using a narrow definition of the concept – one that sees the direct use of physical force against individuals as the defining marker of violence. This foundering stems from a larger failure in academia specifically and in society more generally to define violence narrowly. By using a more encompassing

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[25] Laitin 10.
[26] Stephen R. Anderson, "How Many Languages are there in the World?" *Linguistic Society of America.* Available: http://www.lsadc.org/info/pdf_files/howmany.pdf

definition of violence – one that accounts for the physical harm not *directly* caused to individuals – the specter of nationalism appears even more daunting. Johan Galtung, a leading scholar of the increasingly developing field of peace studies, in his essay *Cultural Violence* approached the issue of what violence and peace mean through a reconceptualization of the terms. In his work, Galtung envisions violence as having different facets of which direct, structural and cultural violence are ultimately interconnected. Direct violence refers to the violence most often associated with the word – torture, war, and murder. Violence, according to Galtung, should be more encompassing. Thus, he termed the phrase structural violence, that is the type of violence perpetuated by social structures and institutions, and which will be most useful in helping to shed light on the persistence of violent nationalism. Cultural violence, similarly, is another facet of violence that uses aspects of a society's culture to justify acts of structural or direct violence.[27]

By using this more encompassing definition of violence – a definition that includes cases of structural and cultural as well as direct violence – it appears that cases of violent nationalism in the twenty first century continue to exist. Western Europe, for example, is rarely seen as the field where nationalist violence plays out in this current age. Wars are often fought in far off lands not to conquer territory or subdue a people, but to combat terrorism and ensure a safe world. However, the developed world and in parts of the developing world more generally, mass waves of immigration are bringing into conflict people from throughout the world in one country. If we employ Galtung's framework of violence, it becomes clearer that the systematic mistreatment of immigrants in countries like Germany and France should be examined through the lens of nationalism. The extent to which foreigners are mistreated or the level of poverty among immigrants can serve, not perfectly of course, as an indicator of the level of structural and cultural violence found in a society.

[27] Galtung, Johan. "Cultural Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 27 (1990): 291-305.

However, this contention should not be taken at face value. Several distinct factors exacerbate the structural violence exacted upon Turkish immigrants in Germany and North African immigrants in France. Racism, for example, need not be infused with a sense of belonging to a greater community that is the nation. A German may advocate against the provision of social welfare to Turks on the basis of a belief that the German state should not help a non-white Turk. Just as easily, a German may advocate for the same provision simply because he or she believes that German welfare should be dispensed only to Germans. Distinguishing the extent that nationalism plays in these cases of structural violence is nearly an impossible task. While public opinion polls can help to tell part of the story, the interrelatedness of these factors can make it difficult to fully distinguish. Moreover, self-censorship can cloud the results so that nationalist sentiment may be unreported or understated.

Secondly, it should give great hope to the scholar who hopes for peace that different nationalities can co-exist – although often intrinsically intertwined – peacefully side-by-side. The data demonstrates that nationalism need not be violent as it is rarely so in the more conventional use of the word violence. In this sense, nationalism can reflect the positive values endowed and created in a society while foregoing those that excite and exacerbate structural violence and direct conflict.

The age of violent nationalism – best highlighted by the unimaginable bloody inter- and intra-state conflicts in the twentieth century as well as the structural inequities set against immigrants – does not appears to be coming to an end soon. While Laitin correctly points to the complex connection between nationalism and direct violence, his conceptualization of violence underestimates nationalism's potential to create havoc and harm people. Nationalism continues to influence the way in which people think and act and thus how states themselves create policies

and act on them. An examination of what drives nationalist violence is necessary if the world is to become more peaceful and inclusive place.

What Makes Nationalism Violent?

"I do not want my grandchildren and great-grandchildren to live in a mostly Muslim country where Turkish and Arabic are widely spoken, women wear headscarves and the day's rhythm is determined by the call of the muezzin."

"I do not want us to end up as strangers in our own land, not even on a regional basis."

- Thilo Sarrazin, Finance Senator to the Senate of Berlin[28]

In *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland,* historian Christopher R. Browning recounts the story of the role of reserve police officers in perpetrating the mass murder of Jews during World War II.[29] Challenging the notion that those who committed the genocidal atrocities of the Holocaust were somehow predisposed to hatred and violence, Browning presents a thesis based on the archival evidence of Reserve Police Battalion 101. He concludes that, however repulsive it may appear, it was ordinary men who executed the atrocious Nazi policy of genocide. Hannah Arendt in her influential book *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* similarly highlights the ordinary nature of Adolf Eichmann, an important Colonel who played a key role in planning the Holocaust. Arendt and Browning propose an important idea in the understanding of nationalist violence – the people who perpetrate ghastly acts of violence are not monsters, rather they are regular people who under certain conditions and certain pressures react in those ways. It is essential to examine the

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[28] Excerpts from his 2010 German best-seller *Germany Does Away with Itself.* While many may consider his viewpoints as on the fringe of German thought, public opinion polls tell a different story. The Hudson Institute reports, "According to a recent survey conducted by TNS Emnid pollsters, around 20 percent of German voters would back a hypothetical political party led by Sarrazin. Another poll conducted by the mass-circulation Bild am Sonntag shows that 89 percent of those surveyed say Sarrazin's arguments are convincing."

[29] Browning, Christopher R. *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland.* New York: HarperPerennial, 1993.

factors that can cause people to perpetrate heinous acts of violence. It is just as important to acknowledge and operate within a framework that sees a community, like the nation, capable of facilitating and creating the conditions necessary for the perpetration of atrocities by otherwise ordinary people. To know that otherwise everyday people were behind perhaps the worst cases of nationalist violence necessitates a comprehensive explanation of these several factors that push people to perform acts of violence. I will focus on objective as well as psychological factors that push people to commit nationalist violence.

One need not subscribe to the idea that nationalism is inherently violent or, to place a value judgment on nationalism, nefarious. Nonetheless, because nationalism appears to play an important role in the creation of violence around the world, it is important to examine superstructure as well as the personal factors that create it. This is a difficult and speculative task but nonetheless essential to envision a more peaceful world.

In the introduction to *Nations and Nationalism*, Gellner addresses the one aim of a nationalist movement: "the political and the national unit should be congruent."[30] Thus, for many nationalist leaders, the aim, and the reason for the existence of violence, is to make the state and the political boundaries of it congruent with the nation. But depending on the type, the age and the level of wealth found in that nation, this struggle could manifest itself in a myriad of ways. This aim often serves as an ideological underpinning of state-led nationalist violence, but does not explain what essentially drives soldiers and other community members to fight and die for the nation. In this essay, I will mostly refer to violence at the individual level, especially the ways in which larger political and social processes influence the individual. I do so because I believe this highlights important aspects of the many aims nationalist violence, such as in the cases where the struggle for autonomy serves as a prime motivator for people.

[30] Gellner 1.

David Laitin identifies four ways in which violence makes itself present in nationalism: irredentism, secession, sons-of-the-soil and communalism.[31] When a nation occupies its own state, but seeks to redeem territory occupied by fellow nationals living in a neighboring state, the nation would commit irredentist violence. Perhaps Hitler's incursion into both Austria and Czechoslovakia prior to the outbreak of World War II serves to highlight the cases of irredentism. When a group within a state, often subjugated to a lower status, seek independence and self-rule they seek to secede. The fights for Basque independence from Spain or Igbo separation from Nigeria in the 1970s are cases in point. Sons-of-the-soil conflicts are more complex. This type of nationalist conflict involves a group from the core of a state that moves to the periphery, in the process uprooting the native population. Violence occurs as the indigenous groups fights to reclaim their historic homeland as well as the violent displacement of the native population in the first place. Examples include the western expansion by U.S. citizens into Native American territory. The last form of violence Laitin identifies is communal warfare. In this type of ethnic/national violence one groups attacks another within a community. The pogroms in Russia and the violence between Muslims and Hindus in India exemplify this type of violence.

To David Laitin's types of nationalist violence I add structural violence. While structural violence can often be the underpinning of Laitin's types – when an ethnic group, for example, feels systematically excluded from the state, the group might see violent revolution as an option – I shall use it as a mechanism itself. As I argued earlier, it is crucial to use a framework that includes structural violence because it broadens the specter of nationalism to industrialized countries that might not otherwise be conceptualized as violent in a nationalist way. As globalization drives the immigration of masses of people, especially from clearly differentiated

[31] Laitin 2.

nations, the encounters between groups begins to make this type of nationalist violence increasingly prevalent in the developed world. While the rifle exemplified the nationalist violence of the twentieth century, it appears that unemployment in immigrant communities will characterize nationalist violence this century. Using the Galtung framework of violence will help examine more clearly the psychological causes that drive people to violence.

Among these mechanisms of violent nationalism there are several threads that bring a sense of relatedness to the issue. It will become clearer that each nation experiences different degrees of nationalism and that many need not be violent. Nonetheless, through this process, the state often plays a central role in the formation of nationalism as well as its development and use. The state has an affinity with nationalism. It is to its advantage that the people who live within its border see each other as a related community. Because nationalism is often very difficult to quantify, scholars often use language as a proxy for nationalism. Using this example, it is clear that the French central states advanced the idea of the French nation during its early development. Through the Edict of Villers-Cotterrets, King Francis I established Francien, a dialect of Ile-de-France, as the official language of the kingdom.[32] Setting this precedent for a bureaucratic language, French became a necessary language to learn. Under Napoleon, Laitin points out, public education meant education in French and French values.

In helping to create nationalism, the state cemented its role fostering violent nationalism. From a cadre of ideologically inclined men Bonaparte, for example, could conscript many to fight wars in far away lands. Yet, in many countries, even as conscription slowly faded the rise of volunteer armies highlights the importance of nationalism to people. Nations are now taken-for-granted frames of reference. Perhaps the story of Army Ranger Pat Tillman serves to illustrate the important of the effect of nationalist ideology on people who dutifully join the

[32] Ibid. 86.

military. Turning down a $3.7 million NFL contract, Tillman enlisted in the US Army to fight in Afghanistan. The state is also a key mover of violence in sons-of-the-soil, irredentism and even communal violence. It is so, because the state provides the institutions from which governments are able to affect decisions of war. The Nazi government, through state institutions, mobilized the German people for war against other countries, to give but one example.

While the existence of the state has proved pivotal in the formation of nations and the channeling of nationalism for violent purposes, individuals too within a state apparatus can wield enormous power in making nationalism violent. Nazi Germany presents perhaps the most infamous case. Adolf Hitler, through his inflammatory speeches – to be understood in historical context – transformed the political and social landscape. Making many of his followers believe in the supposed superiority of the *Volk*, Hitler was able to execute mass murder against Jews, Gypsies, and others thought to be inferior. His oratorical prowess served to move a people in the wake of defeat and economic depression. The charismatic qualities he displayed coupled with the Nazi propaganda machine, exemplified by the sheer cinematic genius of *Triumph of the Will,* helped to convince a desperate population of the possibilities for greatness. Similarly, the violence in the Balkans during the 1990s can be pinpointed to Slobodan Milosevic and his campaign of Serbian expansion. As the President of Serbia, he institutionalized Serbian nationalist policies in an effort to centralize power. Indeed, he served a critical role in the Yugoslav wars as he sought to create 'Greater Serbia.' In France, the ultra nationalist politician Jean-Marie Le Pen, who upset the socialist candidate in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections, agitated anti-immigrant xenophobic sentiment that exacerbated ethnic relations and the relentless structural violence against immigrants. Personalistic, charismatic leaders often play important roles in agitating, or exacerbating ethnic and national tension, yet to fully understand

nationalist violence, it is essential to examine under what conditions these violent outbursts have occurred.

For violence under the guise of nationalism to occur, the economic and social conditions within countries are often critical. In these three examples, the fragile state caused political and economic frailty, in turn allowing for social instability to exist. It is common knowledge that the humiliation of World War I played a key role in the social perceptions of Germans. Moreover, the instability of the Weimar Republic proved unable to deal with the problems that Germany faced. The hyperinflation served to destroy the middle class and further create the conditions that an individual like Hitler could exploit. In the case of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Tito's death in 1980 dealt a devastating blow to the political stability and territorial congruency of the country. With the weakening of Serbian control within Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic exploited the fragile political and social stability through his nationalist rhetoric. In the French case, there persists an economic instability that the government has been unable to redress. The high levels of unemployment have allowed nationalist politicians like Le Pen to scapegoat black African immigrants for the lack of economic success the country experienced. Scholars often use this instability, be it political, social or economic, to explain why newly independent nation-states are often nationalistically violent, as the process of independence itself causes mass societal instability. These conditions reflect characteristics of fragile states and fragile societies. Under these conditions, opportunistic leaders can and often do push people to commit violence against others.

The increasingly important waves of immigration occurring throughout the world highlight another aspect of more recent acts of nationalist violence: different national groups are coming into direct contact with others now more than ever before. These interactions have

important implications for the ways in which violence occurs. In countries suffering economic or social instability, immigration can often lead to leaders to scapegoat immigrants creating negative perceptions and unequal treatment of their communities. Recent public opinion polls demonstrate the chauvinistic views of many European countries exacerbated by growing immigration and at times stagnant economies. A public opinion poll conducted by Ifop for the French newspaper *Le Monde* shows that 42% of French people think that the presence of Muslims in France is a "threat to our identity." Similarly, four in ten Germans believe the presence of a Muslim community to be a threat to German identity.[33] Perhaps more worrying are the surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project that show the strength of anti-immigrant sentiments in Italy. In 2007, nearly 95% of Italians believed immigration to be a problem, with 64% believing immigration to be a very big problem. More over, in Italy, 73% said that immigrants have a bad impact on their country. [34] The Italian case is especially vivid given the wave on anti-immigration violence that swept the country and led to the evacuation of over 1,000 African immigrants from southern Italy. This certainly does not imply that immigration should not occur, rather, when fragile social and economic conditions exist, the immigrant becomes a symbol for nationalists to blame. Mistreatment of these communities – directly or indirectly – often ensues.

Many authors argue that nationalism and nationalist violence finds roots in the psychology of in-groups and out-groups. These authors argue that humans have a deep need for belonging to a group, with nationalism satisfying this role. As these groups form, it becomes nearly certain that favoritism arises within co-nationals, so they argue. Yet, favoritism does not

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[33] Dabi, Frédéric and Jérôme Fourque. "Comparative survey France/Germany on Islam." *Ifop.* 13 December 2010

[34] Menasce Horowitz, Juliana. "Widespread Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in Italy." *Pew Global Attitudes Project.* 12 January 2010.

end there. "It is argued," writes Atkinson and Brock, "that whenever you have an ingroup there must be an outgroup: it is part of the process of ingroup formation that a certain amount of outgroup hostility will occur."[35] Certainly, as Brewer writes, intergroup bias takes the form of in-group favoritism not out-group derogation. Mass group psychology nonetheless makes the case that even if in-groups do not cause the hatred and hostility towards out-groups, there are certainly pressures on individuals that affects decision-making. The case of the Reserve Battalion police officers certainly serves to clarify the effects of a mass mentality on people. Browning distinguishes these reserve police men from their army comrades by pointing to their background as mostly middle class, middle age Germans who had not gone through the army and police indoctrination that younger recruits had. Thus, Browning leaves the readers confounded at the fact that ordinary men committed these mass killings. He explains this by seeing that "Those [men] who did not shoot risked isolation, rejection, and ostracism – a very uncomfortable prospect within the framework of a tight-knit unit … so that the individual had virtually nowhere else to turn for support and social contact."[36] It seems that in cases where a group commits violence speaking out and standing outside or in contrast to a group requires great courage. Of the men in Reserve Police Battalion 101, only around 10 percent chose not to participate in the violence. In the case of structural violence, group psychology can help to explain again that choosing to break with these attitudes is difficult.

By focusing on the factors that motivate and push people to commit acts of nationalist violence, I hope to draw a distinction between arguments that emphasize resources as a source of national conflict and the ideological underpinnings that the variables I described help to further

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[35] Gillian Brock and Quentin D. Atkinson. "What can Examining the Psychology of Nationalism Tell Us About Our Prospects for Aiming at the Cosmopolitan Vision?" *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 11 (2008): 167.
[36] Browning 185.

explain. These factors, such as a charismatic leadership as well as social and economic instability compounded by mass psychology serve to pinpoint how nationalist violence occurs. Nationalist violence remains a reality in the 21st century. Transforming this sentiment will prove a difficult task. In the following section, I will address, through a cosmopolitan framework, the possibilities and challenges of ending violent nationalism.

What is Cosmopolitanism?

"I know that all this talk about the cosmopolitanism of art seems inappropriate at a moment like this. I know that it may seem out of place to swear to pacifism, to swear to love and to the brotherhood of all peoples while people are dying, while children are dying, while young men are returning home crippled and mangled forever… But I have no other way of thinking. I cannot accept war as the only solution, I cannot force myself to hate, I cannot believe that weapons, killing, revenge, hatred, that such an accumulation of evil will ever solve anything."[37]

- Mira Furlan

The word cosmopolitanism, like nationalism, evokes several distinct yet related ideas about how humans relate to each other in the political and social arena. At its core, the philosophy of cosmopolitanism implores a shared humanity and certain rights/obligations that are mutually owed in such relationship. In a cosmopolitan community, "those people who happen not to belong to our particular group (ethnic, national, or political, say) are not less valuable than those who do."[38] This is certainly the idea behind Mira Furlan's *A letter to my co-citizens*, as she implores her neighbors, during the Balkan Wars, to look beyond the markers of nationality and prevent the destructive warfare that nearly tore the social fabric apart. This

[37] Furlan, Mira "A Letter to my Co-Citizens." *Performing Arts Journal* 53 (1996): 20-24.
[38] Brock and Atkinson 166.

distinct way of seeing the world has roots in ancient philosophy and encompasses a diversity of thought in what it means to be cosmopolitan.

Indeed, when the ancient philosopher Diogenes of Sinope was asked of his political citizenship, he replied, to the astonishment of the inquisitive citizen, that he was a cosmopolitan. The word translates literally into citizen of the cosmos, although it is more aptly translated to citizen of the world. This controversial stand put Diogenes at odds with the traditional social and political order of ancient Greece: the city-state. The political allegiance of an individual to his or her city-state or *polis* often characterized and marked life in ancient Greece. This view was radically at odds with the cultural system of ancient Greece in which life centered on the *polis.* While the rhetorical power of Diogenes' stand as a cosmopolitan should be noted, the idea of being a cosmopolitan need not be understood in terms of severing ties to a nation and forsaking the citizenship of a state.

The story of Diogenes gives a brief first impression of what cosmopolitanism is about. It certainly deals with belonging to a wider human community and not merely a smaller political community such as a nation or country. Philosopher Stan van Hooft writes of Diogenes that "his was a philosophical position rather than a political one, which implied that, however important they might be, the concerns of one's *polis* should be seen in the context of a more binding and universal set of values."[39] Yet, through history, cosmopolitanism has carried distinct meanings by different interpreters. Some for example, have pointed to the 19th and 20th century cafes where an elite Parisian could feel at home in New York, London and Berlin just as easily as in Paris. In a sense, these 'cosmopolitans' were the first to breach the boundaries of modern nationality and citizenship that the nation-state framework imposes. This type of social cosmopolitanism was

[39] Stan Van Hooft, *Cosmopolitanism: A Philosophy for Global Ethics* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009) 15.

both exclusive and impractical to put into practice by other communities – namely the working class. And while the current diffusion of cultures, specially through food, points to the cosmopolitan nature of many of the world's largest cities – in the sense that distinct cultures are coming into contact with each other – where one could be found eating Indian food one day and Norwegian the next, there is a certain lack of interaction on a deeper level. This mass diffusion of culture, I will argue, should not be seen as the sole component of cosmopolitanism nonetheless being an important element of the concept.

Another historical example, which can help to highlight part of the essence of cosmopolitanism, is the case of the Mughal Empire under Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar in the late 16th century. Almost paradoxically, a form of social cosmopolitanism has thrived in empires like that of Muhammad Akbar.[40] Under his rule, conversations between many religious leaders of the Indian and European religions transpired. Instead of imposing his own religious views upon his subjects, Akbar allowed for Hindus to share knowledge with Christians and for Muslims to debate with Sikhs, for example. This type of social (religious) cosmopolitanism promoted by Akbar went further than the more superficial cosmopolitanism of the 18th and 19th century European elites. By focusing on such a divisive issue as religion, Akbar showed his respect to the belief systems of his subjects while demonstrating that humans can both be part of a distinct religious community while living in peace with each other just as easily. Nonetheless, while this type of cosmopolitanism thrived in several empires, empires themselves proved problematic in many ways such as the propensity for warfare.

Those scholars who argue for a cosmopolitanism based on a world government, focuses on a potentially dangerous cosmopolitanism: a world state would wield unimaginable coercive force. Without a doubt, in the current state system, there remains an important place of

[40] Ibid. 9.

supranational institutions such as international non-governmental organizations. Yet, international organizations and institutions such as the United Nations could not, and should not, turn into a world government. The practicality of this enterprise would be questionable to say the least. Seeing the difficulties of the interactions between countries in international forums such as the United Nations brings into question the feasibility of creating a worldwide political state. More worryingly, in terms of the power that such a state could acquire, it would be extremely dangerous for a single state to hold universal power given the chance that it could use it tyrannically and without impunity. Again, while some has argued such a government creatively, in the political arena, the keys issue for a cosmopolitan should be the strengthening of international civil society.

Thus, while borrowing from distinct ethical and political cosmopolitan arguments, I will propose cosmopolitanism as a complement to nationalism. This nonetheless requires a reconceptualization of both concepts. "A more positive conception of cosmopolitanism," explains Van Hooft, "would urge us to accord all people equal respect. Once again, this does not imply that we should ignore the difference between people on the bases of which it is legitimate to discriminate between them, such as their accomplishments, but it does suggest that even the least deserving should be given a level of respect that rules out, for example, exploitation or neglect."[41] Indeed, by proclaiming to be a cosmopolitan, a person unavoidably asserts that an imaginary identity does not have the force to justify acts of violence against another human beings. In essence an ethical cosmopolitanism rejects both structural and direct violence in all situations. Yet while these two identities may seem at odds with each other, just as is the case for other identities, they are not mutually exclusive. One could a cosmopolitan and a nationalist.

[41] Ibid. 9.

While many self-proclaimed cosmopolitans would even question the futility of working within the nation-state framework to create a world where individuals can accord all people respect, the relative importance of the nation-state system makes it a player in any pragmatic discussion of the topic. The nation-state, however arbitrary it may seem to cosmopolitans, exists and continues to play an integral role in the lives of individuals and in interactions between countries. While, as cosmopolitans argue, many of the qualities attributed to membership in the nation can be fulfilled by membership in civil society groups, the nation currently does so as well. One should be pragmatic in how one works within this national framework. Thus it is imperative to work for a pragmatic cosmopolitanism, so that a cosmopolitan framework can work within a nationalist and more quickly mitigate the negative results of nationalism.

Cosmopolitanism can help to mitigate violent nationalism. I propose two distinct ways of thinking about cosmopolitanism. I will borrow from a moral/ethical cosmopolitan view so as to argue how one should be cosmopolitan even in the context of nations and nationalism. This discussion will place an emphasis on identities. Secondly, I will argue that a political cosmopolitanism – highlighted by a strong international civil society – could, indeed, be used as a check on violence, if properly nurtured.

On Identity

As I explored earlier in this essay, nationalism, violence and the state are intricately linked; distinct processes that result from the relationship between the state and nationalism can ultimately lead to violence. Yet, while nationalism and the state certainly play a role in fabricating violence, ultimately, it is individuals who commit acts of violence. This is not to say that states do not facilitate violence, rather it is an acknowledgement that within a person there is a choice. The police officers from the reserve battalion 101 had the choice to not kill, especially

prior to the massacre at Josefow, yet only very few were strong enough to take this opportunity when it arose.[42] It is as Zygmunt Bauman explains, the "exception…is the rare individual who has the capacity to resist authority and assert moral autonomy but who is seldom aware of this hidden strength until put to the test."[43] There is great hope for change, nonetheless. Nationalism is neither biological nor unchangeable. Rather nationality is only one of many identities an individual can chose to take. While nations and more specifically nation-states are currently seen as a taken-for-granted framework or natural cultural system, the rise of nations and of nationalisms helps to clarify this contention. Yet, even that the nation-state system is under attack by globalization, it also appears that states and nation-states will continue to play an important, if not slightly modified role in the near future. This again does not imply that in many centuries, this system will collapse, only that the system will pervade for some time to come.

The interwar period setback economic globalization several decades, more recently, increases in global trade have demonstrated the interconnectedness of the global economy. While the growth of economic globalization has been impressive, this process of cultural globalization is outstandingly more significant in its breadth. As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have written about, this globalization demonstrates a growing complexity and vertical integration that it is unprecedented in comparison to past globalizations.[44] In this sense, it is the recent thickening of globalization that appears to weaken – at least to some slight degree – the state and challenges concepts of both citizenship and nationality. This rapid thickening of global interactions, fueled by growing global networks that rely on the Internet and social media, place into question many facets of nationalism. This processes also help to fuel migration and the growing interaction of

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[42] Browning 2.
[43] Ibid. 167.
[44] Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So What?)." *Foreign Policy* 118 (Spring, 2000): 104-119.

immigrants with native populations within countries. Globalization is serving as a tool that makes nationalism be more and more questioned. In this sense, people are beginning to question identities more generally.

Perhaps one of the many pitfalls of cosmopolitan thought is the association of nationalism with violence. While, as I have explored, there is an intricate relationship between the two, nationalism sentiment need not be equated with violence. Indeed, while many proponents of distinct nationalisms as well as communitarian philosophers would hope to see the nation and a person's nationality as they key defining identity, a field of thought surrounding identity has increasingly begun to question this assertion. Perhaps key among those who question the singularity of identity is economist and philosopher Amartya Sen. [45] In *Identity and Violence,* Sen proposes a framework from which to carefully scrutinize sectarian conflict and violence. Sen sees violence, especially identity violence as the "art of constructing hatred [that] takes the form of invoking the magical power of some allegedly predominant identity that drowns other affiliations, and in a conveniently bellicose form can also overpower any human sympathy or natural kindness that we may normally have."[46]

Sen's ideas are important because nationalism can often have a negative psychological effect on the identity of people. However strong the feelings of excitement that nationalism arouses are, it needs to be understood that there is no such thing as a singular identity, or that identity in general need be equated to evil. Sen writes, "identity can be a source of richness and warmth as well as of violence and terror."[47] Thus, having the potential to both adversely affect a

[45] Sen, Amartya. *Identity and Violence: the Illusion of Destiny.* New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006.
[46] Ibid. XV.
[47] Ibid. 4.

person's life as well as bring tremendous joy to it, it becomes clearer that an identity, even a nationalist one, can well be an integral part of a person's existence and not an unnecessary evil.

In his book, Sen examines identity by exploring choice. Choice becomes a critical component of identity in the sense that one chooses nearly all identities. Even if one does not chose, for example, race, an individual chooses how to perform this identity. The case of nationalism is no different, especially in this increasingly global world. For many, nationalism need not be about violence. One, for example, could see patriotic duty as service in the Peace Corp or AmeriCorp. Until recently, for example, German nationals, who were drafted to the Armed Forces, had the option to serve in several NGOs even throughout the world. Likewise, what it means to be part of X or Y nation could reflect the distinct yet positive values that the individuals that make up the nation hold.

In this global world, people have choices in what identities they chose. Even if one places an identity with more importance it need not mean that those other identities are somehow detached. In the process of transforming nationalist violence, a cosmopolitan identity could help to transform nationalist violence. Yet, for many, this requires a process of consciousization. Christopher Browning quotes John Dower when he writes that the "dehumanization of the other contributed immeasurably to the psychological distancing that facilitated killing" in the case of police battalion 101.[48] In many cases, such dehumanization and othering can occur simply because there is a lack of acknowledgement that a person holds other identities. One Nazi German through socialization might see a Jew as only a Jew and not as a son, father, musician, a German, a worker or a myriad of other identities that a person can simultaneously hold. A constant questioning of the status quo appears to be a requisite for a cosmopolitan society to exist.

[48] Browning 162.

The Cosmopolitan Paradox

Perhaps no other place breeds intellectual cosmopolitanism as the university. As an institution of knowledge the university exposes students to cosmopolitan writers such as Kant, Derrida, the Cynics or Appiah. Moreover, the university also pushes students to question and challenge that which is taken for granted. Yet, many of my own colleagues struggle with the paradoxical implications of being a cosmopolitan. How can one, to use a trivial example, cheer for a national team at the Olympics if one is a citizen of the world, and no just of one nation? In other words, how can one be a cosmopolitan in a nationalists' world.

The first obstacle to this seemingly contradictory assertion lies in how the question itself is framed. By bifurcating the concept of nationality, a dichotomy becomes implied in both concepts. Thus, one cold only be a nationalists or only a cosmopolitan. Yet, to fall into this dichotomous trap is not merely foolish, but also dangerous. When the concept of cosmopolitanism stays in the realm of the academic world, it becomes easier to forget the cosmopolitan action of strangers who, without thinking, assist the foreigners.

Thus, so long as nationalism and cosmopolitanism are seen in opposing ends of a binary, transforming nationalist violence will remain an insurmountable challenge. These ideologies, rather, should be seen as mutually reinforcing. One can feel nationalism *and* yet believe that one belongs to a wider human community. These dual identities do not have to stand at odds. If one can identify one's self with the nation and show a mild form of nationalism, such as love for this imaginary community, then one could also show love for a wider human community. This is a process of consciousization. Thought needs to occur so that people can question those taken-for-granted frameworks. A cosmopolitan education can promote this type of analytical learning in schools throughout a country. While some may see it as disadvantageous, to a certain degree, the

state gains from a wider acceptance of this view. Appiah discusses this process of greater cosmopolitan understanding.

Philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah in *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* offers a distinct cosmopolitan viewpoint that can help to shed light on some of the virtues of cosmopolitanism in a national context. "We can live together," writes Appiah, "without agreeing on what the values are that make it good to live together; we can agree about what to do in most cases, without agreeing about why it is right."[49] Essentially Appiah argues for cosmopolitanism without strict Universalist concerns. He paints a picture of a cosmopolitanism that permits the sharing and understanding of ideas, and cosmopolitanism that also promotes the gradual breaking down of the process otherization through conversation and interaction – not necessarily consensus building. If groups and individuals can learn more from each other, than the cosmopolitan venture is heading in the correct direction.

Appiah additionally argues that:

"We should learn about people in other places, take an interest in their civilizations, their arguments, their errors, their achievements, not because that will bring us to agreement, but because it will help us get used to one another. If that is the aim, then the fact that we have all these opportunities for disagreement about values need not put us off. Understanding one another may be hard; it can certainly be interesting. But it doesn't require that we come to an agreement.''[50]

While Appiah's cosmopolitanism requires that we show kindness to strangers it also does not call for a strict vision of universality. For him, it is clear that traditions and locality can shape a person's attitude. Thus, understanding does not presuppose agreement. Appiah's insight is key

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[49] Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers.* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007) 71.
[50]Ibid. 72.

in building a cosmopolitan nationalism. Through conversation, identities can be explored in key ways.

Building Cosmopolitan Institutions

A strong criticism of cosmopolitanism, which I alluded to briefly earlier in the essay, is the lack of theorizing that brings ethical/moral cosmopolitanism to the realm of a pragmatic world. That is to say, while many ethical and moral cosmopolitan arguments have been developed, scholars constantly ignore both how the state can play a role in the diffusion of cosmopolitanism and even how it would react to a cosmopolitan outlook. While there exists a need for the development of cosmopolitan outlooks, given that if all people changed their mentality the change would occur, philosophers and political scientists should more seriously address the issues of building what Garret Wallace Brown has termed the "responsible Cosmopolitan State".[51]

For the purposes of this examination, I shall only briefly translate the idea of the diffusion of ethical cosmopolitanism into institutions for the purpose of preventing or restricting nationalist violence. There certainly is a gap in the theorizing of pragmatic implementation of cosmopolitanism in a nationalists' world. Nonetheless, the work is being worked by an ever-increasing number of scholars interested in a cosmopolitan order.

While an individual cosmopolitan could do very little about the structural forces that exacerbate social chaos or instability, such as economic recessions, wars, natural disasters, and displacement, building institutions that make it difficult to manipulate people is key in this undertaking. In this endeavor there is an especially important role for both the educational establishment and for an active and robust cosmopolitan civil society. In making this argument, I

[51] Brown, Garrett Wallace. "Bringing the States Back into Cosmopolitanism: The Idea of Responsible Cosmopolitan States." *Political Studies Review* 9 (2011): 53-66.

acknowledge that the educational system of most countries is heavily reliant upon the state infrastructures. If it is true, as many have argued, that the state has a stake in sustaining nationalism, then imparting a cosmopolitan thought on its children would run counter to the idea. This perhaps seems to be the case if the state is merely interested in creating extreme nationalists, who would willingly follow state policy as such. Yet an argument could be made for a quasi-independent role of local government in the creation of educational policy.

That is to say, if cosmopolitanism can be sold to the public, so that a majority or even a large plurality is able to affect change, then local school districts can do much to implement courses that seek to teach about values that are important to cosmopolitanism. Indeed, this experiment is not outside the field of pragmatism. In the District of Columbia, for instance, peace educator Colman McCarthy has taught at the high school level courses in justice and peace studies. Indeed, at the national level, public education has much to potentially gain from inculcating cosmopolitan outlooks on children. Sadly, however, this educational undertaking would seem to be more applicable in democracies where the populations often have a say in the formation of policy if not at least the acceptance of it.

While it would be an important milestone to undertake such a radical redefinition of the educational policy of a country, it would only represent one step forward in the creation of a cosmopolitan populace that could redefine nationalist violence and act against it. Indeed, cosmopolitan institutions in civil society would need to further develop so as to further impose cosmopolitanism on a broader population. By cosmopolitan institutions I refer to institutions that promote values that could be considered cosmopolitan. Cosmopolitan in the sense that they promote the idea that human have equal worth regardless of any other possible identity

affiliation. With this definition, it seems clear that several NGO's currently work towards this just order.

This framework only posits how cosmopolitanism can help to create a society where factors that push nationalism towards violence are less relevant. It does it through a questioning of authority that works on the individual and communal level. Indeed, cosmopolitanism offers an opportunity to escape extreme and unquestioning nationalism that is at the root of nationalist violence. Of course, a cosmopolitan perspective can do little to prevent the objective conditions that could presuppose nationalist violence – impoverishment, historical tensions, etc.

Conclusion

While nationalist violence – be it structural or direct – continues to affect our world, globalization as well as environmental degradation is beginning to highlight the importance of governments and individuals working together for a better world. The problems that are beginning to arise now prove the need for a more cosmopolitan nationalism. Indeed, this great component of division that is national fractionalization makes this need to bridge gaps in the practice of a cosmopolitan order even clearer.

As I have explored, nations and nationalism arose in the context of social instability caused by the decline of cultural systems and the increasing urbanization, at times grounded in ethnic realities. Yet while the historical cases highlight the intricate relationship of nationalism and violence, nationalist violence in the age of settled nationalism differs. Nonetheless, several factors help to push people to violence once nationalism has settled, including social, political and economic instability as well as individuals that incite and call for violence. In part, there are psychological factors inherent in-group dynamics and mass psychology that also drive people to violence. If nationalist violence, as I have argued, is neither an essential component of

nationalism, it is necessary to divorce the factors that create violence. The components of this national/ ethnic violence that I explored earlier require us to be both more critical of identities and how we identify each other. It is certainly true that, while these objective sources of instability will not be touched by cosmopolitanism, a conscious citizenry can be less likely to be manipulated into creating violence. This is key to create a better world, a world of cooperation in which people can be treated with respect and dignity.

Mira Furlan's wise words echo Teilhard de Chardin:

"Regardless of whether we will be living in one, or five, or fifty states, let us not forget the people, each individual, regardless of which side of this Wall of ours the person happens to be on. We were born here by accident, we are this or that by accident, so there must be more than that, mustn't there?[52]

[52] Furlan 24.

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