

Nominal and Adjectival Complementation in Spanish and English

Abstract.

Pesetsky & Torrego (2004) look for the complementation patterns of verbs, nouns, and adjectives in languages like English. They base their proposals on the theory of Case and new observations about the distribution of clausal complements. As we try to extend their proposal to Spanish, we find that the same categories can be complement to A and N just because in both of them there is a T_0 seeking for \bar{A} . Therefore, in Spanish, CPs are not self-sufficient categories in order to complement Ns and As. there exist differences between English and Spanish, namely the presence of nominal T_S in infinitivals, the pattern of complementation to A, which differs, too, and the aspectual head proposed in T_0 for English, does not exist for Spanish, or it must be different from personal *a*.

Key words.

Complementation, N complementation, A complementation, syntactic categories, infinitivals, uT ,

0. Introduction.

In this paper I will review Pesetsky and Torrego's (2004) article "Tense, Case, and the Nature of Syntactic Categories," and I will show that their proposal works only with English but we cannot extend it to a language like Spanish. In order to do that, I will structure my paper as follows: first of all I will provide background for the article trying to explain the historical moment in which it was written, and what the motivations for this article were. Next, I will make a brief summary of the article, in order to be able to apply their different proposals to Spanish and I will discuss some points this article does not cover.

In their article, "Tense, Case, and the Nature of Syntactic Categories" (henceforth "P&T (2002)"), Pesetsky and Torrego try to expand and improve their previous article "T-to-C Movement: Causes and Consequences," (henceforth "P&T (2001)"). They look for the complementation patterns of verbs, nouns, and adjectives in languages like English. They base their proposals on the theory of Case and new observations about the distribution of clausal complements.

There is a topic that interests them especially, the subject/non-subject asymmetries, such as *that*-trace effect (Perlmutter 1971), or the *that*-omission asymmetry (Stowell 1981). Stowell proposes that when *that* is missing, a silent category subject to the CP stands in its place. Similarly, Koopman (1983) discusses the asymmetry in the movement of a tensed auxiliary verb from T to C in English matrix *wh*-questions, and suggests that this asymmetry is also due to the ECP. T-to-C movement is obligatory in questions when the nearest subject is not the phrase *wh*-moved to [Spec, CP], as we can see in the examples in (1):

- 1) a. What did Mary buy?
- b. *What Mary bought?

P & T (2002)

- c. *Who did buy the book?
- d. Who bought the book?

Koopman proposed that the presence of T in C in (1c) blocks the government relationship between the trace of *wh*-movement in subject position and the new location of the *wh*-phrase in [Spec, CP].

According to P&T (2001), the ideas and analytic tools necessary for a true understanding of the nature of the subject/non-subject asymmetries had not been developed until Chomsky's (1995b) Minimalist Program, who proposes the hypothesis that movement is not optional, but triggered, and *uninterpretable features* play a crucial role in the triggering process. These uninterpretable features are properties of a lexical item that make no semantic contribution, such as person and number (ϕ -features) on T, or *wh*- on C. As McCloskey (1991) points out, ϕ -features make a semantic contribution when they are found on DP or CP, but they make no semantic contribution to T.

Although it is a fact that uninterpretable features exist, it is not clear why lexical items must bear them. Chomsky proposes that uninterpretable features must delete and disappear by the end of a syntactic derivation. Deletion of an uninterpretable feature F on a lexical item X can happen when another element Y also bears F, and X establishes a syntactic connection with Y. Chomsky (2000) proposes that the simplest connection is the operation *Agree*.

Moreover, and according to Chomsky (1995b), *Move* is from now on a theory of copying, always motivated by an EPP property. If the feature F on X enters into an *Agree* or *Move* relation with another instance of F on Y, we say that F on X *attracts* Y.

Since movement must be triggered, it is claimed that an element Y moves *only* when attracted by a feature (of some head X) with the EPP property. This follows from the Economy Condition:

2) Economy Condition

A head H triggers the minimum number of operations necessary to satisfy the properties (including EPP) of its uninterpretable features.

Once an uninterpretable feature F on X has attracted Y, F is said to be *marked for deletion* or *deleted*. Chomsky (2000; 2001) claims that an uninterpretable feature marked for deletion waits until the completion of a CP or other phase to be finally deleted. Nonetheless, P&T (2001; 2004) will argue that a feature marked for deletion can live longer under some special circumstances.

These three hypotheses, that uninterpretable features must disappear by the end of the derivation, that movement occurs only in response to an uninterpretable feature with an EPP property, and that a feature might remain "alive" for a while after being marked for deletion, are crucial for P&T's (2001; 2004) account of subject/non-subject asymmetries. Thus, they propose the nature of Nominative Case:

3) Nominative Case is an instance of an uninterpretable T feature (uT) on D.

We will see next, that, in P&T (2004), they try to extend this proposal to Accusative Case, since they suggest that Accusative Case must parallel Nominative Case. Therefore:

4) Accusative Case (like Nominative) is an instance of uT on D.

1. Pesetsky & Torrego ((2004)).

In this article, as we have already said, Pesetsky and Torrego look for the complementation patterns of verbs, nouns, and adjectives in languages like English. For their purposes, they will arrange a general theory of complementation patterns, which reveals a previous *hidden complementarity* in the distribution of arguments. Moreover, this *hidden complementarity* provides support for approaches that view the distinctions among lexical categories as contextually determined. Pesetsky and Torrego classify the nature of grammatical features into three groups: (a) features which have a semantic value on L (interpretable features of L); (b) features that have a semantic value on some other lexical item L', but have no value on L (uninterpretable instances of interpretable features); and (c) features that have no semantic value on any lexical item, including L (purely formal uninterpretable features of L).

According to them, most of the features belong to (a) and (b), but Structural Case belongs to (c). The hypothesis expressed in (3) suggests that Nominative Case is an instance of (b), and (c) does not exist. As P&T (2004) claim, *all* grammatical features have some potential semantic value. Therefore, we must adopt this view not only for Nominative Case, but also for all instances of structural Case. They are instances of uT on D.

Accusative Case must parallel Nominative Case in (3), as it is expressed in (4). The question that arises is what category enters into an Agree relation with Accusative uT and allows it to delete? As they will explain in the article, uT on a complement of V enters an Agree relation with an instance of T structurally lower than the main tense of the sentence. Furthermore, apparent distinctions among V, N, and A actually reflect distinctions on this lower T.

1.1 Nominative Case.

Pesetsky and Torrego (2004) review data from P&T (2001) that support hypothesis (3), which states that Nominative Case is an instance of an uninterpretable T feature (uT) on D. They try to account for the paradigm in (5), as a way of supporting (3). We find T-to-C asymmetry in matrix questions as in examples in (5), from Koopman (1983):

- 5) [non-subject wh- → "optional" T-to-C]
 a. What a nice book Mary read _____!
 b. What did Mary read _____?
 [subject wh- → no T-to-C]

- c. Who _____ read the book?
 d. *Who did _____ read the book?/What a nice person did read the book!

The theory of movement Pesetsky and Torrego follow is based on Chomsky's (1995b; 2000; 2001) theory of movement, which contains two main ingredients: (1) the Agree relation between an uninterpretable feature uT of a *probe* and a corresponding feature of a *goal* category G ; and (2) movement itself, triggered by an EPP subfeature of uF to H . As proposed in P&T (2001), the motivation for T-to-C movement in English matrix interrogative clauses is that C bears an uT with the EPP property. When there is *wh*-movement in a matrix clause and it is not a Nominative subject, we find T-to-C movement, as in (5b), in response to an Agree relation established between uT on C and TP ; T-to-C movement fails to apply in (5a), therefore obtaining an exclamative sentence instead of an interrogative one; and, when a Nominative *wh*-phrase undergoes local *wh*-movement, T-to-C movement can never apply (5c-d). According to the nature of Nominative Case defined in (3), if Nominative Case is actually a T-feature, then a Nominative subject should serve as a goal for uT on C as well as TP does. Since neither the Nominative subject nor the TP c-commands the other, both count as bearers of T-features that are equally close to C . The proposal is that *Mary* in (5a) is an inner specifier of CP , moved there in response to [uT , +EPP] on C , just as T itself is moved in (5b).

As Pesetsky and Torrego make clear, in all these examples C bears not only [uT , +EPP], but also [uWh , +EPP]. Thus, in example (5c), the Nominative subject of the clause is also a *wh*-phrase. Then, the closest bearer of uT is also the closest bearer of *wh*, and therefore, a single instance of movement must occur. The same happens in (5d), a single instance of movement could satisfy two properties of C . Notwithstanding, these properties are satisfied by two movements in this case, hence, (5d) is ungrammatical because it violates the general Economy condition:

- 6) The EPP properties of uF on a head H are satisfied by the smallest possible number of movement operations.

We can now compare these English facts to Spanish ones, where we find that T-to-C movement always applies:

- 7) a. ¿Qué libro **leyó** María ____?
 What book read María
 'Which book did María read?'
 b. ¡Qué libro **leyó** María ____!
 What book read María
 'What a book María read!'

In order to explain these facts in P & T's (2004) framework, we can say that in Spanish *María* can never be an inner specifier of CP (as it was in (5a)), and that it is T itself the one that must always move in Spanish, as it was in (5b). Furthermore, we must bear in mind that we find verb subject inversion in most declarative sentences in Spanish. If we

compare (8a) and (8b), we find that (8a) is the unmarked order, while (8b) is focalizing the subject *Juan*:

- 8) a. Llegó Pedro
arrived Pedro
b. Pedro llegó
Pedro arrived

Although Suñer (1986a; 1991; 1993; 1994), claims that verbs in Spanish obligatorily raise through the functional projections of IP, but they do not continue to C°, maybe we could argue that we always have T-to-C movement in Spanish, at least at LF, since this inversion does not appear in longer exclamatives:

- 9) ¡Qué vestido tan lindo Alicia le compró a Marina!
What dress so beautiful Alicia cl bought to Marina
What a beautiful dress Alicia bought to Marina!

Nonetheless, I will leave this point open to further research.

1.2 Accusative Case.

According to Pesetsky and Torrego, the phenomena discussed until now provide support for hypothesis (6), which states that Accusative Case (like Nominative) is an instance of uT on D. In English, both D and C bear uT from the lexicon, but they do not bear iT . The difference is that while CP contains a TP, uT on C has the ability to satisfy its requirements internal to its maximal projection, but since DPs do not contain a TP, they are dependent on the external environment to satisfy uT , which means that DPs must search for Case, unlike CPs. Since structural Case is T, the Case Filter of Government-Binding Theory can be understood as the *Argument-Tense Condition* in (10):

- 10) An argument must bear T (uT or iT)¹.

Although it is true that Accusative Case, like Nominative Case, is an instance of uT in D, the T responsible for Accusative Case must be different from the T responsible for Nominative. There must be some occurrence of T in a transitive clause that is responsible for licensing Accusative Case. Once we have understood the properties of this occurrence of T we can understand the distribution of complements across categories.

The complement position in APs may only be occupied by a self-sufficient argument, a CP, but not by DP, since it is not self-sufficient, as we can see in (11a, b):

- 11) a. *Bill was afraid the storm. (P&T 2002)
b. Bill was afraid that the storm will be destructive.

¹ For P&T (2002), iT corresponds to overt complementizers, such as 'that,' or markers such as *personal a* in Spanish.

The main clauses in (11) contain an occurrence of T, but uT is deleted on a Nominative subject, but not on the Accusative object. There can be two explanations for this to happen, either this instance of T can Agree only with one DP, or the object is structurally too far away from the complement of A. No matter which explanation we choose, this means that we must attribute the availability of Accusative Case for objects of V to some factor different from the main T of the sentence. The suggestion here is that there must exist a *second occurrence of T* which needs to be closer to the complement than main T. Therefore, we will distinguish between T_S and T_O .

Both T_S and T_O bear uninterpretable ϕ -features which act as a probe seeking a goal that also bears ϕ -features in its domain. The only difference Pesetsky and Torrego find between both occurrences of T can appear in the EPP properties, although they leave this possibility open.

In order to justify the place T_O occupies in the structure, they come up with semantic evidence, which seems to work in English, although it does not work in Spanish. P&T (2004) tries to defend the existence of an aspectual head located in the position of T_O , following Kratzer (1996) and Travis (1992). Torrego (1998; 1999/2002) proposed the same structure, and argued that this aspectual head belongs to the category P. Torrego claims that this P is the Spanish personal *a*, which even in traditional grammar is not called preposition, but case marker, personal *a* (R.A.E. 1973), and it is inserted in the derivation, but never projecting a PP. Moreover, Torrego (1998; 1999/2002) and P&T (2004) propose that this personal *a* marks a difference between stative and non-stative clauses, but most of the examples proposed in both articles, are severely questioned by Spanish speakers. Therefore, I think that we can conclude that this aspectual head proposed in T_O does not exist for Spanish, or, at least, it must have a realization different from this “personal *a*”, since this personal *a* is not a preposition.

According to the authors, the semantic function of T_O is apparent. For instance, it relates the two subevents (the process, and the completion of the process) involved in the meaning of telic verbs. Following Hale and Keyser (Hale and Keyser 1993) and Chomsky (1995b), they labeled v the predicate that assigns the agent role, and the lower predicate, V. Thus, the resulting structure for verbal predicates is in (12):

12) SUBJ T_S [$_{VP}$ v T_O [$_{VP}$ V OBJ]]

We need T_O not only with clauses that present temporally distinct subevents, since stative clauses allow DP complements, too. We will discuss the Spanish examples they propose here later.

Based on these facts, they come up with a new structure of adjectival predicates, characterized by the absence of T_O and the distinction between *a* and A, grounded on the already existent distinction between v and V:

13) SUBJ T_S [$_{aP}$ *a* [$_{AP}$ A OBJ]]

They attribute the inability for adjectives to distinguish the times of two subevents to this absence of T_0 . It is impossible to say:

14) *The woman very angry in three minutes was Mary

meaning that “the woman who moved from a state of non-anger to a state of extreme anger in three minutes was Mary.”

1.3 Prepositional Phrases.

The main issue of this whole section is to prove that Ps are instances of T, and Pesetsky and Torrego present some pieces of evidence.

Adjectives can take PPs as complements, as in (15):

15) Bill was afraid of the storm (P&T 2002)

If the Argument-Tense Condition in (10) is true, an argument must bear T (uT or iT), this example must bear a Tense feature. Then, a PP complement must be self-sufficient, as CP is. Pesetsky and Torrego present evidence that the category P is a kind of T, that occupies in the DP a position analogous to the one that T occupies in the CP. Furthermore, PP is very special self-sufficient type of DP, as it is shown by the *P*-trace effect (Kayne 1984). Since Ps are instances of T, it is not surprising that gerunds introduced by P behave like CPs:

16) Anne is afraid [of Mary winning the prize] (P&T 2002)


The uT feature on C/D of the gerund enters on an Agree relation with the preposition, and it does not need an external T_0 to satisfy its requirements.

They mention an obvious objection to this particular point. The derived constituent structure of PPs. If the derived structure for PPs were identical to the derived structure of *that*-clauses and *for*-clauses, we should be able to strand prepositions in these type clauses as we are in (17a):

- 17)a. [The student reading your unpublished paper] we have already apologized
 [for____]
 b. *[The student read your unpublished paper] we have already said [that
 ____]
 c. *[The student to read your unpublished paper] we would prefer [for
 ____]


Following Matushansky (2002), our authors propose that if the topicalized element in (17a) is a maximal projection, the moved element, the preposition, projects, forming a TP (=PP) rather than a CP/DP:

18)



The next proposal we find in the article is that if this analysis is correct for gerunds preceded by prepositions, we can also use it for DPs introduced by a P. The preposition is a type of T merged below D and above *nP*. Therefore, the preposition undergoes head movement triggered by *uT* on D. The possibility of stranding the preposition under movement indicates that it is the moved preposition which projects, rather than the D whose features triggered movement:

19)



There must exist a supercategory that groups both prepositions and instances of T, since, as we can see, elements of the prepositional vocabulary are found in the T position of a variety of clause-types across languages:


- 20) a. John considers [there *to be* many reasons for this]
 b. Mary kept [there *from being* a riot]

1.4 Properties of verbal T_o .

According to Pesetsky and Torrego, there is a special property of T_o in clauses whose main predicate is verbal, shown by the fact that although an adjective can have a PP_{of} as its complement, the verb semantically corresponding to this adjective cannot, as we can see in example (21):


- 21) a. John is afraid of the dark
 b. John fears (*of) the dark
- (P&T 2002)

25)



In the case of a finite complement to V that is not introduced by *that* or *for*, the $u\phi$ -features on T_0 probe the $i\phi$ -features on CP. As long as uT on C is undeleted at the time $u\phi$ on T_0 acts as a probe, (22) is respected:

26)




At this point they introduce the term *timing*. Once uninterpretable features are marked for deletion by entering an Agree relation, they delete quite soon. According to Chomsky (2000), they delete in the next phase. However, this proposal is incompatible with (22):

- 27) An uninterpretable feature uT marked for deletion within a completed phase Π , is deleted the moment a new head σ is merged to Π .


When a complement CP is introduced by *that* (or *for*), T (iT) has moved to C, forming a [Spec, CP] that undergoes morphological merger with C. When T_0 is merged with a VP containing such a CP, uT is still present on the head of CP, satisfying the requirements of verbal T_0 (28):

28)



Finally, when the head of a TP is prepositional, it differs from the CP introduced by *that* or *for* in bearing only iT , and not uT in its head, thus, this cannot be the goal probed by T_o or T_s :

29)



1.5 Properties of nominal T_o .

Pesetsky and Torrego state that the only difference between verbal and nominal T_o is that while the goal of $u\phi$ on verbal T must bear uT , the goal of $u\phi$ on nominal T must bear iT . In order to prove this, let us see first the complementation properties of nouns. At first sight, their behavior looks very similar to that of adjectives. For instance, both of them can take PPs as complements, but not bare DPs. Work on Government and Binding Theory did already show that neither NP nor AP contains a structural Case assigner for the complement. Chomsky (1986a) suggested that N and A do assign Case, but this type of Case is *inherent*, and it is realized as a preposition in languages like English. This can be easily translated to the terms used in this article, saying that N, like A, is not associated with T_o . However, this approach is wrong. The complementation properties of N and A are different, in particular with respect to CP complements. The presence of *that* is optional in finite CP complements to A (30a), but it appears to be obligatory in a finite CP complement to N in English (30b):

- 30) a. Mary was happy to learn the election results (P&T 2002)
 b. I liked your proof *(that) Mary could not have committed the crime

We find similar facts in infinitival complementation. Only a verb that takes an irrealis infinitival complement permits infinitival complementation when it is nominalized. A verb whose infinitival complement is realis, by contrast, excludes infinitival complementation when nominalized.:

- 31) a. *Sue's love to solve problems (realis) (P&T
2002)
b. Sue's attempt to defy the government (irrealis)

According to Pesetsky and Torrego, the relevant property is the presence of \bar{T} on the head of the complement. If we consider the range of possible complements to N, we find that as PP is headed by an instance of \bar{T} , finite CPs introduced by *that* and irrealis infinitival CPs are headed by an instance of \bar{T} , too. Looking now at the complements of N that are not acceptable we find that neither CPs that are not introduced by *that* nor their infinitival counterpart (realis infinitives) are acceptable.

A bare DP contains only uT in D, and does not contain any instance of \bar{T} in D. the fact that a bare DP is not possible as a complement of N once again supports the generalization that a complement to N is acceptable only if its head contains \bar{T} . Nevertheless, they leave open the question of a possible counterpart to T_S in nominals. (32) and (33) represent the verbal and nominal predication structure respectively:

32) SUBJ T_S [_{VP} V t_{OV} [_{VP} V obj]]

33) ... [_{Np} n T_{ON} [_{NP} N OBJ]]

2. The Nature of Syntactic Categories.

The proposal presented in this article postulates correlations between syntactic categories and their complementation properties. They identify structural Case with T, and the analysis of certain elements as instances of T moved to C. As Pesetsky and Torrego explain, we would need to move to a more abstract level in order to observe the relation between the syntactic categories A, V and N and their complementation properties. We might suppose the existence of a single category **PR** (for *predicate*) whose morphological status as A, N or V is determined by rule (34):

- 34) a. PR is morphologically V when associated with T_O that seeks uT .
b. PR is morphologically N when associated with T_O that seeks \bar{T} .
c. Otherwise, PR is morphologically A.

Following the proposals delineated in this article, it is the combination of T_O with PR that determines whether the head of PRP is nominal, verbal or adjectival. If V, N, A are contextually determined names for species of PR, it looks natural to think that the same can be applied to *v*, *n*, and *a*, which may be convenient names for species of a single category *pr*.

We can wonder what combinations of T_S and T_O are possible. They provide examples of English and Spanish gerunds. Their conclusion is that a nominal T_S may cooccur with a

verbal and nominal T_o (35-36a,c), whereas a verbal T_s appears to require the presence of a verbal T_o (35-36b,d):

- | | | |
|--------|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 35) a. | [Mary's reading of the book] surprised us | → nom T_s , nom T_o |
| b. | [Mary reading the book] surprised us | → verbal T_s , verbal T_o |
| c. | [Mary's reading the book] surprised us | → nom T_s , verbal T_o |
| d. | *[Mary reading of the book] surprised us | → verbal T_s , nom T_o |
| 36) a. | [El leer del libro de María] nos sorprendió | → nom T_s , nom T_o |
| b. | [El leer el libro María] nos sorprendió | → verbal T_s , verbal T_o |
| c. | [El leer el libro de María] nos sorprendió | → nom T_s , verbal T_o |
| d. | *[El leer del libro María] nos sorprendió | → verbal T_s , nom T_o |

It would be nice if there were such a clear parallelism between English and Spanish, expecting to find the same parallelism between Germanic and Romance languages. However, all the native speakers of Spanish seem to agree in their judgements about these sentences. All of them agree is in that (36d) is clearly ruled out, confirming that verbal T_s cannot cooccur with nominal T_o . (36b) can be marginal for some speakers, but they generally accept it, therefore, verbal T_s can cooccur with nominal T_o in Spanish as in English. However, (36a) and (36c), the examples with nominal T_s , are accepted by all the speakers, but they find clear that, in these examples, *María* is not the agent/subject of the verb *leer* 'to read', as in English; in Spanish *María* is just the possessor of the book, or maybe the writer of the book.

As we have seen in examples in (36), in Spanish gerunds, the phrase bearing Genitive Case cannot be the agent/subject of the clause, but a real possessor. Within Pesetsky and Torrego's (2001; 2004) framework, this would mean that these examples in Spanish do not have a nominal T_s . This T_s must be verbal, since the subject of the infinitive must be a PRO coindexed with the IO of the matrix clause, *nos* 'us,' since the meaning of both examples would be something like "reading Mary's book surprised us."

Let us think now about intransitive infinitives. We can find something in Spanish such as

- | | | | |
|-----|----|----------------------------------|--|
| 37) | a. | el correr de los años | |
| | | the running of the years | |
| | b. | *el correr los años | |
| | | the running the years | |
| | c. | *el venir de Juan anoche... | |
| | | the coming of Juan last night... | |
| | d. | el venir Juan anoche... | |
| | | the coming Juan last night | |

(37a) and (37b) show that unergative verbs hold nominal T_s , since we need the preposition *de* 'of' in order to obtain the grammatical structure. However, in (37c) and (37d), examples of unaccusative verbs, we find that the verb holds verbal T_s , since the preposition is forbidden for the structure to be grammatical.

This section shows that there is no parallelism between English and Spanish nominalizations, since gerunds in English can have both verbal and nominal T_S , whereas infinitives in Spanish only admit verbal T_S , but never nominal T_S .

3. Complementation in Spanish.

Pesetsky and Torrego (2004) provide a chart of the data presented in the article. They classify the different types of complementation possible in English:

(38)

	PP	DP	CP (no <i>that/for</i>), realis inf.	CP (<i>that/for</i>); irrealis inf.	Explanation
Compl. to A	√	—	√	√	No T_o
Compl. to V	—	√	√	√	T_o seeking uT
Compl. to N	√	—	—	√	T_o seeking iT

This chart would summarize all the examples we have seen in the article corresponding to English. Nonetheless, if we try to transfer this to Spanish, we find one difference with English: Spanish admits a CP not introduced by *que* 'that,' and a realis infinitive as complement to N. Let us see the different examples:

39) Complements to A:

- a. Juan está temeroso **de la oscuridad** **PP**
Juan is afraid of the darkness
'Juan is afraid of darkness'
- b. *Juan está temeroso **la oscuridad** **DP**
Juan is afraid the darkness
'Juan is afraid of darkness'
- c. Juan está temeroso ***(de) leer la novela** **CP (no *that*)**
Juan is afraid of read the novel
'Juan is afraid of reading the novel'
- d. Juan está temeroso ***(de) que leamos su diario** **CP (*that*)**
Juan is afraid of that read his journal
'Juan is afraid that we read his journal'

40) Complements to V:

- a. *Juan teme **de la oscuridad** **PP**
Juan fears of the darkness
'Juan fears darkness'
- b. Juan teme **la oscuridad** **DP**
Juan fears the darkness
'Juan fears darkness'

- c. Juan teme leer **esa novela** CP (no *that*/non finite)
 Juan fears read the novel
 'Juan fears reading the novel'
- d. Juan teme leamos su diario CP (no *that*/finite)
 Juan fears read-we his journal
 'Juan fears that we read his diary'
- e. Juan teme **que leamos su diario** CP (*that*)
 Juan fears that read his journal
 'Juan fears that we read his journal'
- 41) **Complements to N:**
- a. Juan tiene miedo **de la oscuridad** PP
 Juan has fear of the darkness
 'Juan is afraid of darkness'
- b. *Juan tiene miedo **la oscuridad** DP
 Juan has fear the darkness
 'Juan is afraid of darkness'
- c. Juan tiene miedo *(de) **leer la novela** CP (no *that*)
 Juan has fear of read the novel
 'Juan is afraid of reading the novel'
- d. Juan tiene miedo **de que leamos su diario** CP (*that*)
 Juan has fear of that read his journal
 'Juan is afraid that we read his journal'

We can summarize these examples in the following chart:

42)

	PP	DP	CP (no <i>que</i>),	CP (<i>que</i>)	Explanation
Compl. to A	√	—	—	—	—
Compl. to V	—	√	√	√	T ₀ seeking <i>uT</i>
Compl. to N	√	—	—	—	T ₀ seeking <i>iT</i>

If we compare these results in (42) with those in (38), we find three differences: in Spanish, A cannot take as a complement a CP without the preposition *de*, just as happens with the nouns. The only complements A and N admit are those introduced by a preposition. P&T (2004) conclude their classification in English, saying that PPs and CPs (headed or not by *that* or *for*) can be complement to A, because they hold no T₀. Then, what happens to Spanish? Why cannot we have any CP complementing A without the intervention of a preposition? Should we assume that CPs in Spanish hold T₀? This question remains open.

Example (41d) shows a less common case in Spanish. We see a finite CP complement to a V not introduced by *que*, which coincides with the English examples.

There are two important points in their analysis that we should keep in mind in order to understand these differences. They identify structural Case with T, and the analysis of certain elements (*that*, *for*) as instances of T moved to C. These ideas provide a new perspective on the formal significance of alternations in the C system. Once we view the presence or absence of words like *that* as an indicator of differences in the distribution of Tense features in a complement CP, differences in the distribution of CP complements to N and A can be seen as part and parcel of the system traditionally called Case Theory. This works for English, as we saw. Nonetheless, as we can see in chart (39), both A and N accept exactly the same types of complements: PPs, and CPs introduced by *que*. We can fill now the box we left empty in (42), and state that the same categories can be complement to A and N just because in both of them there is a T_0 seeking for \bar{T} . Therefore, in Spanish, CPs are not self-sufficient categories in order to complement Ns and As.

4. Conclusions.

The goal pursued in Pesetsky and Torrego (2004) is quite ambitious. They try to explain the complementation patterns of verbs, nouns and adjectives in languages like English. I think they have found a pattern quite accurate for English, but when they try to extend the generalizations made for English to languages such as Spanish, we see that they do not work. As we have shown in the paper, there exist differences between English and Spanish, namely the presence of nominal T_S in infinitivals, the pattern of complementation to A, which differs, too, and the aspectual head proposed in T_0 for English, does not exist for Spanish, or it must be different from personal *a*.

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